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## The standard portfolio choice problem in Germany

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# WZB

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin  
für Sozialforschung



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## **The standard portfolio choice problem in Germany**

**Discussion Paper**

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Abstract

## **The standard portfolio choice problem in Germany\***

We study an investment experiment conducted with a representative sample of German households. Respondents invest in a safe asset and a risky asset whose return is tied to the German stock market. Experimental investments correlate with beliefs about stock market returns and exhibit desirable external validity: they predict real-life stock market participation. But many households do not significantly react to an exogenous increase in the risky asset's return. The data analysis and analogous laboratory experiments suggest that task complexity decreases the responsiveness to incentives. Modifying the return of the (simpler) safe asset has a larger effect.

*Keywords: Stock market expectations, stock market participation, portfolio choice, artefactual field experiment, financial literacy.*

*JEL classification: D1, D14, D84, G11.*

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# 1 Introduction

We report on an artefactual field experiment that examines investment behavior in a representative sample of the German population. The experiment uses households from the Innovation Sample of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP-IS) as respondents. They act as investors who face a standard portfolio choice problem, allocating a fixed budget between a safe and a risky asset. No other investments are possible and asset returns realize after a fixed horizon. Despite its drastic simplification, this standard portfolio choice problem is widely viewed to capture one of the main tradeoffs in financial decision making. We regard the standard portfolio choice problem's predictive value as an empirical question and examine both its internal consistency and external validity for Germany's general population. Regarding external validity, behavior in our artefactual investment task is robustly correlated with actual stock market participation, even after controlling for many correlates of participation that the existing literature has identified. Regarding internal consistency, we find that investments in the risky asset are correlated with measures of beliefs in the asset's return, lending credibility to the story that the standard portfolio choice model sets out to tell. However, the behavioral reaction to an exogenous change in returns also shows how severely respondents' cognitive limitations and financial skills affect decisions. Only a subsample of presumably financially savvy respondents react to changes in incentives. For all other respondents, the opportunity to earn additional money is lost.

Alongside the artefactual field experiment, we also present a complementary laboratory study in which we use the same protocol on a convenience sample of university students. The results are largely congruent between the two settings, with one notable difference: Unlike the general population, university students do react to the variation in incentives.

In our choice task respondents are asked to imagine investing €50,000 for a period of one year in either a safe asset that pays 4% or in a risky asset. Actual payments are scaled down by a factor of 1/2,000 so that each respondent invests €25 of real money. The risky asset is constructed by drawing from historical

returns on the DAX, Germany’s prime blue chip stock market index. The DAX is well-known to German households at least by name due to vast media coverage. Additionally, the risky asset’s expected return varies exogenously. Depending on a respondent’s treatment, the risky asset pays a year-on-year return of the DAX plus or minus 0, 5 or 10 percentage points. We elicit beliefs about the total return through two mechanisms: one that asks for the distribution of returns via a histogram elicitation method, and one that asks only for the expected (average) return. We also elicit forward-looking expectations about the current year’s DAX return.

In order to assess external validity of the different response variables, we compare how strongly each is statistically associated with real-life stock market participation. The share of the endowment invested in the experiment (“equity share” hereafter) shows a strong association with stock market participation. The unconditional stock market participation rate is 18% in our representative sample of households; moving the experimental equity share by one standard deviation moves stock market participation by 6 percentage points. The estimates remain large when controlling for other variables in multivariate regression analyses.

A noteworthy result of the belief elicitation is that the belief data in the representative sample offer a surprisingly precise description of historical returns. The aggregate belief across all households mirrors the actual (historical) return distribution almost perfectly. This is relevant because it lends support to the suspicion of Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) that, at least in Germany, the low level of stock market participation is not simply caused by a systematic bias in the population’s assessment of returns. We also find that stated beliefs correlate strongly with the experimental equity share.

But this does not mean that the participants update and act on their reported beliefs in a consistent way. We find that the exogenous treatment variation of expected returns has, on average, no detectable effect on investments. While investments of the student population react strongly to the manipulation of returns, the investments of the representative household sample react only for particular subsamples: for those with a university degree, those with

relatively high wealth levels and those with good numerical skills. Concerning beliefs, we find that both populations, SOEP participants and students, do not significantly react to the exogenous modification of returns. The overall weak treatment effects, and the differential responses in different subsamples are consistent with the hypothesis that only the behavior of a small set of financially sophisticated people are well captured by models that presume full rationality in financial decision making.

The above observations lead us to hypothesize that complexity is a crucial impediment to rational reactions to changes in incentives. The two assets in standard portfolio choice problems differ in terms of their complexity, one being characterized by just one number, the other by a (subjective) probability distribution. This feature allows a directed hypothesis regarding the effects of complexity: decision makers may react more strongly to changes in the safe asset than to changes in the risky asset. We test this hypothesis in an additional laboratory experiment where economically equivalent incentive shifts come in two guises — once as a shift in the return of the risky asset and once as a shift in the safe asset. This is mere framing and all standard theories of choice predict identical reactions to both frames. The experimental results show, however, that, in line with our complexity hypothesis, the reaction to changes in the safe asset are significantly stronger. This is investigated only among the university students but we regard it as plausible that complexity assumes a similar role in the general population: differential complexity of different asset classes render some incentive changes harder to assess than others. This pattern has not yet been observed in the literature, to our knowledge, and cannot be explained by standard theories of decision-making under uncertainty.

In terms of possible interventions to increase stock market participation, one implication of our study is that policies that create incentives to invest may have different effects on different people and may depend on their precise framing. Even when controlling for important factors like availability of investment opportunities, less financially savvy people may react less to new incentive schemes, potentially causing unintended distributional effects.

*Relation to existing literature.* Our experimental design builds on the sizable



literatures on stock market participation, belief elicitation and experiments on choice under uncertainty. Our results are mostly, but not in all cases, consistent with these literatures and we emphasize some of the relevant comparisons.

The observation that stock market participation is puzzlingly low is widely credited to Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) who find that not only do relatively few members of the middle class invest in stocks, but even amongst the rich, where classical rationales for non-participation are unlikely to hold, participation is far from universal. Germany is a strong case for this puzzle, as only about 18% of households are stockholders. “Behavioral” explanations of the puzzle are common in the literature<sup>1</sup> and observational or experimental findings on financial literacy and subjective expectations abound (for survey evidence on financial literacy and its correlates in the German population, see Bucher-Koenen & Lusardi, 2011).

A growing literature measures the subjective beliefs of the general public about stock returns to understand how elicited beliefs correlate with real-life investments. The earliest survey questions about stock-market expectations asked for a measure of central tendency only (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2004). Probabilistic beliefs were first elicited in the 2002 version of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) in which respondents were asked for the “chance that mutual fund shares invested in blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be worth more than they are today” and the “chance they will have grown by 10 percent or more” (Dominitz & Manski, 2007). Assuming no measurement error these two questions yield two points on the CDF and, if one is willing to make distributional assumptions, allow fitting an entire distribution for every individual. This method has since been generalized to more than two points. Dominitz and Manski (2011) analyse data from 27 monthly waves of the Survey of Economic Expectations from July 1999 to March 2001 and three waves of the Michigan Survey of Consumers from 2002 to 2004 in which respondents were asked a series of questions about the probability of a

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<sup>1</sup>Frequently mentioned explanations are education, cognitive skills (Grinblatt, Keloharju, & Linnainmaa, 2011) and financial literacy (van Rooij, Lusardi, & Alessie, 2007), transaction cost and availability of information.

hypothetical investment in stocks exceeding a certain threshold.

One drawback of these methods is that responses are often internally inconsistent. In the HRS data 41% of respondents give the same answer to both the question about the likelihood of a positive return and the question about a return above 10%, and a further 15 % violate monotonicity outright (Binswanger & Salm, 2013) indicating the intrinsic difficulty of belief formation.

Instead of asking for probabilities of a return lying above a threshold, we use a histogram elicitation method pioneered by Delavande and Rohwedder (2008) in which respondents are asked to distribute a fixed number of items that jointly represent a probability mass of 1 into a number of bins. The method allows using all available data instead of focusing on consistent sets of responses. The method also has the advantage of being easy for respondents to understand; it is robust to several variations and has been successfully used even with respondents with little formal education and low numerical and statistical skills (Delavande, Giné, & McKenzie, 2011).

The broad picture emerging from the literature on households' stock market expectations is that expectations (and their adaptations) are extremely heterogeneous and often far off actual returns (Hurd, van Rooij, & Winter, 2011). For example, Kézdi and Willis (2009) find that in 2002 the average subjective probability of a stock market gain was just 49% compared to a historical frequency of 73%. Dominitz and Manski (2011) report that from 2002 to 2004, the average subjective probability of a gain was 46.4%. This is in contrast to our finding that aggregate beliefs accurately capture the historical return distribution. There are, of course, many possible reasons why belief accuracy may change between points in time and between countries.

Questions to elicit the entire subjective distribution of market returns have recently been added to the Survey of Economic Expectations (Dominitz & Manski, 2011), the Michigan Survey of Consumers (Dominitz & Manski, 2011), the American Life Panel (Hurd & Rohwedder, 2012), the French 'Mode de vie des Français' panel (Arrondel, Calvo-Pardo, & Tas, 2012) and the Dutch CentER panel (Hurd et al., 2011). These studies all report on the positive predictive power of elicited beliefs. In our data elicited beliefs have much less

predictive power for stock market participation. This may in part be due to the smaller sample size (we have 562 representative households, whereas the cited papers all have a few thousand) yielding estimates with wider confidence intervals, and the different parts of the sample which enter into econometric analysis (studies in which internally contradictory beliefs can be reported often discard the sizeable number of respondents who report such beliefs). But there is further evidence suggestive of a systematic difference between the German sample and others. In particular, the subjective probability of the relevant stock market index making a gain varies significantly less between stockholders and non-stockholders in our data than it does in the other studies.<sup>2</sup>

While there is a large literature on how people make risky choices<sup>3</sup> and on the relevant correlates<sup>4</sup>, there are no existing studies that we know of that examine whether risky choices in simple lab-style portfolio problems help to predict stock holdings. But while our finding of a strong correlation between an experimental investment and real-life stock market participation is new, the idea is not. In the working paper version of Dohmen et al. (2011) the authors report on an investment experiment that was done in a German household survey and is not too different from ours. Dohmen et al. make the important observation that domain-specific risk attitudes are better predictors of real-world behavior. This is consistent with our finding that a choice framed in the context of financial markets is a better predictor for real-life stock holdings than, for example, the respondents' general risk tolerance.

There is also a small but rapidly growing literature on how the complexity of the choice environment influences people's ability to respond optimally to the incentives they face. The literature's findings of suboptimal choices and

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<sup>2</sup>In each of Hurd et al. (2011), Dominitz and Manski (2011) and Arrondel et al. (2012), the stockholders assign about ten percentage points more probability mass to the event that the relevant index makes a gain. In our data, this probability differs between stockholder and non-stockholders only by 2.3 percentage points.

<sup>3</sup>For evidence on choice patterns in representative samples, see, e.g. Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2008), Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009), von Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengström (2011), Huck and Müller (2012) or Choi, Kariv, Müller, and Silverman (2013).

<sup>4</sup>For example, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) show with Dutch household panel data how general trust correlates with stock holdings.

mented reactions to changes in incentives closely match our results. Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009), for example, show that consumers react to the inclusion of sales taxes on price tags even when the after-tax price of goods does not change and react more weakly to changes in taxes that are applied at the register instead of being posted on the price tag. Abeler and Jäger (2014) find much the same thing in a laboratory real-effort task in which earnings are taxed either according to a straight-forward schedule or a more complex schedule, which is described by 30 rules. Though both schedules yield the same optimal work effort in theory, subjects who face the complex schedule are further away from the optimal solution. Moreover, and similar to our finding, participants with comparatively low cognitive abilities react less strongly to the imposition of new tax rules under the complex schedule.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, we note that given the lack of response to stark variations in incentives that we observe in our study, it is perhaps not surprising that, elsewhere, investors are found to react to extraneous information such as advertisements for standard financial assets (like individual stocks) or photos of financial advisors (Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zinman, 2010). This is also consistent with the findings of Binswanger and Salm (2013) who re-analyze the HRS data on stock-market expectations and argue that large subsamples of the population may not think probabilistically about stock market returns at all.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the experimental design and procedures for both the household panel and the laboratory. In Section 3 we focus on the experimental data, analyze treatment effects and study the relation between beliefs about returns and investments in the experiment. In Section 4 we turn to the validity questions that relate the experimental data to socioeconomic data from the household panel. Section 5 discusses the differential results that we find for different subsamples of our data. Section 6 presents the additional experiment comparing the return

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<sup>5</sup>These findings complement experimental findings in more abstract tasks. Huck and Weizsäcker (1999) demonstrate in simple binary lottery choice problems how the complexity of simple lotteries induces deviations from expected value maximization.

manipulation between safe and risky assets, and Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Experimental Design and Procedures

### 2.1 Survey module

Our experimental module was part of the 2012 wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel’s Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS). The SOEP is a nationally representative sample of the German population and the SOEP-IS is its sister survey which is used to trial new questions and modules (see Richter & Schupp, 2012, for details). Its sampling of households follows the same procedure as the SOEP does and renders the SOEP-IS representative of the German population. The module was presented to 1146 respondents in 700 households, all of which were added to the SOEP-IS sample in 2012. All households completed the long SOEP baseline questionnaire on the same day as our experimental module. Trained interviewers collected responses via computer-aided personal interviewing (CAPI) at the respondents’ homes. In the data analysis, we will only use the responses from the “head of household”, whom we take to be the household member who responds to the household questionnaire in addition to the personal questionnaire that every household member answers.

The module contains a regular survey component that we use to elicit several aspects of respondents’ asset portfolio (liquid assets, debt, retirement savings) as well as financial literacy and attitudes towards savings and risk. The core component of the module is the interactive experiment modelled on the standard portfolio choice problem that we describe in the following.<sup>67</sup>

The first screen of our experiment shows respondents a summary description of the investment decision. They are asked to imagine owning €50,000 that they will invest for the duration of one year. The two available assets are a safe asset that pays 4% and is framed as a German government bond,

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<sup>6</sup>To minimize interviewer influence, the CAPI-notebooks are placed in front of the respondents and they themselves get to enter their responses. Interviewers are instructed to intervene only if respondents show visible difficulties with the task or explicitly ask for help.

<sup>7</sup>A complete set of instructions are available in the Supplementary Material.

and a risky asset, referred to as the “fund”. The fund is based on the DAX, Germany’s prime blue chip stock market index. Respondents receive a one-sentence description of the DAX and learn that, depending on the treatment, the fund pays a return equal to a DAX return drawn from the historical distribution plus a percentage point shifter. There are five treatments that differ in the value of the shifter, with possible values in the set  $\{-10, -5, 0, 5, 10\}$ . Respondents are randomly allocated to treatments. If their shifter value is 0, then the shifter is not mentioned (for simplicity). Otherwise the first screen indicates the absolute size of the shifter but not its sign. For example, a respondent would learn that the fund pays either 5 percentage points less than the DAX or 5 percentage points more than the DAX and that she will subsequently learn which of the two values applies. The respondents also learn that they will be paid in cash on a smaller scale at the end of the survey.

On the second screen, respondents receive more detailed explanations about the determination of payments including (in bold letters) the information of the shifter’s sign that “the computer has determined through a random draw”. We use this two-step revelation of the shifter’s random draw in order to maximize the respondent’s appreciation that the shifter is random with zero mean, carrying no information about the underlying DAX return. Since each respondent is only confronted with one realized shifter value in their choice problem, showing the mirrored value should make it salient that the shifter carries no information. The procedure also ensures that the instructions of the laboratory replication are identical despite the fact that only two shifter values are possible there (see Section 2.2 below).

The text on the second screen also gives some numerical examples and specifies that the fund’s return depends on a draw from historical DAX returns from 1951 to 2010 and that actual payments are scaled down by a factor of

2000.<sup>8</sup>

Upon reading these short instructions the respondents make their investment decision on the third screen. Respondents who invest their entire endowment in the riskless asset would receive a certain payment of €26. Investing the entirety in the risky asset could yield a payment anywhere from €11.52 to €56.52 depending on the treatment and the randomly drawn year. No information on historical returns is made available to the respondents during the experiment. Under the assumptions of rational expectations, EU-CRRA and usual degrees of risk aversion, one can generate the approximate prediction that in treatments with non-negative shifters, all respondents with degree of relative risk aversion below 3 should invest their entire endowment in the risky asset; those with a shifter of -10 should invest very little whereas those with -5 should invest intermediate amounts.<sup>9</sup>

On the fourth screen we elicit respondents' beliefs about the return of the fund, using the histogram elicitation method pioneered by Delavande and Ro-

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<sup>8</sup>For all years since the DAX's origination in 1988 we use the actual yearly returns on the index. For all previous years we make use of the yearly return series from Stehle, Huber, and Maier (1996) and Stehle, Wulff, and Richter (1999), who impute the index going back all the way to 1948. All returns are nominal. In contrast to e.g. the S&P 500 the DAX is a performance index, which means that dividend payments are included in the return calculations.

<sup>9</sup>These statements hold in a classic two-period two-asset portfolio choice model with log-normal asset returns and CRRA utility over wealth in the second period (i.e. a simplified version of Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969); see also Campbell and Viceira (2002)). In this model the optimal equity share  $\alpha$  can be approximated by

$$\alpha = \frac{\mu_r - r_f + \sigma_r^2/2}{\rho \cdot \sigma_r^2},$$

where  $\mu_r$  is the expected log return,  $\sigma_r^2$  is the variance of returns,  $r_f$  is the natural logarithm of the risk-free rate and  $\rho$  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Over the payoff-relevant period 1951-2010 the log-normality assumption was approximately correct for year-on-year returns on the DAX (Shapiro test p-value: 0.6), the mean log-return was 0.11 and the variance of returns was 0.1. The riskless asset in the experiment paid 4%. The predictions made in the main text readily result under rational expectations. For respondents with log-utility ( $\rho \approx 1$ ) the optimal equity share in Treatment 0 is 1, in Treatment -5 it is 0.74 and in Treatment -10 it is 0.22. Under the same assumptions positive shifters have no effect on equity share, which remains at the corner solution. However, given that equity shares observed in reality are often much lower than those predicted by the model and that most of the finance literature estimates risk aversion to be substantially higher we decided to also include positive shifters.

hwedder (2008) and refined by Delavande et al. (2011) and Rothschild (2012).<sup>10</sup> A screenshot of the interface can be found in Appendix A. Respondents have to place 20 “bricks”, each representing a probability mass of 5%, into seven bins of possible percentage returns. The set of available bins is  $\{(-90\%,-60\%),(-60\%,-30\%),(-30\%,0\%),(0\%,30\%),(30\%,60\%),(60\%,90\%),(90\%,120\%)\}$ . The bins are, hence, wide enough to allow responses over the entire historical support of DAX returns<sup>11</sup> and, more generally, allow for a large set of possible subjective beliefs. In addition, on the fifth screen, respondents enter the “average return [they] expect for the fund”. For both the histogram elicitation of beliefs and for the stated beliefs, it is straightforward to formulate the rational prediction of treatment differences: no matter what the distribution of beliefs in the population, the shifter should move the beliefs one-to-one. For example, the reported beliefs should differ by 20 percentage points between the -10 shifter and the +10 shifter.

Like all previous surveys on beliefs about stock market returns we decided not to incentivize either of these belief measures. Properly incentivizing subjects would have required a payment mechanism whose explanation would have strained the attention span of our respondents (see Allen, 1987, for an example of such a mechanism) and taken up valuable survey time for very little gain.<sup>12</sup>

On the sixth and seventh screens, respondents report how confident they are of their belief statements, on a scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 10 (“very sure”), and answer a few understanding questions. The eighth screen elicits the respondents’ beliefs about next year’s DAX return using the same histogram

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<sup>10</sup>For an overview of studies which have used this or similar methods see Goldstein and Rothschild (2014) and references therein.

<sup>11</sup>The lowest return on the DAX in the payoff-relevant period was -43.9% in 2002. The highest return was 116.1% in 1951. The lowest bin was included for reasons of rough symmetry and to keep subjects from anchoring their reports on the lowest possible return displayed in the interface.

<sup>12</sup>Systematic experimental evidence provided by Armantier and Treich (2013) and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2011) shows that the wrong scoring rule can induce bias in the responses. In contrast, not incentivising the elicitation of beliefs does not yield biased answers in these studies but merely noisier answers. A further concern with incentives is the introduction of possible motives for attempted hedging between tasks (see e.g. Karni & Safra, 1995).



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Dependent variable: Participation in the Experiment

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Female	−0.001 (0.030)
Born in the GDR	0.028 (0.038)
Abitur	0.043 (0.058)
University Degree	−0.001 (0.070)
Household Size	−0.018 (0.019)
Number of Children in Household	0.019 (0.034)
Employed	0.017 (0.038)
Financially Literate	0.028 (0.030)
Interest: < 250 Euros	−0.028 (0.035)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros	0.027 (0.049)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros	0.096 (0.093)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros	0.120 (0.240)
Interest: refused to answer	−0.076 (0.087)
Stock Market Participant	0.025 (0.046)
Risk Tolerance: Low	0.029 (0.033)
Risk Tolerance: High	0.027 (0.041)
Age bracket 31-40	0.032 (0.077)
Age bracket 41-50	−0.083 (0.059)
Age bracket 51-60	−0.084 (0.057)
Age bracket 61-70	−0.064 (0.060)
Age bracket > 70	−0.200*** (0.059)
N	692

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\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 replicates

**Table 1:** Selection into the experiment: Probit marginal effects

interface that was used before. Finally, on the ninth and last screen of the experimental module respondents were told which of the years between 1951 and 2010 had been drawn and received a detailed calculation for their payment. Respondents were paid in cash, with amounts rounded up to the nearest euro, at the end of the entire survey interview. On average respondents received €27.16 (min: €17, s.d.: €3.43, max: €48).

Before respondents are presented with the experimental module and its instructions, they have a choice whether or not to participate. The participation rate is 80%. Those who decline primarily cite old age and problems in using the computer interface but also a lack of interest in financial matters or ethical or religious reservations against any sort of financial “gambling”. The probit

regression shown in Table 1 mirrors answers to an open-ended question about the reasons for non-participation. The most potent predictor, indeed the only predictor, of selection into the experiment is age. Respondents over the age of 40 are somewhat less likely to participate and respondents above the age of 70 are significantly less likely to participate. Their participation rate is about two thirds.<sup>13</sup> All other observable characteristics play no role in the selection into the experiment. A Wald-test for the joint significance of all variables other than the age brackets cannot reject the null of no effect ( $\chi^2(18) = 19.41, p = 0.37$ ).

## 2.2 Laboratory Experiment

Upon completion of the field data collection in the SOEP-IS, we used the identical experimental module for a set of 198 university students in the WZB-TU Berlin decision laboratory in 2012/13. Recruitment into the laboratory sample followed standard procedures.<sup>14</sup> The instructions and sequence of informational displays on the computer screens in the laboratory were as close to the CAPI environment as we could produce them, so that the potential practical difficulties with the format would affect both populations. The experimental participants' payments were also scaled by the same factor as payments to SOEP participants. The only relevant difference in experimental design and procedures are that (i) the experimental participants do not have to fill out the long SOEP questionnaire, and (ii) we conducted only the two treatments, -10 and 10, in the laboratory, focusing on the strongest treatment difference in incentives. Since the SOEP respondents who happened to be in either of these two treatments were only informed about the existence of these two treatments, we could leave the instructions entirely unchanged between survey and lab environments.

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<sup>13</sup>There are about 120 main household respondents above age 70 in the sample, hence the increase in non-participation among the elderly amounts to only about 15 sets of observations.

<sup>14</sup>The decision laboratory uses ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).

### 3 Experimental Data

The data analysis commences by considering the experimental variables collected in both the SOEP sample and the laboratory sample. Sections 4 and 5 focus on the SOEP sample and consider the experimental variables' relation with stock market participation and other personal background variables.

Subsection 3.1 describes the correlation between equity share (the investment in the risky asset) and beliefs. Subsection 3.2 addresses the connection between these two variables and the shifter variable that creates the differences between the experimental treatments. Since the shifter variation is exogenous, its correlation with other variables indicates causality. Subsection 3.3 addresses the accuracy of beliefs relative to the historical return distribution.

#### 3.1 Beliefs and Investments

We start with a summary description of equity shares and elicited beliefs about the fund's return. In both samples the distribution of equity shares has a relatively large support and is not too concentrated at the extremes, giving rise to the possibility of finding co-variation with other variables. Summing over all treatments, the means (and standard deviations in parentheses) of the equity share are 0.37 (0.25) in the SOEP sample and 0.46 (0.31) in the laboratory sample. The proportions of respondents investing all, exactly half, or nothing in the risky asset are 0.03, 0.2 and 0.18 in the SOEP sample and 0.12, 0.05 and 0.09 in the laboratory sample.

A description of the beliefs about the fund's return is more involved, since each belief report contains an entire histogram. A clear difference between the SOEP and the lab is that the laboratory participants use more bins than the representative respondents.<sup>15</sup> The median numbers of bins that contain at least one brick is 6 in the laboratory while it is only 3 in the SOEP where 28% of respondents use only a single bin and a further 14% only use two bins.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Appendix C contains examples of the raw data of elicited histograms from both samples.

<sup>16</sup>Compared with other belief elicitation using similar methods these frequencies are on the low side. Delavande and Rohwedder (2008) report that 73% of their subjects used two bins or less.

	Equity Share		Imputed Expectation of Belief		Imputed S.D. of Belief		Stated Expectation of Belief		N
	Mean	S.D	Mean	S.D	Mean	S.D	Mean	S.D	
<b>Overall</b>	0.37	(0.25)	12.53	(20.59)	23.96	(16.54)	8.27	(17.84)	562
<b>Age Bracket</b>									
<30	0.41	(0.27)	12.16	(16.06)	30.25	(16.07)	8.74	(16.64)	82
31-40	0.39	(0.22)	13.85	(15.73)	25.60	(17.13)	12.02	(16.54)	76
41-50	0.40	(0.23)	12.57	(24.70)	26.36	(16.75)	7.12	(18.65)	107
51-60	0.37	(0.26)	13.24	(21.86)	22.72	(16.46)	8.43	(19.41)	107
61-70	0.34	(0.26)	10.02	(19.63)	20.46	(15.88)	6.22	(17.27)	111
>70	0.32	(0.28)	14.13	(22.49)	19.19	(14.77)	8.36	(17.63)	79
<b>Gender</b>									
female	0.35	(0.24)	9.72	(22.29)	25.60	(17.20)	7.86	(21.59)	271
male	0.39	(0.26)	15.14	(18.52)	22.43	(15.78)	8.65	(13.46)	291
<b>Born in</b>									
West Germany	0.37	(0.26)	12.11	(20.97)	23.34	(15.60)	7.40	(17.38)	379
East Germany	0.34	(0.23)	12.87	(21.96)	22.47	(17.46)	7.75	(17.69)	116
abroad	0.42	(0.28)	14.95	(15.44)	29.74	(19.10)	14.66	(17.35)	54
<b>Abitur</b>									
yes	0.37	(0.28)	10.74	(19.51)	26.70	(14.83)	6.40	(13.47)	122
no	0.37	(0.25)	13.02	(20.87)	23.20	(16.93)	8.78	(18.85)	440
<b>University Education</b>									
yes	0.35	(0.28)	11.54	(21.78)	26.95	(15.40)	5.55	(16.46)	72
no	0.37	(0.25)	12.67	(20.42)	23.52	(16.67)	8.67	(18.01)	490
<b>Employed</b>									
yes	0.39	(0.25)	13.64	(20.70)	24.38	(16.13)	8.98	(16.13)	297
no	0.35	(0.26)	11.27	(20.42)	23.49	(17.01)	7.47	(19.58)	265
<b>Financially Literate</b>									
yes	0.36	(0.25)	14.13	(20.80)	24.02	(15.98)	8.08	(17.68)	283
no	0.38	(0.26)	11.05	(20.27)	24.00	(17.14)	8.47	(18.09)	277
<b>Stock Owner</b>									
yes	0.45	(0.29)	12.79	(18.20)	22.66	(14.55)	8.95	(13.82)	107
no	0.35	(0.24)	12.50	(21.13)	24.29	(16.99)	8.11	(18.69)	454

“Financially Literate” is an indicator variable which is 1 whenever the respondent states that he/she is either “good” or “very good” with financial matters. For details on this and the other variables, see Appendix E.


**Table 2:** Experimental Responses in the SOEP by subgroup

In the analysis below we will often use summary statistics that we compute from the reported histograms. To compute statistics like the expectation or the standard deviation of the underlying belief distribution we take the 8 points on the CDF, interpolate between them using a cubic spline and then calculate the statistics numerically. A more detailed description of the interpolation procedure can be found in Appendix D.

Using these imputed distributions, we find that the average of the SOEP respondents' mean expected return of the fund is 12.5% and the average standard deviation of the fund's return distribution is 24.0%. For the laboratory sample, the average mean belief about the fund's return is 11.6% and the average standard deviation is 35.6%.

As described in the previous section, we also elicited scalar belief reports by asking for the expected average regarding the fund return. In the SOEP sample, this variable has a mean of 8.3% and a standard deviation of 17.8%. In the laboratory sample, the mean is 11.0% and the standard deviation is 19.1%. Stated expectations are highly correlated with expectations inferred from belief distributions in both settings (Pearson correlation coefficient: 0.5 for the SOEP and 0.31 for the lab sample). Table 2 collects key descriptives for the main experimental variables for different subgroups of the SOEP sample (a similar table for the lab sample is omitted because the student population is very homogeneous).

We now investigate the extent to which equity share and beliefs are correlated. Figure 1 contains a scatter plot of equity shares and the belief measures for both the SOEP and the lab sample. The figure shows pronounced positive relationships between belief and investment overall. At the mean of the data an increase in the expected return by one percentage point is associated with a one third percentage point increase in the equity share (see Figure 1 for OLS regressions). This relationship holds for both our belief measures and is roughly the same in the laboratory. The evidence on a positive statistical connection between beliefs and investments is consistent with many studies in the belief elicitation literature (see, for example, Naef and Schupp (2009) and Costa-Gomes, Huck, and Weizsäcker (2013) in the context of trust games).



Overlapping observations are aggregated, with the dot's size being proportional to the number of observations thus aggregated. Model fit comes from a polynomial regression in which investments are a cubic function of expected return (Models 2, 5, 8 and 10 below). 95% confidence interval in light gray.

	Dependent Variable: Equity Share									
	SOEP: Stated Beliefs			SOEP: Imputed Beliefs			Lab: Stated Beliefs		Lab: Imputed Beliefs	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Imputed Expected Return	0.003*** (0.0005)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)				0.003** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.003)		
Imputed Expected Return <sup>2</sup>		-0.00002*** (0.00001)	-0.00001 (0.00001)					-0.0001 (0.0001)		
Imputed Expected Return <sup>3</sup>		-0.00000** (0.00000)	-0.00000*** (0.00000)					-0.00000 (0.00000)		
Imputed S.D. of Return			0.001 (0.001)							
Probability of a Gain			-0.010 (0.037)							
Stated Expected Return				0.004*** (0.0005)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)			0.002 (0.002)	0.006 (0.005)
Stated Expected Return <sup>2</sup>					-0.00001 (0.00001)	-0.00001 (0.00001)				-0.0001 (0.0002)
Stated Expected Return <sup>3</sup>					-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)				0.00000 (0.00000)
Constant	0.330*** (0.012)	0.330*** (0.013)	0.370*** (0.110)	0.340*** (0.011)	0.330*** (0.013)	0.400*** (0.110)	0.420*** (0.028)	0.410*** (0.035)	0.440*** (0.030)	0.420*** (0.037)
Personal Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
N	562	562	560	562	562	560	198	198	198	198
R <sup>2</sup>	0.074	0.093	0.160	0.081	0.090	0.140	0.031	0.063	0.016	0.038
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.072	0.088	0.120	0.080	0.085	0.100	0.026	0.048	0.011	0.023

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Personal controls include dummy variables for gender, being born in the former GDR, having Abitur, having a university education, being employed, for having a high self-assessed financial literacy, for owning stocks and for each level of our wealth proxy. They also include age and age<sup>2</sup>, household size, the number of children in the household and household income

All standard errors are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust

Figure 1: Equity Share and Beliefs

Notice that there are also patterns that are hard to square with the theoretical predictions of the standard model. As in Merkle and Weber (2014) there is a substantial fraction of participants who expect a negative excess return for the experimental asset and yet invest positive amounts. But altogether, the statistical connection between belief data and investment decisions can be regarded as supporting the most basic—and unsurprising—implication of the standard portfolio choice model: higher expected returns occur together with larger investments.

### 3.2 Treatment effects

Recall that we implement five exogenous treatments that shift the historical DAX's return. The shifts are sizeable, ranging from -10 percentage points to +10 percentage points. Table 3 documents that by and large there is, surprisingly, no effect of the return shifter on equity share in the SOEP sample. The lack of response can hardly be explained by small incentives. In terms of the nominal framing of the €50,000 investment, the difference in returns between Treatments -10 and 10 amounts to a difference in gross returns of up to €10,000. In terms of the real monetary value of the experimental investment, the variation in return amounts to a difference of up to €5. Even the latter difference is clearly large enough for the typical participant in an experiment (even in representative samples) to react. The overall lack of response therefore suggests that many respondents find it difficult to incorporate the shift in their investment choice. In Section 5 we investigate in more detail to what extent different socioeconomic groups' investments react more elastically to incentives.

For now, returning to Table 3, we notice an important difference between the SOEP and the laboratory sample. While SOEP participants appear to ignore the shifter on average, there is a strong and statistically significant reaction of investments to the treatment in the laboratory. There, the equity share rises from 0.3 to 0.63 in response to improving the return of the fund by 20 percentage points.

Setting	Variable	-10	-5	0	5	10	ANOVA	Kruskall-Wallis
SOEP	Equity Share	0.40 (0.02)	0.34 (0.02)	0.32 (0.02)	0.39 (0.02)	0.39 (0.02)	0.106	0.135
	Imputed Beliefs	13.14 (1.97)	10.58 (1.81)	9.38 (1.85)	14.48 (1.83)	14.45 (2.18)	0.232	0.326
	Stated Beliefs	8.55 (1.71)	7.68 (1.70)	6.60 (1.98)	9.28 (1.43)	8.93 (1.66)	0.810	0.990
	Probability of a Gain	0.68 (0.03)	0.67 (0.03)	0.67 (0.03)	0.74 (0.02)	0.69 (0.03)	0.323	0.313
Lab	Equity Share	0.30 (0.03)				0.63 (0.03)	0.000	0.000
	Imputed Beliefs	10.05 (1.71)				13.37 (1.57)	0.156	0.016
	Stated Beliefs	9.87 (2.28)				12.30 (1.38)	0.374	0.004
	Probability of a Gain	0.59 (0.02)				0.65 (0.01)	0.029	0.009

**Table 3:** Mean levels by treatment

The beliefs about the fund’s return, however, do not respond to the shifter in the way they should, no matter what measure of beliefs we use and no matter whether we consider the SOEP data or the laboratory data. While there is a statistically significant effect in the laboratory sample, it is much smaller than the 20 percentage points predicted by probabilistic sophistication, and there is no effect at all in the SOEP sample. In both samples and regardless of whether we consider imputed beliefs or stated beliefs, we can strongly reject the rational prediction that the shifter moves the mean of beliefs one-to-one.


We tentatively conclude from this evidence that it is much harder to manipulate beliefs than to elicit them.<sup>17</sup> In light of the previous finding that subjects’ investment choices strongly correlate with their elicited beliefs in the expected way, we still regard the elicited beliefs as meaningful predictors of choice. However, there are clear bounds as to how beliefs can be influenced. Whether this is due to cognitive limitations (which in our case amounts to the failure to perform simple addition) or inherent in the process of belief formation is impossible to say with the available data. However, the next subsection will show that subjects’ beliefs about past DAX returns are surprisingly accurate.

### 3.3 Calibration

Figure 2 compares the respondents’ beliefs about the fund’s return with the true historical distribution of DAX returns. The figure shows, in different

<sup>17</sup>Incidentally, the absent correlation between shifter and beliefs prevents us from using the shifter as an instrument for beliefs. With probabilistic sophistication, we could have studied whether beliefs about returns are causal for investment choices—indeed, this was one of the reasons for our design—but as things are, we do not have a working first stage.





Historical benchmark for each treatment indicated by black horizontal lines.

**Figure 2:** Historical distribution of returns vs. the average distributions in Lab and SOEP

shades of grey and ordered from left to right within each bin, the five different distributions of beliefs for the five different treatments. The figure also compares these distributions with five corresponding true distributions, indicated by black horizontal lines for each bin and treatment, that result from the true historical distribution plus the five shifters (in the same order, that is, from -10 to the very left to +10 to the very right, within each bin). The figure shows that SOEP respondents are remarkably well calibrated. In none of the seven bins are respondents off by more than 5 percentage points when data are pooled across treatments. The largest two deviations are that the frequency of small losses between 0 and 30% is slightly underestimated and the frequency of larger losses is slightly overestimated. The good calibration can also be seen in other metrics. While the mean return on the DAX from 1951 to 2010 was 15.5%, both the imputed and the stated expected return on the experimen-


tal asset of 12.5% and 8.3% respectively—while lower—are at least similar in magnitude to the historical mean. Moreover, while the relative frequency of a positive return over these six decades was 70.0%, SOEP respondents thought the DAX had seen a gain 69.3% of the time.<sup>18</sup> In contrast, the average distribution of our student subjects in the lab (also shown in Figure 2) differs significantly from the historical benchmark in that too much probability mass is assumed to be in the tails of the distribution.

Underneath the excellent calibration of the average SOEP respondent’s belief lies, however, substantial heterogeneity in beliefs and miscalibration at the individual level. Very few of the distributions provided by individual respondents are close to the historical benchmark, and what produces the excellent calibration in the aggregate is a mixture of respondents who put the entire probability mass into a single bin and respondents who report diffuse distributions.

That the return expectations we elicit show such remarkable calibration stands in contrast to evidence from other countries, where substantial miscalibration is commonly observed. For the US Kézdi and Willis (2009) report that HRS respondents expected a stock market gain with roughly 50% probability in the 2002, 2004 and 2006 waves while the historical frequency of a gain on the Dow Jones was 68%. Similarly, the probability of a gain larger than 10% was estimated at 39% but the corresponding frequency was 49%. Dominitz and Manski (2011) find similar numbers in the monthly surveys of the Michigan Survey of Consumers from mid-2002 to mid-2004. In the Netherlands, Hurd et al. (2011) find that in 2004 the median expected rate of return on the Dutch stock market index was a mere 0.3%, a severe underestimate of the historical median return of 14%. A downward bias in expectations is by no means a universal finding, however. Respondents in the 1999, 2000 and 2001 waves of

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<sup>18</sup>In order to predict whether subjects invest in the risky asset, a relevant question—under expected utility, the *only* relevant question—is whether respondents expect a strictly positive excess return, i.e. a mean return that exceeds 4%. Based on reported beliefs, the proportion of respondents who expect a strictly positive excess return is 69.2% when using stated beliefs, and 72.6% when using imputed beliefs. The historical frequency of the DAX returning strictly more than 4% is 68.3%.



Error bars are 95% confidence interval.

**Figure 3:** Average distributions of past and future returns

the Survey of Economic Expectations reported expectations for the S&P500 that were substantially above the historical average, but also held the S&P500 to be more volatile than has been the case historically (Dominitz & Manski, 2011).

What explains these differences with the existing literature? One possible explanation is that the papers quoted above compare respondents' expectations about the future with returns realized in the past. A test for correct calibration in this setting then amounts to a joint test of whether subjects hold the historical distribution of returns to be identical to the distribution of returns in the future and, if so, whether they have an accurate picture of the historical distribution. In contrast, we elicit beliefs about the distribution of returns over a well-defined period of time in the past and can test for calibration without auxiliary assumptions. The beliefs that we elicit about the next 12 months look, however, fairly similar, if somewhat more pessimistic –

Stock-market participation rate by...	Decile									
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>th</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>	5 <sup>th</sup>	6 <sup>th</sup>	7 <sup>th</sup>	8 <sup>th</sup>	9 <sup>th</sup>	10 <sup>th</sup>
Household Income	7%	7%	3%	21%	14%	17%	20%	19%	26%	46%
Liquid Wealth	0%	2%	2%	2%	5%	13%	11%	39%	43%	56%

**Table 4:** Stock-market participation rate by income and wealth deciles


see Figure 3. This may not be entirely surprising as the survey period was just after the economic crises in parts of Europe had reached their peak intensity. In contrast to expectations about the past, where SOEP respondents and students differed substantially (with the former being more realistic), we find virtually identical expectations about the future between the two samples. The mean imputed return is 12.5% while the probability of a gain on the DAX is thought to be 58.8% on average. 51.8% of subjects state that they expect a return that is higher than 4%.

## 4 External validity: Stock market participation

We now turn to the important question whether our response variables are indicative of real-life investments. Specifically, we now test the external validity of our data by comparing elicited behavior in the experiment with survey responses to the question “Do you own any stock market mutual funds, stocks or reverse convertible bonds (“Aktienanleihen”)?”

Table 4 shows that 18.0% of all households answered this question affirmatively, which is in line with other evidence on the German stock market participation.<sup>19</sup> The table also shows that for richer households the stock market participation increases but stays well below 100%. We split the sample by deciles of the income distribution (row 1) as well as by deciles of the distribution of earnings from interest, presumably our best available proxy for

<sup>19</sup>Most other surveys provide numbers only for the percentage of individuals who hold stocks. In our data this percentage stands at 15.4% (S.E.: 1.1%) while a 2012 survey by Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2012) puts it at 13.7%.



The correlogram above visualizes the pairwise (Pearson) correlation coefficients of the variables. E(DAX) is the imputed expected return on the DAX going forward while SD(DAX) is the imputed standard deviation of the reported return distribution. P(DAX>0) is the reported probability that the DAX will make a gain over the next year.

**Figure 4:** Correlogram

wealth.<sup>20</sup>

Figure 4 displays a correlogram, a visualization of the correlation matrix for several survey and experimental variables. Starting from the vertical, positive correlations are displayed as wedges that are shaded clockwise while negative correlations are shaded counter-clockwise. The higher the correlation, the

<sup>20</sup>The SOEP question about interest earned on investments over the previous year is answered by far more people than more detailed questions about the amounts of wealth held in the form of various assets. We therefore use this variable as a proxy for liquid wealth. The alternative measure, the sum over all asset classes, yields broadly similar though less precisely estimated results. For details on these variables, see Appendix E.

larger the wedge and the darker the shade of the wedge.

The correlogram shows that only a handful of variables are reliable predictors of stock market participation. Most of the significant correlations have been observed in the previous literature. For example, household size is known to be a significant correlate of stock market holdings. Likewise, household income and *Abitur* – the highest form of secondary education in Germany and the only form that grants access to the university system – are well-known and entirely unsurprising predictors of stock ownership. Notice that equity share is the only experimental variable that has predictive power for stock holdings (correlation: 0.14, p-value:  $< 0.001$ ).

But the correlograms only show bivariate relations. In order to gain a broader picture we investigate whether the correlations change if we add other explanatory variables. This is similar to the approach taken by Guiso et al. (2008) who study the co-variation of stock market participation with generalized trust and other variables. We find that equity share has explanatory power over and above the other variables, see Table 5. Even after including all relevant controls, which drives up the  $R^2$  to around 30%, the coefficient for equity share remains both economically important and statistically significant and is robust to different specifications.

The fact that equity share helps to explain stock holdings even if we control for all other variables that are known to be good predictors of stock market participation is important for two reasons. First, it establishes external validity. Investment behavior in the experiment is strongly related to investment behavior outside of the experiment. Second, the result gives hope that the simple experimental portfolio choice problem can be used as a wind tunnel: it allows the controlled manipulation of a behavioral variable that has a close connection to stock market participation, both in terms of economic theory and in terms of empirical correlation. Hence, there is hope that interventions, for example, to encourage stock ownership could be pre-tested in laboratory or artefactual field experiments such as ours.

	Dependent variable: Stock Market Participant		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Equity Share	0.220*** (0.072)	0.240*** (0.068)	0.200*** (0.064)
Female		-0.043 (0.032)	-0.029 (0.030)
Born in East Germany		-0.058* (0.034)	-0.044 (0.033)
Age		0.006 (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Abitur		0.200*** (0.061)	0.150** (0.058)
University Degree		0.049 (0.078)	-0.003 (0.072)
Household Size		0.039** (0.019)	-0.004 (0.022)
Risk Tolerance: Low		0.020 (0.037)	0.034 (0.035)
Risk Tolerance: High		0.008 (0.044)	0.058 (0.043)
Imputed expectation of DAX		0.001 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)
Imputed S.D. of DAX		-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Gain Probability of DAX		-0.003 (0.088)	0.039 (0.085)
Number of Children in Household		-0.096*** (0.030)	-0.057* (0.030)
Employed		-0.015 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.037)
Financially Literate		0.140*** (0.032)	0.080*** (0.031)
Interest: < 250 Euros			0.061* (0.033)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros			0.270*** (0.057)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros			0.430*** (0.086)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros			0.310*** (0.110)
Interest: refused to answer			0.150 (0.100)
Household Income (missing=0)			0.023 (0.018)
Household Income: missing			0.210** (0.084)
Constant	0.110*** (0.029)	-0.130 (0.140)	-0.130 (0.140)
N	561	560	560
R <sup>2</sup>	0.021	0.150	0.280
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.019	0.130	0.250

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Household income is in thousands of Euros

Household income is set to zero where missing (48 cases). Moreover, a dummy variable is added to the regression which is 1 for the observations with missing household income.

**Table 5:** Predicting real-world stock-market participation

## 5 Different results for different people

In this section we exploit the rich data set on the SOEP respondents in order to study the role of socioeconomic background variables and direct measures or plausible correlates of savviness. As discussed above, we find strong differences between the SOEP sample and the university student sample regarding the extent to which they react to incentives. This raises the question of whether there is other evidence that “smart”, financially savvy respondents react more strongly to variations in incentives. The subsequent analysis confirms the existence of such differences. They have potential implications for the consequences of interventions to foster household investments; policy changes may want to pay heed to the possibility that different households react differently to the variation of incentives even if these are not predicted by theory. We also re-examine the issue of external validity and find that the link between experimental investments and stock market participation in real life is stronger for “smarter” respondents.

We caution that our examination of heterogeneity in the SOEP sample is a “fishing exercise”. However, its results are largely in line with what other studies have documented before, namely the fundamental role of cognitive ability for financial decisions making.

Table 7 documents treatment effects on choices and beliefs for different subgroups. It shows that there are small subsamples of the population that do react to better incentives. For respondents with a university degree, the coefficients indicate an increase in equity share of one percentage point per one percentage point increase in return. Moving from the worst shifter of -10 to the best shifter of +10, the equity share is predicted to increase by 20 percentage points. This is similar to the effect we observe in the laboratory study with university students where the equity share increases by 33 percentage points. Hence, it appears that the main difference between SOEP and lab is driven by selection on educational covariates.

The results for respondents with different wealth levels are somewhat mixed. For reasons one can only speculate about, the strongest treatment effect is ob-



served for those who withhold information on income from interest. There is also a notable composition effect between the two largest categories: respondents with low but positive levels of income from interest are predicted to increase their equity share by 14 percentage points when we move from the worst to the best shifter. Those without any interest earnings are estimated to exhibit a negative treatment effect.

Among the financial literacy questions we find a heterogenous treatment effect only for the compound interest question. The other variables that might capture financial literacy do not show significant interactions with the experimental treatment. While the results on financial literacy and wealth are a bit patchy, overall a picture emerges that is familiar from the literature. Even relatively simple investment tasks as the one we have implemented here appear to be cognitively so complex that sensible responses to variations in parameters are shown only by skilled and sophisticated subjects. An inspection of the two right-hand columns of Table 7 reveals that when it comes to belief manipulation no systematic patterns emerge. Only one of the interactions is statistically significantly different from zero, but only marginally so.

Given that we can identify some subgroups that react better to incentives, it is not far-fetched to presume that we might also be able to detect a stronger external validity of investment levels for these groups. With less noise in behavior inside and presumably outside the laboratory, the measured correlations between the experimental equity share and stock market participation may increase. Table 6 shows the regression-based conditional correlates of stock market participation, separately for different subgroups. Indeed it is the case that “smarter” subsamples show stronger external validity.

	Stock Market Participant			
	All	Abitur	University Degree	Financially Literate
Equity Share	0.200*** (0.064)	0.370** (0.180)	0.480 (0.300)	0.230** (0.110)
Female	-0.029 (0.030)	-0.120 (0.110)	-0.230 (0.150)	-0.049 (0.052)
Born in East Germany	-0.044 (0.033)	-0.021 (0.120)	-0.160 (0.190)	-0.083 (0.061)
Age	0.004 (0.006)	-0.028 (0.023)	-0.062 (0.044)	0.002 (0.011)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.001 (0.0005)	-0.00004 (0.0001)
Abitur	0.150** (0.058)			0.240** (0.100)
University Degree	-0.003 (0.072)	-0.002 (0.097)		-0.041 (0.120)
Household Size	-0.004 (0.022)	0.036 (0.087)	0.045 (0.110)	-0.020 (0.035)
Risk Tolerance: Low	0.034 (0.035)	-0.015 (0.110)	-0.0003 (0.140)	0.048 (0.059)
Risk Tolerance: High	0.058 (0.043)	-0.002 (0.160)	0.098 (0.240)	0.058 (0.064)
Imputed expectation of DAX	0.0003 (0.001)	0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.010)	0.001 (0.003)
S.D. of DAX	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.002)
Gain Probability of DAX	0.039 (0.085)	-0.051 (0.310)	-0.330 (0.480)	0.062 (0.160)
Number of Children in Household	-0.057* (0.030)	-0.110 (0.110)	-0.180 (0.150)	-0.062 (0.049)
Employed	-0.024 (0.037)	0.033 (0.120)	0.022 (0.210)	-0.007 (0.067)
Financially Literate	0.080*** (0.031)	0.170* (0.100)	0.200 (0.150)	
Interest: < 250 Euros	0.061* (0.033)	0.047 (0.110)	-0.033 (0.170)	0.086 (0.054)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros	0.270*** (0.057)	0.330** (0.140)	0.270 (0.220)	0.320*** (0.084)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros	0.430*** (0.086)	0.560*** (0.180)	0.560** (0.240)	0.440*** (0.110)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros	0.310*** (0.110)	0.150 (0.170)	0.013 (0.300)	0.560*** (0.170)
Interest: refused to answer	0.150 (0.100)	0.350 (0.250)	0.046 (0.360)	0.260 (0.170)
Household Income (missing=0)	0.023 (0.018)	0.039 (0.040)	0.029 (0.059)	0.010 (0.029)
Household Income: missing	0.210** (0.084)	0.150 (0.330)	0.520 (0.560)	0.140 (0.130)
Constant	-0.130 (0.140)	0.580 (0.490)	1.400 (0.910)	-0.007 (0.260)
N	560	122	72	283
R <sup>2</sup>	0.280	0.360	0.480	0.320
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.250	0.220	0.260	0.260

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Standard errors are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust. Household income is set to zero where missing (48 cases). Moreover, a dummy variable is added to the regression which is 1 for the observations with missing household income. "Financially Literate" is an indicator variable which is 1 whenever the respondent states that he/she is either "good" or "very good" with financial matters. For details on this and the other variables, see Appendix E.

**Table 6:** Stock market participation by subgroups

	Equity Share				Imputed Expectation of Fund				Stated Expectation of Fund			
	Mean		Treatment Effect		Mean		Treatment Effect		Mean		Treatment Effect	
<b>Education</b>												
< University Degree	0.373	(0.011)	0.000	(0.002)	12.646	(0.922)	0.107	(0.139)	8.649	(0.815)	0.076	(0.113)
University Degree	0.349	(0.033)	0.010**	(0.004)	11.426	(2.619)	0.325	(0.353)	5.586	(2.039)	-0.115	(0.300)
<b>Interest from Wealth</b>												
0	0.368	(0.017)	-0.005**	(0.002)	13.265	(1.572)	0.110	(0.224)	9.012	(1.597)	0.086	(0.214)
< 250 Euros	0.360	(0.019)	0.007***	(0.003)	10.576	(1.344)	0.320	(0.207)	7.759	(1.113)	0.076	(0.163)
250 - 1.000 Euros	0.344	(0.027)	0.001	(0.004)	18.231	(1.758)	-0.123	(0.297)	9.618	(1.569)	-0.247	(0.301)
1.000 - 2.500 Euros	0.422	(0.048)	-0.005	(0.007)	13.582	(3.266)	0.501	(0.518)	7.783	(1.846)	0.011	(0.204)
> 2.500 Euros	0.382	(0.054)	0.004	(0.007)	7.830	(8.722)	-0.653	(1.246)	5.481	(3.307)	0.206	(0.246)
refused to answer	0.339	(0.073)	0.015**	(0.007)	1.971	(8.978)	0.558	(1.030)	3.353	(3.572)	0.543	(0.351)
<b>Financial Literacy: self-assessed</b>												
'good' or 'very good'	0.360	(0.015)	0.002	(0.002)	14.064	(1.231)	0.287	(0.180)	8.047	(1.059)	0.153	(0.153)
'a little' or 'not at all'	0.381	(0.016)	-0.001	(0.002)	11.052	(1.227)	-0.001	(0.183)	8.479	(1.091)	-0.056	(0.147)
<b>Financial Literacy: compound interest</b>												
correct	0.384	(0.014)	0.004*	(0.002)	13.066	(1.157)	0.177	(0.178)	8.741	(0.865)	0.080	(0.117)
incorrect	0.349	(0.018)	-0.003	(0.003)	11.381	(1.415)	0.119	(0.190)	7.701	(1.431)	0.004	(0.213)
don't know	0.365	(0.059)	-0.003	(0.006)	15.608	(3.751)	-0.161	(0.547)	8.560	(4.725)	0.005	(0.533)
<b>Financial Literacy: volatility</b>												
correct	0.400	(0.047)	-0.005	(0.007)	21.056	(4.591)	-0.415	(0.664)	14.726	(4.607)	-0.763	(0.640)
incorrect	0.372	(0.012)	0.001	(0.002)	11.938	(0.906)	0.161	(0.134)	7.911	(0.755)	0.084	(0.102)
don't know	0.301	(0.041)	0.003	(0.006)	11.234	(3.342)	0.556	(0.439)	4.944	(3.744)	0.980*	(0.561)
<b>Stock Owner</b>												
yes	0.448	(0.028)	-0.002	(0.004)	12.828	(1.756)	-0.054	(0.308)	9.280	(1.417)	-0.439*	(0.237)
no	0.353	(0.011)	0.002	(0.002)	12.483	(0.992)	0.185	(0.142)	8.099	(0.878)	0.157	(0.118)

The table shows the results of multivariate regressions in which, for each set of rows, the outcome variables in the columns are regressed on indicator variables for the different levels of the row variables and a variable for the size of the shifter interacted with the different levels of the row variables. "Mean" and "Treatment Effect" therefore correspond to the constants and slope coefficients in bivariate regressions of the column variables on each of the different levels of the row variables. Standard errors for OLS regressions are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust.

**Table 7:** Treatment effect by subgroups

## 6 Asset Complexity and Reactions to Changes in Incentives

In this section we investigate the role of complexity with an additional lab experiment. Our previous results suggest that changing the excess return in different ways may have different effects. Adding a bonus to an asset whose return is stochastic may be a more demanding task than adding a bonus to an asset with a fixed return. Consequently, shifts in the risky asset's return may result in weaker changes in investment than shifts in the riskless asset's return. This would also be largely consistent with the available evidence on reactions to tax incentives as, e.g., in Chetty et al. (2009) and Abeler and Jäger (2014).

We design an experiment to demonstrate the hypothesized effect. In the experiment, the excess return of the risky asset is varied in two ways: either a shift of  $\Delta$  in the risky asset's return, or a shift of  $-\Delta$  in the safe asset's return. To make the two shifts fully economically equivalent, we modify the decision maker's exogenous income level, as detailed in the next subsection. Subsection 6.2 shows the results that confirm the conjecture.

Before we present the details of the experiment, two remarks are in order: First, we designed this section's experiment after we observed the results from the experiments described in Section 2.2—hence the separate presentation. Second, the fact that we could run the complexity experiment only in a laboratory format also means that we cannot investigate the present research question for the subsamples that show the weakest reaction to incentive shifts. These subsamples may well show larger differences in their reactions to different shifts.

### 6.1 Experimental Design

The design follows the same format as the paper's main experiment, implementing the standard portfolio choice problem. In the new experiment (i) each participant makes eight investment decisions, allowing a within-subject analy-

sis and (ii) each participant receives a task-specific fixed payment in addition to the earnings from the portfolio choice.

The selection of parameters for the eight tasks allows us to test the hypothesis that participants react more strongly to changes in the safe asset, in the following manner: The participants are endowed with  $W_I$  worth of an illiquid asset that generates a sure income and liquid wealth  $W_L$  that they can allocate among a safe asset and a risky asset. The risky asset pays a rate of return  $r$  whereas the safe asset pays a rate of return  $r_f$ .

Now consider an increase in the risky return  $r$  by an amount  $\Delta$ , analogous to the exogenous return manipulation of the paper's main experiment. Under this manipulation, a decision maker who invests  $\alpha$  in the risky asset earns a random payoff given by:

$$\pi(\alpha) = \alpha W_L(1 + r + \Delta) + (1 - \alpha)W_L(1 + r_f) + W_I$$

For a framing variation of this manipulation by  $\Delta$ , we can alternatively induce a simultaneous shift in  $r_f$  by amount  $-\Delta$  and  $W_I$  by amount  $\Delta W_L$ , yielding the same payoff from investing a share  $\alpha$  in the risky asset:

$$\pi(\alpha) = \alpha W_L(1 + r) + (1 - \alpha)W_L(1 + r_f - \Delta) + (W_I + \Delta W_L)$$

From the fact that  $\pi(\alpha)$  is identical between both treatments and for all  $\alpha$ , we conclude that the same risks are available between the two manipulations. Therefore, expected utility theory, and any other theory that employs a stable mapping from a constant set of uncertainty states about the risky asset into outcomes, predict an identical choice by the decision maker. The same statement is true if both the safe and the risky assets' returns are additionally shifted by a constant amount  $\Delta'$ . The experiment's null hypothesis is thus that participants react equally between the equivalent manipulations of incentives applying to the safe asset or the risky asset.

To ensure that the results are not driven by an asymmetry between positive shifts and negative shifts, we formulate the entire experiment such that only positive shifts occur. This is achieved by adding an appropriate return

shift  $\Delta'$  to both assets.<sup>21</sup> The parameters for the eight choice problems are displayed in Table 8. The collection of equivalent variations is the following: Problems 1 and 3 are economically equivalent, Problems 2 and 4 are economically equivalent, Problems 5 and 7 are economically equivalent, and Problems 6 and 8 are economically equivalent. Problems 1 and 2 differ only in the risky asset's return; Problems 3 and 4 differ in the shifter applied to the riskless asset (and a compensatory change in the illiquid endowment), in the described way. But the difference in incentives is the same between 1 and 2 as between 3 and 4. Thus, expected utility and most of its generalizations predict that the difference in investments is identical. Analogously, the difference between 5 and 6 is predicted to be identical to the difference in investments between 7 and 8. Our previous analysis suggests that reactions to changes in the riskless asset might be stronger, i.e. investments differ more between 3 and 4 than between 1 and 2, and more between 7 and 8 than between 5 and 6.

76 participants were recruited into 4 experimental sessions at WZB-TU Berlin laboratory using identical procedures as in the study described in Section 2.2. Similar to the first lab study we take a fixed-interest German government bond (now yielding 2 % per annum) as the safe asset and the return on the DAX in a year randomly drawn from 1951 to 2010 as the risky asset. Treatments were presented in random order so as to avoid confounds from learning or contrast effects. One of the eight tasks was randomly selected and paid out at the end of the experiment, ensuring incentive compatibility for each task.

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<sup>21</sup>We also ran three pilot sessions but do not use the data gathered in these sessions here. In the first pilot session subjects were presented with both “bonuses” and “fees” on the two assets and displayed aversive reactions to any asset to which a fee was applied. Since the effect of gain/loss framing was not the subject of this study we therefore ran two sessions with bonuses only but found that up to 42.11 % of subjects chose investments at the lower boundary of the budget set. Since this much truncation presents problems both in terms of power and in terms of the distributional assumptions one is required to make to deal with it, we therefore changed the magnitude of the bonuses to arrive at the values reported here, values that yield much fewer truncated responses. Note, however, that the responses in all pilots were also indicative of stronger reactions to changes in the safe asset.

Treatment	Bonus on Risky Asset	Bonus on Riskless Asset	Illiquid Endowment	Liquid Endowment
1	9.00	5.90	16000	50000
2	2.65	5.90	16000	50000
3	5.90	2.80	17550	50000
4	5.90	9.15	14375	50000
5	9.10	6.05	14275	50000
6	3.10	6.05	17275	50000
7	6.05	3.00	15800	50000
8	6.05	9.00	15800	50000


**Table 8:** Treatment parameters

## 6.2 Results

Figure 5 displays the differences in average equity shares (the percentage of the liquid endowment invested in the risky asset) for each of the four pairs. A weaker reaction to changes in the risky asset return is immediately visible. Treatments 1 and 2 vary the risky asset return by 6.35 percentage points while holding the riskless asset return constant. This causes a change in mean equity share from 0.28 when the bonus on the risky asset is 2.65 percentage points to 0.62 when the bonus on the risky asset is 9 percentage points for a difference of 0.34. A change of equal magnitude in the return of the riskless asset causes a larger change in the equity share. While the mean equity share in treatment 3 is 0.61, almost identical to that in treatment 1, the mean equity share in treatment 4 is 0.21, lower than that in treatment 2. This yields a difference of 0.4. The same pattern of responses hold analogously for treatments 5 to 8.<sup>22</sup>

Given the comparatively small sample size, each of these mean responses is subject to considerable sampling error. In order to formally test our main hypothesis we therefore pool the data from all treatments. We compute the difference in differences for treatments 1 to 4 and add to this the difference in differences for treatments 5 to 8. Under the null of rational, equal-sized

<sup>22</sup>A graph of the raw responses is available in the Supplementary Material.



Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.

**Figure 5:** Investments in the risky asset by treatment

responses to changes in either the risky and riskless asset returns this sum should be zero. Instead, we find it to be 0.10, positive and statistically significantly so (two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test p-value = 0.03, two-sided t-test p-value = 0.09).<sup>23</sup>

## 7 Conclusion

The paper at hand describes a simple portfolio choice problem with one safe and one risky asset, implemented in an artefactual field experiment for a representative population sample in Germany. The data from this experiment

<sup>23</sup>Over all treatments about 11% of responses are truncated below at zero. The percentage of truncated responses is higher in treatments 4 and 8 than it is in treatments 2 and 6. The truncation therefore potentially obscures larger differences between treatments 3 and 4, and 7 and 8, and biases the differences the test statistic towards zero.



exhibit high degrees of external validity as shown through direct comparison of behavior inside and outside the experiment. This may be viewed as a success for the standard portfolio choice model. Despite its extreme reductionism it captures important real-life tradeoffs in financial markets.

The analysis also shows that the degree of external validity varies between different subgroups. External validity is stronger for skilled and savvy subjects. We also observe that only these savvier subgroups of subjects respond in a meaningful way to changes in incentives, highlighting, once again, the important role of cognitive ability for even the simplest financial decision problems. In our setting less educated subjects forgo substantial additional earnings by not responding to exogenous shifts in investment incentives. Related to previous studies on financial literacy (e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) on retirement savings, Gerardi, Goette, and Meier (2010) on mortgage foreclosure), this difference addresses the possibility of distributional effects that arise from cognitive differences. Similar interventions to foster investments in real life (such as tax subsidies for equity holdings) could have similar undesired effects.

In a separate experiment, we also find evidence that asset complexity is a factor in this under-reaction to incentives. Even university students, who compare favorably with the general population on proxies for cognitive ability, react more strongly to shifts in the return of an asset with a constant return than to shifts in an asset with a stochastic return when both shifts are economically equivalent. To our knowledge, this is a phenomenon that has not yet been documented in the literature on financial literacy, with the exception of the related effects in Chetty et al. (2009) and Abeler and Jäger (2014)

For future research, our study may inform the design of further wind tunnels for interventions regarding financial investment of households. In particular, in the light of the current underfunding of many pension systems (both pay as you go and capital funded), greater stock participation by the middle class appears desirable to many economists and policy makers. Testing interventions in artefactual field experiments such as ours might avoid costly mistakes.

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
## B Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	700	0.480	0.500	0	1
Age	700	53.000	17.000	16	94
Born in Germany	700	0.860	0.350	0	1
Born in the GDR	700	0.200	0.400	0	1
Abitur	700	0.200	0.400	0	1
University degree	700	0.120	0.330	0	1
Employed	700	0.500	0.500	0	1
Household Size	700	2.300	1.200	1	8
Number of Children in Household	700	0.360	0.780	0	6
Monthly Household Income (in 1000s of Euros)	652	2.500	1.500	0.100	12.000
Risk Tolerance	700	4.900	2.500	0	10
Financial Literacy (self-assessed: 'good' or 'very good')	697	0.500	0.500	0	1
Financial Literacy (compound interest question correct)	690	0.580	0.490	0	1
Financial Literacy (volatility question correct)	690	0.840	0.370	0	1
Equity share (in experiment)	562	0.370	0.260	0.000	1.000
Imputed expectation of fund	562	13.000	21.000	-80.000	110.000
Stated expectation of fund	562	8.300	18.000	-80.000	95.000
Gain Probability of Fund	562	0.690	0.280	0.000	1.000
Imputed expectation of DAX	562	5.500	18.000	-60.000	90.000
Gain Probability of DAX	562	0.590	0.330	0.000	1.000
Total Liquid Assets	515	19.000	44.000	0.000	446.000
Stock Market Participation	693	0.180	0.390	0	1
Stocks (amount)	671	1,780.000	7,874.000	0	110,000
Stocks / Total Liquid Assets	452	0.066	0.190	0.000	1.000
Total Debt	666	17,174.000	54,514.000	0	800,000

*N* is the number of non-missing observations

**Table A1:** Descriptive statistics for the 700 heads of household in SOEP sample

## C Some Individual Belief Distributions



**Figure A2:** 24 randomly chosen belief distributions from both the SOEP and the lab sample.



## D Imputation of Moments

To derive various summary statistics from the elicited belief distributions we fit continuous distributions to the raw data and calculate the statistics from these distributions.

While much of the existing literature fits parametric distributions we follow an approach similar to Bellemare, Bissonnette, and Kröger (2012) and fit cubic interpolating splines using an approach due to Forsythe, Malcolm, and Moler (1977). We first cumulate the probabilities that respondents place within each of the seven bins. This yields 8 points on the cumulative distribution function from which the responses were generated. We take these 8 points to be the knots of the spline (that is, we ignore any rounding in the response and assume that the CDF at these points is *known*) and interpolate between them with a piecewise cubic polynomial.


Since each of the 7 pieces is defined by four polynomial coefficients this is a problem with 28 unknowns. The condition that the spline must go through each of the 8 points gives 14 equations (one each for the end-points and two each for the interior knots) and further assuming that the spline is twice continuously differentiable at each of the knots yields 12 additional equations. What pins down the spline are two boundary conditions, which are found by fitting exact cubics through the four points closest to each boundary and imposing the third derivatives of these cubics at the end-points on the spline.

What is problematic about using such a spline to impute a CDF is that nothing in the procedure described above guarantees that the resulting spline is monotonic. To overcome this problem we apply a filter to the spline that is due to Hyman (1983). The filter relaxes some of the smoothness conditions enough to ensure monotonicity.<sup>24</sup>

Figure A3 demonstrates the fit for six representative respondents. Circles show the raw cumulative probabilities to which both the Hyman-filtered cubic splines as well as various alternative distributions are fitted. By construction the splines are extremely close to the data in all cases – often much closer than

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<sup>24</sup>Both the Forsythe et al. construction of the spline as well as the Hyman filter are implemented in R through the `splinefun()` function with methods `fmm` and `hyman` respectively



**Figure A3:** CDFs derived from the belief data using both spline interpolation and parametric distributions fit via least squares

any of the parametric distributions that have been fit to the data by minimizing the sum of squared deviations at the 8 points. The two distributions on the left are single-peaked and have non-zero probability in several bins and for these cases all of the methods yield roughly the same fit. The distributions in the middle have mass only in a single or in two of the bins, which is a problem for the parametric distributions because in such cases the fit can be improved ad infinitum by reducing the variance of the distribution and thereby reducing the sum of squared deviations at the 8 points. In the two cases on the right the distribution is multi-modal, which naturally leads to terrible fit for the parametric distributions, all of which are unimodal. The splines, in contrast make no such assumptions and therefore fit even these cases rather well.

Finally, we calculate both the mean and the standard deviation from these distributions numerically using adaptive Gauss-Kronrod quadrature.

## **E Variable Description and Coding**

The full data set contains 1146 respondents in 700 households. Since asset allocation is commonly seen in the literature as the result of joint optimization of all household members we narrow the sample to the 700 heads of household, which we identify as the respondents who filled out the SOEP household questionnaire. All demographics whose coding is detailed below are the demographics of this household head.

### **Abitur**

Germany has a multi-track educational system in which only students who graduate from high school with an “Abitur” diploma are automatically allowed to enroll at university. In the SOEP respondents are asked directly for the highest secondary school degree they have obtained and our Abitur variable is coded mainly according to the answer to this question. There is one special case, however, that requires special attention. 59 respondents obtained their secondary education outside of Germany and a separate question gives too little information to be able to map the secondary education they obtained into the German educational system precisely. Of these subjects, 11 have university degrees, however; education for which, had it been obtained in Germany, the Abitur would almost always be a prerequisite. Since we are interested in the Abitur as a proxy for higher ability and higher education and foreign respondents with university degrees plausibly possess the same higher ability and higher education we recode these subjects as having Abitur.

### **Born in East Germany**

This indicator variable is 1 if the respondent was born in the German Democratic Republic. It is 0 for respondents born in the Federal Republic of Germany, those born outside of Germany and those born in East Germany after reunification in 1990 (14 cases).

## Interest from Wealth

This variable is our main proxy for respondents' liquid wealth holdings. Though our survey module included detailed questions about more specific asset classes, item non-response rates for the questions asking for the invested amounts were fairly high. The household questionnaire also included the question "How large, all in all, was your income from interest, dividend payments and capital gains in 2011", with six answer categories.<sup>25</sup> For the econometric analysis we generate a variable that uses information from both questions. We create a new category for subjects who report that their capital income was precisely zero, sort all respondents who gave exact answers into the six categories above and then merged the highest three categories into a single category for capital incomes above €2500 to increase the cell count (counts before the merge were 20 for the €2500 to €5000 category, 5 for the €5000 to €10000 category and 5 for the more than €10000 category). Lastly, we added a category for all subjects who refused to answer both questions.

## Financial Literacy

We assess respondents' financial literacy in two different ways. First, we ask people to self-assess their financial literacy with the question:

**"How good, all in all, are you with financial matters?"**<sup>26</sup>

- very good
- good
- a little
- not at all

Second, we ask two questions that explicitly test respondents' financial literacy:

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<sup>25</sup>In German: "Wie hoch waren, alles in allem, die Einnahmen aus Zinsen, Dividenden und Gewinnen aus allen Ihren Wertanlagen im Jahr 2011?". Many respondents were either unwilling or unable to provide a precise answer to this question. In a follow-up question they were therefore asked to estimate the amount and choose between 6 categories: below €250, €250 to €1000, €1000 to €2500, €2500 to €5000, €5000 to €10000, more than €10000

<sup>26</sup>In German: "Wie gut kennen Sie sich alles in allem in finanziellen Angelegenheiten aus? Gar nicht, ein bisschen, gut oder sehr gut?"

**“Suppose you have €100 in a savings account. You receive 20% on this amount per year and leave the money in the account for 5 years. How much money will be in the account after these 5 years?”<sup>27</sup>.**

- more than €200
- exactly €200
- less than €200
- don’t want to answer

**“Which of the following types of investments has the largest fluctuations in returns over time?”<sup>28</sup>.**

- savings accounts
- fixed income securities
- stocks
- don’t want to answer

### **Liquid assets**

All household members are asked about individual holdings of the following asset types:

1. checking accounts
2. savings accounts
3. call deposit accounts (“Tagesgeld”)
4. fixed deposits
5. covered bonds, municipal bonds, bank bonds, corporate bonds or sovereign bonds
6. stock market mutual funds, stocks or reverse convertible bonds (“Aktienanleihen”)

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<sup>27</sup>In German: “Angenommen, Sie haben 100 € Guthaben auf Ihrem Sparkonto. Dieses Guthaben wird mit 20% pro Jahr verzinst, und Sie lassen es 5 Jahre auf diesem Konto. Wie viel Guthaben weist Ihr Sparkonto nach 5 Jahren auf?”

<sup>28</sup>In German: “Was glauben Sie: Welche der folgenden Anlageformen zeigt im Laufe der Zeit die höchsten Ertragsschwankungen? Sparbücher, festverzinsliche Wertpapiere oder Aktien?”

7. real estate funds
8. bond and money market funds
9. other funds
10. other securities

For each of these types, respondents are first asked whether they own any assets of that type at all and, if the question is answered affirmatively, about the size of the asset holdings. Respondents are instructed to estimate this amount should they be unable to provide an exact figure. We code a household as participating in the stock market if the head of household answers the question about stock market mutual funds, individual stocks and reverse convertible bonds with “yes”.

## F Robustness Checks

## F.1 Predicting real-world stock-market participation – alternative wealth measures, alternative specifications

	Dependent Variable: Stock Market Participant					
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	OLS (3)	OLS (4)	OLS (5)	Probit marginal effects (6)
Equity Share	0.220*** (0.072)	0.240*** (0.068)	0.200*** (0.064)	0.210*** (0.066)	0.140* (0.076)	0.170*** (0.056)
Female		-0.043 (0.032)	-0.029 (0.030)	-0.028 (0.030)	-0.028 (0.033)	-0.016 (0.029)
Born in East Germany		-0.058* (0.034)	-0.044 (0.033)	-0.032 (0.032)	-0.021 (0.036)	-0.079** (0.036)
Age		0.006 (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.00004 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.000 (0.000)
Abitur		0.200*** (0.061)	0.150** (0.058)	0.140** (0.058)	0.120* (0.065)	0.140*** (0.044)
University Degree		0.049 (0.078)	-0.003 (0.072)	0.013 (0.074)	-0.014 (0.083)	-0.021 (0.052)
Household Size		0.039** (0.019)	-0.004 (0.022)	0.003 (0.023)	0.013 (0.028)	0.003 (0.019)
Risk Tolerance: Low		0.020 (0.037)	0.034 (0.035)	0.033 (0.035)	0.020 (0.039)	0.017 (0.033)
Risk Tolerance: High		0.008 (0.044)	0.058 (0.043)	0.052 (0.043)	0.058 (0.048)	0.068 (0.042)
Imputed expectation of DAX		0.001 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.0005 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
S.D. of DAX		-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Gain Probability of DAX		-0.003 (0.088)	0.039 (0.085)	0.035 (0.081)	0.096 (0.096)	0.003 (0.083)
Number of Children in Household		-0.096*** (0.030)	-0.057* (0.030)	-0.067** (0.031)	-0.072** (0.035)	-0.092*** (0.031)
Employed		-0.015 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.037)	-0.030 (0.037)	-0.006 (0.042)	-0.015 (0.039)
Financially Literate		0.140*** (0.032)	0.080*** (0.031)	0.091*** (0.032)	0.078** (0.036)	0.071** (0.030)
Interest: < 250 Euros			0.061* (0.033)			0.120*** (0.046)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros			0.270*** (0.057)			0.260*** (0.047)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros			0.430*** (0.086)			0.330*** (0.058)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros			0.310*** (0.110)			0.270*** (0.069)
Interest: refused to answer			0.150 (0.100)			0.170* (0.090)
Total Liquid Assets (missing=0)				0.011*** (0.003)		
Total Liquid Assets <sup>2</sup> (missing=0)				-0.0001** (0.00003)		
Total Liquid Assets <sup>3</sup> (missing=0)				0.00000 (0.00000)		
Total Liquid Assets: missing				0.130*** (0.040)		
Household Income (missing=0)			0.023 (0.018)	0.032* (0.017)		0.020* (0.012)
Household Income: missing			0.210** (0.084)	0.230*** (0.082)		0.180*** (0.069)
Total Liquid Assets					0.012*** (0.003)	
Total Liquid Assets <sup>2</sup>					-0.0001** (0.00003)	
Total Liquid Assets <sup>3</sup>					0.00000 (0.00000)	
Household Income					0.020 (0.019)	
Constant	0.110*** (0.029)	-0.130 (0.140)	-0.130 (0.140)	-0.100 (0.130)	-0.210 (0.140)	
N	561	560	560	560	417	560
R <sup>2</sup>	0.021	0.150	0.280	0.290	0.310	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.019	0.130	0.250	0.260	0.280	
Log Likelihood						-187.000
AIC						422.000

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Income and Liquid assets are in thousands of Euros

Standard errors for OLS regressions are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust.


Standard errors for probit marginal effects are bootstrapped with 1000 replicates



## Supplementary Material: For Online Publication

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## A Raw Data in Complexity Experiment



Point size is proportional to the number of overlapping observations.

**Figure S1:** Raw Data in Complexity Experiment

## **B Instructions – SOEP study (original German)**

### **Einwilligung zur Teilnahme**

Im Folgenden bitten wir Sie, an einem "Finanzentscheidungsexperiment" teilzunehmen.

Sie können auf keinen Fall Geld verlieren!

Abhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung und zufälligen Faktoren, bekommen Sie am Ende der Befragung einen Geldbetrag tatsächlich ausbezahlt.

- Finanzentscheidungsexperiment starten
- Möchte nicht teilnehmen

### **Einwilligung zur Teilnahme – Nachfrage**

Das "Finanzentscheidungsexperiment" ist Teil der Befragung, bei dem Sie zusätzlich einen Geldbetrag ausbezahlt bekommen. Sind Sie sicher, dass Sie nicht teilnehmen wollen?

- Finanzentscheidungsexperiment doch starten
- Möchte nicht teilnehmen, weil: .....

## **Baseline – Schirm 1**

Wir bieten Ihnen eine Investitionsmöglichkeit an.

Stellen Sie sich bitte vor, 50.000 EUR aus eigenem Besitz zu investieren.

Diesen Betrag können Sie auf die folgenden beiden Geldanlagen verteilen:

1. Ein vom deutschen Staat ausgegebenes Wertpapier, das Ihnen einen Zins von 4% garantiert. Das Wertpapier wird im weiteren Text “Bundesanleihe” genannt.
2. Ein Bündel von Aktien, das im weiteren Text “Fonds” genannt wird. Der Gewinn oder Verlust dieses Fonds orientiert sich am Deutschen Aktien Index DAX, der die Entwicklung von 30 deutschen Grossunternehmen zusammenfasst.

Wir werden Sie entsprechend Ihrer Entscheidung in einem kleineren Masstab tatsächlich bezahlen.

Nehmen Sie sich Zeit, die Anweisungen in Ruhe durchzulesen und über Ihre Entscheidung nachzudenken.

## **Treatment – Schirm 1**

Wir bieten Ihnen eine Investitionsmöglichkeit an.

Stellen Sie sich bitte vor, 50.000 EUR aus eigenem Besitz zu investieren.

Diesen Betrag können Sie auf die folgenden beiden Geldanlagen verteilen:

1. Ein vom deutschen Staat ausgegebenes Wertpapier, das Ihnen einen Zins von 4% garantiert. Das Wertpapier wird im weiteren Text “Bundesanleihe” genannt.
2. Ein Bündel von Aktien, das im weiteren Text “Fonds” genannt wird. Der Gewinn oder Verlust dieses Fonds orientiert sich am Deutschen Aktien Index DAX, der die Entwicklung von 30 deutschen Grossunternehmen zusammenfasst.

Der Fonds schneidet entweder 5 Prozentpunkte besser oder 5 Prozentpunkte schlechter ab als der DAX. Welche der beiden Möglichkeiten zutreffen wird, erfahren Sie gleich.

Wir werden Sie entsprechend Ihrer Entscheidung in einem kleineren Massstab tatsächlich bezahlen.

Nehmen Sie sich Zeit, die Anweisungen in Ruhe durchzulesen und über Ihre Entscheidung nachzudenken.

## Baseline – Schirm 2

Sie verteilen zunächst, wie oben beschrieben, die 50.000 EUR auf Bundesanleihe und Fonds. Wir berechnen dann den Ertrag, den diese Investition erzielt.

- Für Geld, das Sie in die Bundesanleihe investieren, ist diese Berechnung einfach: Bei einem Zins von 4% machen Sie für jede 100 EUR, die Sie investieren einen sicheren Gewinn von 4 EUR.
- Um Gewinne und Verluste für Investitionen in den Fonds festzustellen, benutzen wir historische DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus diesem Zeitraum aus und berechnet für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen investierten Betrag geworden wäre.

Hier sehen Sie zwei Beispiele, die natürlich nur willkürlich sind und nichts über die tatsächliche Entwicklung des DAX aussagen:

Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr

- einen Gewinn von +15% erzielt hat, dann machen Sie für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben einen Gewinn von 15 EUR
- einen Verlust von -15% erzielt hat, dann verlieren Sie für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben, 15 EUR.

Ihr Gesamtgewinn ist dann einfach die Summe des Gewinns, den Sie durch Investitionen in die Bundesanleihe und den Fonds erzielen. Diesen Betrag zahlen wir Ihnen in kleinerem Massstab aus. Für je 2000 EUR bekommen Sie am Ende des Experiments 1 EUR in bar ausbezahlt.

## Treatment (minus) – Schirm 2

Sie verteilen zunächst, wie oben beschrieben, die 50.000 EUR auf Bundesanleihe und Fonds. Wir berechnen dann den Ertrag, den diese Investition erzielt.

- Für Geld, das Sie in die Bundesanleihe investieren, ist diese Berechnung einfach: Bei einem Zins von 4% machen Sie für jede 100 EUR, die Sie investieren einen sicheren Gewinn von 4 EUR.
- Um Gewinne und Verluste für Investitionen in den Fonds festzustellen, benutzen wir historische DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus diesem Zeitraum aus und berechnet für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen investierten Betrag geworden wäre.

**Zusätzlich wurde vom Computer zufällig bestimmt, dass Sie 5 Prozentpunkte weniger erhalten.**

Hier sehen Sie drei Beispiele, die natürlich nur willkürlich sind und nichts über die tatsächliche Entwicklung des DAX aussagen: Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr

- einen Gewinn von +15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Gewinn von  $15\% - 5\% = 10\%$ . Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben einen Gewinn von 10 EUR
- einen Verlust von -15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Verlust von  $-15\% - 5\% = -20\%$ . Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben einen Verlust von -20 EUR.
- Einen Gewinn von +2% gemacht hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Verlust von  $2\% - 5\% = -3\%$ . Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben, einen Verlust von -3 EUR.

Ihr Gesamtgewinn ist dann einfach die Summe des Gewinns, den Sie durch Investitionen in die Bundesanleihe und den Fonds erzielen. Diesen Betrag zahlen wir Ihnen in kleinerem Maßstab aus. Für je 2000 EUR bekommen Sie am Ende des Experiments 1 EUR in bar ausbezahlt.

## Treatment (plus) – Schirm 2

Sie verteilen zunächst, wie oben beschrieben, die 50.000 EUR auf Bundesanleihe und Fonds. Wir berechnen dann den Ertrag, den diese Investition erzielt.

- Für Geld, das Sie in die Bundesanleihe investieren, ist diese Berechnung einfach: Bei einem Zins von 4% machen Sie für jede 100 EUR, die Sie investieren einen sicheren Gewinn von 4 EUR.
- Um Gewinne und Verluste für Investitionen in den Fonds festzustellen, benutzen wir historische DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus diesem Zeitraum aus und berechnet für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen investierten Betrag geworden wäre.

**Zusätzlich wurde vom Computer zufällig bestimmt, dass Sie 5 Prozentpunkte mehr erhalten.**

Hier sehen Sie drei Beispiele, die natürlich nur willkürlich sind und nichts über die tatsächliche Entwicklung des DAX aussagen:

Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr

- einen Gewinn von +15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Gewinn von  $15\% + 5\% = 20\%$ . Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben einen Gewinn von 20 EUR
- einen Verlust von -15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Verlust von  $-15\% + 5\% = -10\%$ . Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben einen Verlust von -10 EUR.
- einen Verlust von -2% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Gewinn von  $-2\% + 5\% = 3\%$ . Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben, einen Gewinn von 3 EUR.

Ihr Gesamtgewinn ist dann einfach die Summe des Gewinns, den Sie durch Investitionen in die Bundesanleihe und den Fonds erzielen. Diesen Betrag zahlen wir Ihnen in kleinerem Maßstab aus. Für jede 2000 EUR bekommen



Sie am Ende des Experiments 1 EUR in bar ausbezahlt.

### **Baseline – Schirm 3**

Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also in jedem Fall eine Verzinsung von 4% ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung jeden der DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010 erzielen kann.

Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in den Fonds?

Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass die beiden Beträge zusammen genau 50.000 EUR ergeben.

In die Bundesanleihe ..... Euro

In den Fonds ..... Euro

### **Treatment (minus) – Schirm 3**

Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also in jedem Fall eine Verzinsung von 4% ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung jeden der DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010, abzüglich der 5 Prozentpunkte, erzielen kann.

Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in den Fonds?

Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass die beiden Beträge zusammen genau 50.000 EUR ergeben.

In die Bundesanleihe ..... Euro

In den Fonds ..... Euro

### **Treatment (plus) – Schirm 3**

Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also in jedem Fall eine Verzinsung von 4% ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung jeden der DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010, zuzüglich der 5 Prozentpunkte, erzielen kann.

Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in den Fonds?

Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass die beiden Beträge zusammen genau 50.000 EUR ergeben.

In die Bundesanleihe ..... Euro

In den Fonds ..... Euro

## Baseline – Schirm 4

Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Entwicklung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des DAX in den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab.

Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie die möglichen Zahlungen des Fonds einschätzen.

Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Verluste und Gewinne des Fonds in den folgenden sieben Bereichen zusammen:

Verlust zwischen 60% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 30% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 30% und 60%	Gewinn zwischen 60% und 90%	Gewinn zwischen 90% und 120%
---------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	---------------------------------------

Über den sieben Bereichen befinden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Kästchen. Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häufig Sie den Fonds im jeweiligen Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästen über den sieben Bereichen anklicken. Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine Häufigkeit von 1 zu 20, also 5 Prozent.

Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie es halten, dass Ihr Fonds einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem entsprechenden Bereich erzielt.

- Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so bringen Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der Verlust oder Gewinn Ihres Fonds nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
- Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie einen Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr wahrscheinlich
- Mehr Kästchen — bis zu 20 in einem Bereich — stehen für entsprechend höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten.

## Treatment (minus) – Schirm 4

Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Entwicklung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des DAX in den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab. Der Fonds liegt dabei immer 5 Prozentpunkte unter dem, was der DAX in einem dieser Jahre gezahlt hätte.

Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie die möglichen Zahlungen des Fonds einschätzen.

Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Verluste und Gewinne des Fonds in den folgenden sieben Bereichen zusammen:

Verlust zwischen 60% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 30% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 30% und 60%	Gewinn zwischen 60% und 90%	Gewinn zwischen 90% und 120%
---------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	---------------------------------------

Über den sieben Bereichen befinden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Kästchen. Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häufig Sie den Fonds im jeweiligen Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästen über den sieben Bereichen anklicken. Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine Häufigkeit von 1 zu 20, also 5 Prozent.

Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie es halten, dass Ihr Fonds einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem entsprechenden Bereich erzielt.

- Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so bringen Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der Verlust oder Gewinn Ihres Fonds nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
- Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie einen Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr wahrscheinlich
- Mehr Kästchen — bis zu 20 in einem Bereich — stehen für entsprechend höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten.

## Treatment (plus) – Schirm 4

Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Entwicklung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des DAX in den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab. Der Fonds liegt dabei immer 5 Prozentpunkte über dem, was der DAX in einem dieser Jahre gezahlt hätte.

Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie die möglichen Zahlungen des Fonds einschätzen.

Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Verluste und Gewinne des Fonds in den folgenden sieben Bereichen zusammen:

Verlust zwischen 60% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 30% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 30% und 60%	Gewinn zwischen 60% und 90%	Gewinn zwischen 90% und 120%
---------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	---------------------------------------

Über den sieben Bereichen befinden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Kästchen. Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häufig Sie den Fonds im jeweiligen Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästen über den sieben Bereichen anklicken. Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine Häufigkeit von 1 zu 20, also 5 Prozent.

Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie es halten, dass Ihr Fonds einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem entsprechenden Bereich erzielt.

- Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so bringen Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der Verlust oder Gewinn Ihres Fonds nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
- Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie einen Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr wahrscheinlich
- Mehr Kästchen – bis zu 20 in einem Bereich – stehen für entsprechend höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten.



**Treatment (plus & minus) – Schirm 5**

Markieren Sie jetzt bitte die 20 Kästchen so, dass Sie Ihre Entschätzung der Wertveränderung des Fonds widerspiegeln. Beachten Sie dabei alle für Sie denkbaren Möglichkeiten, die sich aus der historischen DAX-Entwicklung und dem (Aufschlag/Abschlag) von 5 Prozenpunkten ergeben.

Sollten Sie zu diesem Zeitpunkt Ihre Investitionsentscheidung noch einmal ändern wollen, drücken Sie bitte auf “Zurück”.

*Füllen Sie die Kästchen immer, ohne Lücken, von UNTEN nach OBEN auf!*

Verlust zwischen 60% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 30% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 30% und 60%	Gewinn zwischen 60% und 90%	Gewinn zwischen 90% und 120%

**Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 6**

Geben Sie bitte ausserdem an, welche durchschnittliche Wertveränderung (in %) Sie für den Fonds erwarten.

→ Bitte maximal auf eine Stelle nach dem Komma eingeben (z.B. xx.x)!

→ Bitte Punkt anstatt Komma eingeben

Durchschnittliche Wertsteigerung .....

oder

Durchschnittlicher Wertverlust: .....

**Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 7**

Wir würden Ihnen nun gern ein paar Fragen zu dem soeben absolvierten Experiment stellen.

Wie Sie diese Fragen beantworten wird keinen Einfluss auf Ihre Auszahlung haben.

**Wie sicher sind Sie sich Ihrer Einschätzung des Fonds?**

Antworten Sie bitte anhand der folgenden Skala, bei der “0” gar nicht sicher und der Wert “10” sehr sicher bedeutet.

Mit den Werten zwischen “0” und “10” können Sie Ihre Meinung abstufen.

Gar nicht sicher                                        Sehr sicher



## Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 8

Wahr oder falsch? Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr einen Gewinn von 40% gemacht hat, so wirft auch der Ihnen angebotene Fonds einen Gewinn von 40% ab.

- wahr
- falsch

Wahr oder falsch? Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr einen Verlust von 4% gemacht hat, so erzielt der Ihnen angebotene Fonds einen Verlust von -1%

- wahr
- falsch

## **Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 9**

Nachdem es in den bisherigen Fragen um die Entwicklung eines an den DAX gekoppelten Fonds in der Vergangenheit ging wüssten wir nun gern, was Sie für die zukünftige Entwicklung des DAX selbst erwarten. Geben Sie auf dem nächsten Bildschirm an, wo Sie den DAX in einem Jahr sehen, ausgedrückt in Gewinn oder Verlust gegenüber dem heutigen Wert. Wir fassen dazu erneut die möglichen Gewinne und Verluste in die sieben grösseren Bereiche zusammen.

Wir bitten Sie auch hier, alle für Sie denkbaren Entwicklungen des DAX in Betracht zu ziehen.

Zeigen Sie uns dann an, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie die jeweiligen Gewinne und Verluste halten.

Bitte drücken Sie dies aus, indem Sie wieder die 20 Kästchen markieren.

Ein Kästchen steht hier wieder für eine Häufigkeit von 1 zu 20, also 5 Prozent.

Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns für wie wahrscheinlich Sie die Wertveränderung des DAX, in einem Jahr, in einem der sieben Bereiche halten.

- Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so bringen Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass die Wertveränderung des DAX nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
- Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie die Wertveränderung des DAX in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr wahrscheinlich.
- Mehr Kästchen – bis zu 20 in einem Bereich – stehen für entsprechend höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten.

**Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 10**

Markieren Sie jetzt bitte die 20 Kästchen so, dass Sie Ihre Einschätzung der DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verlust in den nächsten 12 Monaten, also bis zum 19.11.2013 widerspiegeln.

*Füllen Sie die Kästchen immer, ohne Lücken, von UNTEN nach OBEN auf!*

Verlust zwischen 60% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 30% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 30% und 60%	Gewinn zwischen 60% und 90%	Gewinn zwischen 90% und 120%

## Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 11

Ausserdem interessiert uns auch hier, wie sicher Sie sich Ihrer Einschätzung des DAX sind.

Wie sicher sind Sie sich Ihrer Einschätzung des DAX?

Antworten Sie bitte anhand der folgenden Skala, bei der “0” gar nicht sicher und der Wert “10” sehr sicher bedeutet.

Mit den Werten zwischen “0” und “10” können Sie Ihre Meinung abstufen.

Gar nicht sicher                                        Sehr sicher

## Baseline & Treatment – Auszahlungsübersicht

Der Computer hat per Zufall das Jahr 1975 ausgewählt.

In diesem Jahr hat der DAX einen Gewinn von 41.21%,  
und der Fonds somit einen Gewinn von 36.21% gemacht.

Wir zahlen Ihnen deshalb auf Basis Ihrer Investition 31 EUR aus, die sich wie folgt berechnen:

Anlage	Investition	Gewinn/Verlust	Auszahlung
Bundesanleihe	20000 EUR	4,0%	20800 EUR
Fonds	30000 EUR	36,21%	40863 EUR
		Summe	61663 EUR

Auszahlung	30,83 EUR
Auf den nächsten Euro gerundet	31 EUR

Das Finanzentscheidungsexperiment ist nun zu Ende

⇒ *Der Auszahlungsbetrag wird am Ende des Interviews nochmal angezeigt!*

## C Instructions – SOEP study (English translation)

### Agreement to Participate

In the following we kindly ask you to take part in a "financial decision experiment".

You cannot possibly lose any money!

Depending on the decisions you will make and some random factors you will, however, receive some actual money at the end of the survey.

- Start the financial decision experiment
- I do not want to participate

### Agreement to Participate – Second Take

The "financial decision experiment" is a part of this survey in which you can earn some money. Are you sure that you do not want to participate?

- I have changed my mind: Start the financial decision experiment
- I do not want to participate because: .....

## **Baseline – Screen 1**

We offer you an investment opportunity.

Please imagine that you would like to invest 50,000 EUR of your own savings.

You can distribute this amount between the following investments:

1. A German sovereign bond that guarantees you an interest rate of 4%. We will call this asset the "Bund" henceforth.
2. A bundle of stocks that will be called the "fund". The gains and losses on this fund will be based on the German stock market index DAX, which is a summary measure of the performance of 30 major German enterprises.

We will pay you according to your decision on a smaller scale.

Please take your time to carefully read the instructions and think about your decision.

## **Treatment – Screen 1**

We offer you an investment opportunity.

Please imagine that you would like to invest 50,000 EUR of your own savings.

You can distribute this amount between the following investments:

1. A German sovereign bond that guarantees you an interest rate of 4%. We will call this asset the "Bund" henceforth.
2. A bundle of stocks that will be called the "fund". The gains and losses on this fund will be based on the German stock market index DAX, which is a summary measure of the performance of 30 major German enterprises.

The return of the fund will be either 5 percentage points higher or 5 percentage points lower than that of the DAX. You will find out which of these two possibilities applies to you soon.

We will pay you according to your decision on a smaller scale.

Please take your time to carefully read the instructions and think about your decision.

## Baseline – Screen 2

Please distribute the 50,000 EUR over Bund and fund as described above. We will then calculate the total return on your investment.

- For money invested in the Bund the calculation is simple: For each 100 EUR you invest in the Bund at an interest rate of 4% you will make sure profit of 4 EUR.
- Gains and losses on investments in the fund will be based on historical DAX gains and losses from 1951 to 2010. The computer will randomly choose a year in this time period and calculate for this exact year how your investment would have fared.

The following two examples are arbitrary and do not say anything about the actual performance of the DAX:

If the DAX in the randomly chosen year had made

- a gain of +15%, you would have earned 15 EUR for each 100 EUR invested in fund.
- a loss of -15%, you would have lost 15 EUR for each 100 EUR invested in fund.

Your total profit will be the sum of the profits of your investments in both Bund and fund. We will actually pay you this amount on a smaller scale. At the end of the experiment you will receive 1 EUR in cash for each 2000 EUR.



## Treatment (minus) – Screen 2

Please distribute the 50,000 EUR over Bund and fund as described above. We will then calculate the total return on your investment.

- For money invested in the Bund the calculation is simple: For each 100 EUR you invest in the Bund at an interest rate of 4% you will make sure profit of 4 EUR.
- Gains and losses on investments in the fund will be based on historical DAX gains and losses from 1951 to 2010. The computer will randomly choose a year in this time period and calculate for this exact year how your investment would have fared.

**Additionally the computer has determined through a random draw that you will receive 5 percentage points less.**

The following two examples are arbitrary and do not say anything about the actual performance of the DAX:

If the DAX in the randomly chosen year had made

- a gain of +15%, the fund would make a gain of  $15\% - 5\% = 10\%$ . This means that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would earn 10 EUR.
- a loss of -15%, the fund would make a loss of  $-15\% - 5\% = -20\%$ . This means that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would lose 20 EUR.
- a gain of +2%, then the fund would make a loss of  $2\% - 5\% = -3\%$ . This means that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would lose 3 EUR.

Your total profit will be the sum of the profits of your investments in both Bund and fund. We will actually pay you this amount on a smaller scale. At the end of the experiment you will receive 1 EUR in cash for each 2000 EUR.

## Treatment (plus) – Screen 2

Please distribute the 50,000 EUR over Bund and fund as described above. We will then calculate the total return on your investment.

- For money invested in the Bund the calculation is simple: For each 100 EUR you invest in the Bund at an interest rate of 4% you will make sure profit of 4 EUR.
- Gains and losses on investments in the fund will be based on historical DAX gains and losses from 1951 to 2010. The computer will randomly choose a year in this time period and calculate for this exact year how your investment would have fared.

**Additionally the computer has determined through a random draw that you will receive 5 percentage points more.**

The following two examples are arbitrary and do not say anything about the actual performance of the DAX:

If the DAX of the randomly chosen year had made

- a gain of +15%, the fund would make a gain of  $15\%+5\%=20\%$ . This means that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would earn 20 EUR.
- a loss of -15%, the fund would make a loss of  $-15\%+5\%=-10\%$ . This means that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would lose 10 EUR.
- a loss of -2%, the fund would make a gain of  $-2\%+5\%=3\%$ . This means that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would earn 3 EUR.

Your total profit will be the sum of the profits of your investments in both Bund and fund. We will actually pay you this amount on a smaller scale. At the end of the experiment you will receive 1 EUR in cash for each 2000 EUR.

**Baseline – Screen 3**

To sum up: The Bund guarantees you an interest of 4% while the fund can produce any of the DAX-gain or DAX-losses from the years 1951 to 2010.

How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how much do you want to invest in the fund?

Please make sure that the two amounts sum up to exactly 50,000.

Bund .....Euro

fund .....Euro

**Treatment (minus) – Screen 3**

To sum up: The Bund guarantees you an interest of 4% while the fund can produce any of the DAX-gain or DAX-losses from the years 1951 to 2010, minus the 5 percentage points.

How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how much do you want to invest in the fund?

Please make sure that the two amounts sum up to exactly 50,000.

Bund .....Euro

fund .....Euro

**Treatment (plus) – Screen 3**

To sum up: The Bund guarantees you an interest of 4% while the fund can produce any of the DAX-gain or DAX-losses from the years 1951 to 2010, plus the 5 percentage points.

How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how much do you want to invest in the fund?

Please make sure that the two amounts sum up to exactly 50,000.

Bund .....Euro  
fund .....Euro

## Baseline – Screen 4

As you know, the development of the fund depends on the development of the DAX from 1951 to 2010.

In the following we would like to ask you for your expectations of the fund's possible payoffs.

For this purpose we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund into seven ranges on the next screen.

Loss of 60% to 90%	Loss of 30% to 90%	Loss of 0% to 30%	Gain of 0% to 30%	Gain of 30% to 60%	Gain of 60% to 90%	Gain of 90% to 120%
--------------------------	--------------------------	-------------------------	-------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	---------------------------

On the next screen 20 boxes will be placed above each of the seven ranges. Please indicate for all seven ranges how often you expect the fund to be in each range by clicking on the mentioned boxes. Please mark exactly twenty boxes. One box stands for a frequency of 1 in 20, i.e. for 5 percent.

By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your fund will produce a gain or loss in the given range.

- If, for instance, you don't mark any of the boxes in a particular range, this will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in this range.
- If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or gain in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
- More boxes -- up to 20 in one range -- imply correspondingly higher probabilities.

## Treatment (minus) – Screen 4

As you know, the development of the fund depends on the development of the DAX from 1951 to 2010. The fund will always be 5 percentage points below the outcome that the DAX would have paid in one of these years.

In the following we would like to ask you for your expectations of the fund's possible payoffs.

For this purpose we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund into seven ranges on the next screen.

Loss of 60% to 90%	Loss of 30% to 90%	Loss of 0% to 30%	Gain of 0% to 30%	Gain of 30% to 60%	Gain of 60% to 90%	Gain of 90% to 120%
--------------------------	--------------------------	-------------------------	-------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	---------------------------

On the next screen 20 boxes will be placed above each of the seven ranges. Please indicate for all seven ranges how often you expect the fund to be in each range by clicking on the mentioned boxes. Please mark exactly twenty boxes. One box stands for a frequency of 1 in 20, i.e. for 5 percent.

By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your fund will produce a gain or loss in the given range.

- If, for instance, you don't mark any of the boxes in a particular range, this will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in this range.
- If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or gain in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
- More boxes -- up to 20 in one range -- imply correspondingly higher probabilities.

## Treatment (plus) – Screen 4

As you know, the development of the fund depends on the development of the DAX from 1951 to 2010. The fund will always be 5 percentage points above the outcome that the DAX would have paid in one of these years.

In the following we would like to ask you for your expectations of the fund's possible payoffs.

For this purpose we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund into seven ranges on the next screen.

Loss of 60% to 90%	Loss of 30% to 90%	Loss of 0% to 30%	Gain of 0% to 30%	Gain of 30% to 60%	Gain of 60% to 90%	Gain of 90% to 120%
--------------------------	--------------------------	-------------------------	-------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	---------------------------

On the next screen 20 boxes will be placed above each of the seven ranges. Please indicate for all seven ranges how often you expect the fund to be in each range by clicking on the mentioned boxes. Please mark exactly twenty boxes. One box stands for a frequency of 1 in 20, i.e. for 5 percent.

By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your fund will produce a gain or loss in the given range.

- If, for instance, you don't mark any of the boxes in a particular range, this will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in this range.
- If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or gain in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
- More boxes -- up to 20 in one range -- imply correspondingly higher probabilities.

**Baseline – Screen 5**

Please mark the 20 boxes such that they reflect your assessment of the development of the fund. Please consider every — in your opinion — possible historical DAX development.

If you would like to reconsider and change your investment decision, please click the button “Back”.

*Mark the boxes, avoiding gaps from BOTTOM to TOP!*

Loss of 60% to 90%	Loss of 30% to 90%	Loss of 0% to 30%	Gain of 0% to 30%	Gain of 30% to 60%	Gain of 60% to 90%	Gain of 90% to 120%	



**Treatment (plus & minus) – Screen 5**

Please mark the 20 boxes such that they reflect your assessment of the development of the fund. Please consider every — in your opinion — possible combination of the historical DAX development and the (addition/deduction) of 5 percentage points.

If you would like to reconsider and change your investment decision, please click the button “Back”.

*Mark the boxes, avoiding gaps from BOTTOM to TOP!*

Loss of 60% to 90%	Loss of 30% to 90%	Loss of 0% to 30%	Gain of 0% to 30%	Gain of 30% to 60%	Gain of 60% to 90%	Gain of 90% to 120%	

**Baseline & Treatment – Screen 6**

Please also let us know what average return (*lit*: “change in value”) (in %) you expect for the fund.

→ *Please use a maximum of one decimal! (e.g. xx.x)*

→ *Please use a decimal point instead of a comma*

Average increase in value    .....

or

Average decrease in value:    .....

**Baseline & Treatment – Screen 7**

We would like to ask you some questions about the experiment which you have just completed.

Your answers to these questions will not influence your payment.

**How confident are you in your assessment of the fund?**

Please answer according to the following scale, in which “0” means “not at all confident” and the value “10” means “very confident”.

With the values between “0” and “10” you can grade your opinion.

Not at all confident    0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   Very confident

### **Baseline & Treatment – Screen 8**

True or false? If the DAX made a gain of 40% in the randomly chosen year, the fund you have been offered would also make a gain of 40%.

- true
- false

True or false? If the DAX made a loss of 4% in the randomly chosen year, the fund you have been offered would make a loss of -1%.

- true
- false

## Baseline & Treatment – Screen 9

The questions so far all concerned the development of a fund whose returns were tied to the development of the DAX in the past. We would now like to ask you some questions concerning your expectations for the *future* development of the DAX itself. On the next screen, please let us know where you see the DAX in one year, expressed as a gain or loss relative to its current value. We will again group the possible gains and losses into seven larger ranges.

Again we ask you to consider all of the developments of the DAX that you believe are possible. Please indicate how likely you think the different profits and losses to be. Please express this by again marking 20 boxes. As before, one box stands for a frequency of 1 out of 20, i.e. 5 percent.

By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you consider the change in value of the DAX in one year to lie in each of the 7 ranges

- If, for instance, you don't mark any of the boxes in a particular range, this will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will not lie in this range.
- If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or gain in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
- More boxes -- up to 20 in one range -- imply correspondingly higher probabilities.

**Baseline & Treatment – Screen 10**

Please mark the 20 boxes according to your assessment of the development of the DAX-profits and DAX-losses in the next 12 months, i.e. until 19.11.2013.

*Mark the boxes, avoiding gaps from BOTTOM to TOP!*

Loss of 60% to 90%	Loss of 30% to 90%	Loss of 0% to 30%	Gain of 0% to 30%	Gain of 30% to 60%	Gain of 60% to 90%	Gain of 90% to 120%	

**Baseline & Treatment – Screen 11**

Moreover, we are interested in how sure you are about your assessment of the DAX.

How confident are you in your assessment of the DAX?

Please answer according to the following scale, in which “0” means “not at all confident” and the value “10” means “very confident”.

With the values between “0” and “10” you can grade your opinion.

Not at all confident                                        Very confident

## Baseline & Treatment – Auszahlungsübersicht

The Computer randomly chose the year 1975.

In this year the DAX incurred a profit of 41.21%

which means that fund incurred a profit of 36.21%

As a result, we will pay you 31 EUR based on your investment, according to the following calculation:

Asset	Invested Amount	Gain/Loss	Payment
Bundesanleihe	20.000 EUR	4.0%	20.800 EUR
Fonds	30.000 EUR	36.21%	40.863 EUR
		Sum	61.663 EUR

Payment	30.83 EUR
Rounded up to the next Euro	31 EUR

This concludes the financial decision experiment.

⇒ *The amount of payment will reappear on the screen at the end of the interview.*

## **D Instructions – Complexity Study (original German)**

### **Willkommens-Schirm**

Willkommen!

Im Folgenden bitten wir Sie, an einem Finanzentscheidungsexperiment teilzunehmen.

Abhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung und zufälligen Faktoren, bekommen Sie am Ende der Befragung einen Geldbetrag tatsächlich ausbezahlt. Sie können dabei auf keinen Fall Geld verlieren.

Es ist wichtig, dass Sie während des Experiments still bleiben und nicht mit anderen Teilnehmern kommunizieren. Sollten Sie Fragen haben oder Hilfe brauchen, dann heben Sie bitte die Hand, und ein Experimentator wird zu Ihnen kommen. Sollten Sie sich nicht an diese Anweisung halten, so müssen wir Sie vom Experiment ausschließen. Vielen Dank.



## Schirm 1

Im Folgenden müssen Sie in 8 Runden jeweils eine Investitionsentscheidung fällen. Alle Runden sind gleich aufgebaut. Eine der 8 Runden wird am Ende des Experiments zufällig ausgewählt und Ihnen tatsächlich ausbezahlt. Wie genau das passiert, dazu gleich gleich mehr.

Sie haben in jeder Runde jeweils eine Summe Geld zur Verfügung, die Sie zwischen zwei Geldanlagen aufteilen müssen. Außerdem bekommen Sie jeweils einen zusätzlichen festen Geldbetrag, unabhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung in dieser Runde.

Eine der beiden Geldanlagen hat einen festen Zinssatz. Die andere Geldanlage hat einen Zinssatz, der von der Entwicklung am Aktienmarkt abhängt. Darüber hinaus gibt es pro Runde auf jede der beiden Geldanlagen einen Bonus (das heißt der Zinssatz wird um einen festen Betrag erhöht).

Die Geldanlage mit dem festen Zinssatz zahlt in jeder Runde 2% Zinsertrag zuzüglich des Bonus. Diese Geldanlage wird im weiteren Text "Bundesanleihe" genannt. Die andere Geldanlage orientiert sich am Deutschen Aktien Index DAX, der die Entwicklung von 30 deutschen Großunternehmen zusammenfasst. Um die Verzinsung dieser Geldanlage festzustellen, benutzen wir historische DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010, und addieren den entsprechenden Bonus hinzu. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus diesem Zeitraum aus und berechnet für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen investierten Betrag geworden wäre. Diese Geldanlage wird im weiteren Text "Fonds" genannt.

## Schirm 2

Ein Beispiel könnte wie folgt aussehen. Sie haben 50.000 Euro, die Sie auf Bundesanleihe und Fonds aufteilen müssen und eine Auszahlung von 14.000 Euro, die Sie unabhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung bekommen. Auf den Zins der Bundesanleihe erhalten Sie einen Bonus von 3 Prozentpunkten, auf den Zins des Fonds erhalten Sie ebenfalls einen Bonus von 3 Prozentpunkten.

Konkret bedeutet das in diesem Beispiel, dass Sie für den Betrag, den Sie in die Bundesanleihe investieren, einen Zins von 5% erhalten: die stets gleichen 2% zuzüglich des in dieser Runde relevanten Bonus von 3%. Sie machen also für jede 100 Euro, die Sie in die Bundesanleihe investiert haben, einen Gewinn von 5 Euro, und bekommen am Ende 105 Euro ausgezahlt. Die Verzinsung des in den Fonds investierten Betrags wird in diesem Beispiel wie folgt bestimmt: Sie ist die realisierte Kursentwicklung des DAX in einem zufällig gezogenen Jahr (aus 1951 bis 2010) plus der Bonus von 3

- Hat also der DAX zum Beispiel in dem zufällig gezogenen Jahr einen Gewinn von 3,5% gemacht, erhalten Sie auf den Betrag, den Sie in den Fonds investiert haben, eine Verzinsung von 6,5%. Sie machen also für jede 100 Euro, die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben, einen Gewinn von 6,50 Euro, und bekommen am Ende 106,50 Euro ausgezahlt.
- Hat der DAX dagegen im zufällig gezogenen Jahr einen Gewinn von 12% gemacht, erhalten Sie auf Ihren investierten Betrag eine Verzinsung von 15% (mit 115 Euro Auszahlung pro 100 Euro Investition).
- Hat der DAX im zufällig gezogenen Jahr einen Verlust von 12% gemacht, so erhalten Sie eine negative Verzinsung, die aber wegen dem Bonus um 3% geringer ist, also ein Verlust von 9%. In diesem Fall würden Sie für jede 100 Euro Investition eine Auszahlung von 91 Euro bekommen.

Ihre Gesamtauszahlung ergibt sich in diesem Beispiel als 14.000 Euro (die feste Auszahlung) plus die verzinste Investition in die Bundesanleihe plus die verzinste Investition in den Fonds.

Bitte beachten Sie, dass der Bonus auf die Bundesanleihe sich später vom Bonus auf den Fonds unterscheiden wird. Sie sind nur in diesem Beispiel gleich hoch gewählt.

(Das Beispiel ist natürlich willkürlich und sagt nichts über die tatsächliche Entwicklung des DAX oder über andere unbekanntes Größen aus.)

### **Schirm 3**

Die Gesamtauszahlung zahlen wir Ihnen für eine der 8 Runden im kleineren Maßstab aus. Das heißt, der Computer wählt am Ende des Experiments zufällig eine der 8 Runden aus. Dabei hat jede Runde die gleiche Wahrscheinlichkeit, ausgewählt zu werden. Diese Runde wird Ihnen in bar ausbezahlt.

Zusätzlich zieht der Computer ebenso zufällig und mit gleicher Wahrscheinlichkeit ein Jahr aus dem Zeitraum 1951 bis 2010. Der Gewinn oder Verlust des DAX in diesem Jahr wird dann herangezogen, um Ihre Auszahlung zu bestimmen.

Für je 5000 Euro, die Sie in der Runde als Gesamtauszahlung bekommen, erhalten Sie 1 Euro in bar.

Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also eine Verzinsung von 2% zuzüglich des entsprechenden Bonus ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung jeden der DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010 zuzüglich des entsprechenden Bonus erzielen kann.

## Investitions-Schirm

### Runde 1

Sie haben 50.000 Euro, die Sie zwischen der Bundesanleihe und dem Fonds aufteilen müssen. Unabhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung erhalten Sie zusätzlich einen Betrag von 17.550 Euro.

Für die Bundesanleihe gibt es einen Bonus von 2,80 Prozentpunkten.

Für den Fonds gibt es einen Bonus von 5,90 Prozentpunkten.

Bonus auf die Bundesanleihe	Bonus auf den Fonds	Investitions-summe	zusätzliche Zahlung
2,80	5,90	50.000	17.550
Prozentpunkte	Prozentpunkte	Euro	Euro

Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in den Fonds?

*Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass beide Beträge ganze Zahlen sind und zusammen genau 50.000 EUR ergeben.*

In die Bundesanleihe ..... Euro

In den Fonds ..... Euro

#### Schirm 4

Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Verzinsung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des DAX in den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab. Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie die Gewinne und Verluste des DAX in diesem Zeitraum einschätzen.

Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Gewinne und Verluste in den folgenden sieben Bereichen zusammen:

Verlust zwischen 60% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 30% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 30% und 60%	Gewinn zwischen 60% und 90%	Gewinn zwischen 90% und 120%
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Über den sieben Bereichen befinden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Kästchen. Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häufig Sie den DAX im jeweiligen Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästchen über den sieben Bereichen anklicken.

Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine Häufigkeit von 1 zu 20, also 5 Prozent.

Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns Einschätzung darüber, wie häufig der DAX in den Jahren 1951-2010 einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem entsprechenden Bereich erzielt, an.

- Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar kein Kästchen, so bringen Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der Verlust oder Gewinn des DAX nie in diesem Bereich lag.
- Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie einen Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr wahrscheinlich.
- Mehr Kästchen - bis zu 20 in einem Bereich - stehen für entsprechend höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten.

## Schirm 5

Markieren Sie jetzt bitte die 20 Kästchen so, dass Sie Ihre Einschätzung der Wertveränderung des DAX im Zeitraum 1951 bis 2010 widerspiegeln.

*Füllen Sie die Kästchen immer, ohne Lücken, von UNTEN nach OBEN auf!*

Verlust zwischen 60% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 30% und 90%	Verlust zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 0% und 30%	Gewinn zwischen 30% und 60%	Gewinn zwischen 60% und 90%	Gewinn zwischen 90% und 120%

## Auszahlungsübersicht

Das war's. Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme!

Der Computer hat per Zufall bestimmt, dass Ihnen ihre Investition aus Runde 6 ausbezahlt wird. In dieser Runde haben Sie 25.000 EUR in die Bundesanleihe und 25.000 EUR in den DAX investiert. Der Bonus auf den Zins der Bundesanleihe betrug in dieser Runde 3,00 Prozentpunkte, der Bonus auf den DAX betrug 6,05 Prozentpunkte.

Der Computer hat außerdem per Zufall das Jahr 1992 ausgewählt. In diesem Jahr hat der DAX einen Verlust von 0,66% gemacht.

Wir zahlen Ihnen deshalb auf Basis ihrer Investition 14 EUR aus, die sich wie folgt berechnen:

Anlage	investierter Betrag	Gewinn / Verlust	Bonus/Malus	Gewinn / Verlust insgesamt	Auszahlung
Bundesanleihe	25.000 EUR	2 %	3,00 %	5,00 %	26.250 EUR
Fonds	25.000 EUR	-0,66 %	6,05 %	5,39 %	26.348 EUR
				Zusätzliche Zahlung	15.800 EUR
				Summe	68.398 EUR
				Summe / 5000	13,68 EUR
				(auf den nächsten EUR gerundet)	14 EUR

Bitte bleiben Sie noch einen Moment sitzen. Sobald die große Mehrzahl der Teilnehmer das Experiment abgeschlossen hat, werden wir mit der Auszahlung beginnen.

## **E Instructions – Complexity Study (English translation)**

### **Welcome Screen**

Welcome!

In the following, we kindly ask you to take part in a financial decision experiment.

Depending on your decision and some random factors, you will receive an amount of money for real at the end of the experiment. You cannot possibly lose any money.

It is important that you remain silent throughout the experiment and that you do not communicate with other participants. Should you have any questions or need any help, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you do not follow these instructions, we will have to exclude you from the experiment. Thank you very much.



## Screen 1

In the following you have to make one investment decision in each of 8 rounds. All rounds are constructed in the same way. At the end of the experiment one of the 8 rounds will be randomly selected and the money earned in this round will be your payment. We will tell you more about the exact way this works shortly.

In each round you will have a certain amount of money, which you must distribute among two financial assets. Furthermore, in each round you will receive an additional fixed amount of money that you will receive independent of what your investment decision is.

One of the two financial assets offers a fixed rate of interest. The other asset has an interest rate which depends on the development of the stock market. In addition there will be a bonus applied to both assets (i.e. the interest rate will be increased by a fixed amount).

The investment possibility with the fixed interest rate pays 2% plus the bonus in each round. We will call this asset the “Bund” in the following text. The other financial asset will be based on the German stock market index DAX, which is a summary measure of the performance of 30 major German enterprises. To determine the return on this investment, we use historical DAX-profits and DAX-losses from the years 1951 to 2010 and then add the bonus. The computer randomly chooses a year in this period and calculates for this exact year how your invested sum would have fared. We will call this financial asset the “fund”.

## Screen 2

An example could be as follows. Imagine that you have 50,000 Euros, which you must distribute over Bund and fund, as well as a payment of 14,000 Euros that you receive independent of your investment decision. You receive a 3 percentage points bonus on the interest of the Bund, and a 3 percentage points bonus on the interest of the fund.

Concretely for this example, that means that you would receive an interest of 5% for the amount invested in the Bund: the usual 2% plus the relevant bonus of 3% for this round. For each 100 Euros invested in the bund, you earn 5 euros, and are paid 105 euros at the end. The interest of the amount invested in the fund is calculated as follows: It will be the realized return of the DAX in one randomly chosen year (from 1951 to 2010) plus the bonus of 3%.

- If the DAX made a profit of 3.5% in the randomly chosen year, you would would get an interest rate of 6.5 % on the amount invested in the fund. This means that you earn 6.50 euros for each 100 euros invested in the fund and are paid 106.50 euros at the end of the experiment.
- If, in contrast, the DAX made a gain of 12% in the randomly chosen year, you would receive an interest rate of 15% on your investment (with 115 euros earned for each 100 euros of your investment).
- If, in the randomly chosen year, the DAX made a loss of 12%, you would receive a negative interest rate, which however would be lower due to the bonus of 3%, i.e. a loss of 9%. In this case you would earn 91 euros for each 100 euros invested.

In this example your complete payment would be made up of 14.000 euros (the fixed payment) plus the result of the investment in the Bund plus the result of the investment in the fund.

Please note that the bonus on the Bund later may differ from the bonus on the fund. They are merely equally high in this example.

(The example is of course arbitrary and does not contain information on the

actual development of the DAX.)

### **Screen 3**

You will receive the total payment of one of the 8 rounds on a smaller scale. At the end of the experiment the computer will choose one of the 8 rounds at random. Every round has the same probability of being chosen. This round will be paid out in cash.

Moreover, the computer randomly chooses a year from 1951 to 2010, also with equal probability. The gain or loss on the DAX in this year will be used to determine your payment.

For every 5000 Euro that you obtain in this round you will receive 1 Euro in cash.

To sum up: The bund yields an interest of 2% plus the corresponding bonus while the fund can yield every DAX-profit or DAX-loss of the years 1951 to 2010 plus the corresponding bonus.

## Investment Screen

### Round 1

You have 50,000 euros which you have to distribute over the Bund and the fund. In addition, you will receive 17,550 euros independent of your choice.

For the bund, the bonus is 2.80 percentage points.

For the fund, the bonus is 5.90 percentage points.

Bonus on the Bund	Bonus on the fund	Endowment	Additional payment
2.80	5.90	50,000	17,550
percentage points	percentage points	Euro	Euro

How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how much do you want to invest in the fund?

*Please make sure that both amounts are integers and sum up to exactly 50,000 EUR.*

Bund ..... Euro

fund ..... Euro

#### Screen 4

As you know, the return on the fund depends on the development of the DAX in the years from 1951 to 2010. In the following, we want to ask you what you think the DAX's gains and losses were during this period of time.

Therefore we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund in seven ranges on the next screen.:

Loss of 60% to 90%	Loss of 30% to 90%	Loss of 0% to 30%	Gain of 0% to 30%	Gain of 30% to 60%	Gain of 60% to 90%	Gain of 90% to 120%
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On the next screen there are 20 boxes above each of these seven ranges. Please show us for the seven ranges how often you expect the DAX to have been in each range by clicking the mentioned boxes.

Please mark exactly twenty boxes. One box stands for a frequency of 1 in 20, i.e. for 5 percent.

By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your fund will produce a gain or loss in the given range.

- If, for instance, you don't mark any of the boxes in a particular range, this will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in this range.
- If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or gain in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
- More boxes -- up to 20 in one range -- imply correspondingly higher probabilities.

## Screen 5

Please mark the 20 boxes according to your assessment of the development of the DAX in the years from 1951 to 2010.

*Mark the boxes, avoiding gaps from BOTTOM to TOP!*

Loss of 60% to 90%	Loss of 30% to 90%	Loss of 0% to 30%	Gain of 0% to 30%	Gain of 30% to 60%	Gain of 60% to 90%	Gain of 90% to 120%	

## Overview of Payoffs

That's it. Thank you for participating!

The computer has determined by random draw that you will receive your investment of round 6. In this round you invested 25,000 EUR in the bund and 25,000 EUR in the DAX. In this round the bonus on the interest rate of the bund was 3.00 percentage points, and the bonus on the DAX was 6.05 percentage points.

Moreover, the computer has randomly chosen the year 1992. In this year the DAX made a loss of 0.66%.

As a result, we will pay you 14 EUR based on your investment, which are computed as follows:

Asset	Invested amount	Gain / Loss	Bonus	Overall Gain/ Loss	Payoff	
Bund	25,000 EUR	2 %	3.00 %	5.00 %	26,250 EUR	
Fund	25,000 EUR	-0.66 %	6.05 %	5.39 %	26,348 EUR	
					Additional Payment	15,800 EUR
					Total	68,398 EUR
					Total / 5000	13.68 EUR
					(Rounded up to the nearest Euro)	14 EUR

Please remain seated for a little while. We will start the payment as soon as the vast majority of participants has completed the experiment.

## F Decision Screen in Complexity Experiment

### Runde 1

Sie haben 50.000 Euro, die Sie zwischen der Bundesanleihe und dem Fonds aufteilen müssen. Unabhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung erhalten Sie zusätzlich einen Betrag von 15.800 Euro.

Für die Bundesanleihe gibt es einen Bonus von 9,00 Prozentpunkten.

Für den Fonds gibt es einen Bonus von 6,05 Prozentpunkten.

<b>Bonus auf die Bundesanleihe</b>	<b>Bonus auf den Fonds</b>	<b>Investitions- summe</b>	<b>zusätzliche Zahlung</b>
9,00	6,05	50.000	15.800
Prozentpunkte	Prozentpunkte	Euro	Euro

**Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in den Fonds?**

*Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass beide Beträge ganze Zahlen sind und zusammen genau 50.000 EUR ergeben.*

In die Bundesanleihe  Euro  
In den Fonds  Euro

Figure S2: Decision Screen





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