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Active labour market programmes for women with a partner: Challenge or replication of traditional gender roles

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Articles on labour market issues

Active labour market programmes for women with a partner

Challenge or replication of traditional gender roles

Eva Kopf
Cordula Zabel

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Active labour market programmes for women with a partner

Challenge or replication of traditional gender roles

Eva Kopf and Cordula Zabel (IAB)

Mit der Reihe „IAB-Discussion Paper“ will das Forschungsinstitut der Bundesagentur für Arbeit den Dialog mit der externen Wissenschaft intensivieren. Durch die rasche Verbreitung von Forschungsergebnissen über das Internet soll noch vor Drucklegung Kritik angeregt und Qualität gesichert werden.

The “IAB-Discussion Paper” is published by the research institute of the German Federal Employment Agency in order to intensify the dialogue with the scientific community. The prompt publication of the latest research results via the internet intends to stimulate criticism and to ensure research quality at an early stage before printing.

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Abstract

A major unemployment and welfare benefit reform took place in Germany in 2005. One objective of this reform was to more strongly encourage an adult worker model of the family, with an emphasis on activating the formerly inactive. Our hypothesis is, however, that assignments to activation programmes, such as training or workfare, will in practice still tend to replicate patterns for the division of labour in the household that couples have become accustomed to. The views of case workers in employment offices and those of benefit recipients themselves about the division of labour in the household may influence the allocation process to labour market programmes. We classify couples based on each partner's cumulative income across the ten years prior to benefit receipt. We compare women's programme entries between former male breadwinner households, dual earner households, no-earner households, and female breadwinner households. We analyse large-scale administrative data, applying event-history analysis. Our findings are that in western Germany, assignments to activation programmes do indeed replicate couples' prior division of labour in the household. In eastern Germany, by contrast, women in former male breadwinner households are actually allocated to several programmes at higher rates than women in households without a clear former division of labour.

Zusammenfassung

Ein Ziel der Hartz IV Reformen im Jahr 2005 war eine stärkere Aktivierung von Personen, die bisher nicht am Arbeitsmarkt beteiligt waren. Bei Paarhaushalten wird somit ein ‚adult worker‘ Modell angestrebt, bei dem beide Partner erwerbstätig sind und zum Haushaltseinkommen beitragen. Eine wichtige Hypothese unserer Studie ist jedoch, dass Vermittlungen in Programme der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik, wie beispielsweise Trainingsmaßnahmen oder Arbeitsgelegenheiten, in der Praxis weiterhin die Arbeitsteilung im Haushalt replizieren, an die sich Paare gewöhnt haben. Die Ansichten von Sachbearbeitern in den Jobcentern sowie der ALG II Empfänger selbst hinsichtlich der Arbeitsteilung im Haushalt können den Prozess der Vermittlung in Programme der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik beeinflussen. Wir bilden verschiedene Haushaltsklassifikationen basierend auf dem kumulativen Einkommen beider Partner während der zehn Jahre vor Beginn der Zeit als erwerbslose Leistungsbezieher. Wir vergleichen die Eintrittsraten in Programme der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik zwischen Frauen in Haushalten mit einem vormaligen männlichen Hauptverdiener, in vormaligen Doppelverdienerhaushalten, in Haushalten ohne vormaligen Hauptverdiener, sowie in vormaligen weiblichen Hauptverdienerhaushalten. Unsere Analysen beruhen auf administrativen Daten, und wir wenden Methoden der Ereignisanalyse an. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Vermittlungen in Maßnahmen der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Westdeutschland tatsächlich die vormalige Arbeitsteilung im Haushalt replizieren. In Ostdeutschland werden Frauen in vormaligen männlichen Hauptverdiener Haushalten

dagegen in einige Maßnahmen sogar vermehrt vermittelt verglichen mit Frauen aus Haushalten ohne vormals klare Arbeitsteilung.

JEL classification:

C41, D13, I38, J12, J64, J65, J68, Z18

Keywords:

active labour market programmes, households, adult worker family model, couples' division of labour

1 Introduction

Germany traditionally is a country with an attachment to the male breadwinner model of the family (Lewis et al. 2008). However, the country has experienced radical policy changes during the last decade. One current example is the entitlement to a childcare slot for young children aged one year or above, effective from August 2013. This policy reform evidently encourages female employment. On the other hand, a care allowance for families who care for their children at home and forgo their right to a childcare slot was introduced simultaneously, conversely impeding female employment. Family policy reforms in Germany are thus a case in point of policies developing in a complex, partially inconsistent manner and conveying mixed messages (Daly 2011). A major labour market reform in 2005, called Hartz IV, likewise had implications for family lives and female employment. This reform changed the conditions for receiving welfare benefits, while at the same time encouraging an adult worker model of the family for the group of welfare recipients. 'Adult worker model' is a term used to describe a family model where each adult member is employed and is able to be economically self-sufficient, as opposed to the male breadwinner model of the family, characterised by a specialization of spouses to market or non-market work (Lewis 2001).

Case managers can assign benefit recipients to active labour market programmes (ALMPs), such as training or workfare, to improve their employment chances. However, they have wide discretion in doing so, such that welfare recipients' preferences may influence their decisions as well. In principle, all adult household members who are capable of working can be requested to participate, even those who were not employed before the household entered benefit receipt and saw their role as that of the homemaker. While the formal policy guidelines thus open the opportunity for case managers to challenge established divisions of labour in the household, it is unclear to what extent they make use of this possibility. We investigate whether couples' former division of labour is in fact contested, or whether it is replicated in assignments to active labour market programmes after all.

The contribution of our research to the literature is to present representative evidence of the impact of couples' former division of labour in the household on active labour market programme participations. We are able to do so by drawing on extensive administrative data, allowing us to analyse very large sample sizes and obtain representative results. We also have the unique opportunity to take data on individuals' long-term employment history into account. This enables us to incorporate information on couples' actual division of paid work in the past. Our analyses look into the question of whether their history of dividing paid work is reflected in assignments to ALMPs. If this is indeed the case, this would be quite an interesting finding from a theoretical perspective. As described above, an intention to encourage the adult worker model of the family is inherent in welfare policy reforms in Germany in that all adult household members can be called upon to participate in activation measures, irrespective of past allocations of household roles. If however activation practices deviate from this policy

intention, this would be an example of policy goals being adapted at the local level due to street-level bureaucrat's discretion. In exercising their discretion, case managers may be guided by conflicting incentives set for them by policy makers, as well as discrepancies between societal norms and policy developments.

We base our research questions on previous qualitative findings (Jaehrling 2010) that case managers wish to respect couples' choices and not interfere with the division of labour in the household they have become accustomed to. We aim to build on these findings by determining whether we can find evidence that case managers are true to such principles, i.e., basing activation choices on couples' previous division of labour, using representative data on actual ALMP participations.

In addition, our analyses disentangle the impact of various household-specific factors, such as the influence of the former division of labour in the household, the impact of having a partner at all compared to being single, the influence of having children, as well as the independent impact of women's own employment experience on rates of participation in active labour market programmes. Moreover, we distinguish between households in eastern and western Germany. Due to historically different political and societal trajectories, the two parts of Germany have diverging traditions concerning attitudes towards female employment as well as actual female employment rates. To carry out these analyses, we employ event-history analysis, studying entry rates into each of five different types of active labour market programmes.

Our paper is structured as follows. The next section gives an overview of the institutional framework structuring conditions for the receipt of means-tested unemployment benefits in Germany. Theoretical considerations and a summary of findings from previous qualitative research follow in section three. The fourth section presents our research questions. This is followed by a discussion of the data and our method of analysis in section five. Section six, then, discusses our empirical findings. Section seven concludes.

2 Employment and family policies

2.1 The German Hartz IV reform in international comparison

A large-scale employment and welfare policy reform took place in 2005 in Germany, known as the Hartz IV reform. In this study, we aim to investigate to what extent the inherent potential for encouraging the adult worker model of the family among households receiving the newly created Unemployment Benefit II (UB II) is implemented in practice. First, though, we will give a brief overview of the changes brought about by the Hartz IV reform.

The Hartz IV reforms in 2005 merged the former unemployment assistance for the long-term unemployed and the former welfare benefit to create the new UB II (Eichhorst, Grienberger-Zingerle and Konle-Seidl 2010). An important goal of the

reform was to reduce the level of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment. Since the reform, unemployed persons are under more pressure to search for a job quickly. Not only is UB II a comparatively low-level benefit, but it is also connected to quite intensive activity requirements. Recipients of UB II are required to accept any type of legal job offer, and can be sanctioned by temporary benefit cuts for not doing so (Wolff and Moczall 2012). They are also required to participate in ALMPs, if assigned by their case managers.

There are different types of ALMPs available to UB II recipients: qualification measures and instruments to improve job integration opportunities, employment promotion measures such as wage subsidies or measures promoting self-employment, as well as public employment or workfare programmes. Some programmes are intended to be directed towards specific groups of benefit recipients, as characterised by their educational and occupational background or employment experience. Workfare, for instance, is directed especially towards people with less employment experience. Participants in further vocational training programmes are often better educated than other unemployed persons. An important reason for this is that these programmes are offered through vouchers, which better educated unemployed persons have been found to be more likely to redeem (Kruppe 2009). Our study concentrates on participation in the following important German ALMPs: workfare programmes, short classroom training programmes, short in-firm training programmes, further vocational training, and wage subsidies for employers and employees in private firms. A detailed description of these programmes can be found in Hohmeyer (2012) (workfare), Kopf (2013) (training), Bernhard and Kruppe (2013) (further vocational training), Bernhard, Gartner and Stephan (2008) (wage subsidies for employers), and Haller, Wolff and Zabel (2010) (wage subsidies for employees).

Moreover, each adult member of an UB II recipient household who is capable of working is expected to contribute to enabling the household to exit UB II receipt or at least to reducing the level of the household's benefit dependency (Sozialgesetzbuch Zweites Buch (SGB II) 2011). This includes spouses of the formerly employed, even if they had not previously participated in the labour market themselves. They are now likewise obliged to search for jobs or take part in ALMPs. By contrast, spouses of unemployment insurance recipients do not have these obligations, nor did spouses of unemployment assistance recipients before the reform.

In this sense, the Hartz IV reform encourages an adult worker model of the family (Dingeldey 2010). Since activity requirements for UB II recipients apply even to those who had formerly not participated in the labour market, Jaehrling (2010) concludes that the reform in principle has led to far-reaching possibilities to interfere in families' division of labour in the household. If for instance the woman in a couple formerly considered her role to be that of the homemaker, she can now nevertheless be

required to participate in the labour market should the household become dependent on UB II.¹

The new activity requirements for household members who were formerly not participating in the labour market imply a significant shift away from the traditional encouragement of the male breadwinner model of the family in Germany. The greater emphasis on activation since the Hartz reforms reflects the European Employment Strategy's (EES) objective of encouraging universal labour market participation (Pfister 2008). Giullari and Lewis (2005) as well as Annesley (2007) have likewise commented on the European Employment Strategy's endorsement of the adult worker model of the family.

Social policy reforms in other countries likewise show evidence of an at least partial reorientation towards the adult worker model of the family. We list several examples from different countries. In the United Kingdom, a series of welfare to work programmes was initiated in the late 1990s. Among these, the New Deal for Partners, introduced in 1999, particularly aimed at activating partnered women who previously did not participate in the labour market. This programme offered work counselling for spouses of the unemployed (Ingold and Etherington 2013). The introduction of Joint Claims for Jobseeker's Allowance followed in 2001, which considers both partners to be available for work. Since 2009, as a consequence of the Welfare Reform Act, parents caring for children aged seven or older are expected to be available for work as well (Ingold and Etherington 2013; Kennedy 2010). In the United States, Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1996. It limited the duration that lone parents can receive the benefit to five years over their lifetime (Giddings, Dingeldey and Ulbricht 2004). Financial work incentives were likewise increased via reforms of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the 1990s (Lower-Basch and Greenberg 2009). In Australia, activation measures for means-tested benefit recipients began to be introduced in the late 1980s. Partnered women were more strongly affected in 1994, with the initiation of the Working Nation reforms, which required them to claim benefits in their own right. The reform Australians Working Together (2003) then introduced further work-related requirements for partnered (and lone) parents (especially affecting mothers). Welfare to Work (2006) reduced the age of the youngest child up to which one is not required to work from sixteen to six (Ingold and Etherington 2013). Also, in the Netherlands, the limit for the age of the youngest child up to which lone parents receiving welfare benefits were exempt from work requirements was reduced from age eighteen to age five in 1996 (Knijn 2004). In France, workfare programmes for lone parents receiving lone parent benefits were introduced between 2001 and 2006 (Knijn, Martin and Millar 2007).

¹ This is at odds with the taxation system and many family policies in Germany, which promote the male breadwinner model. Family policies in Germany are described in more detail in section 2.2.

These examples do not give a comprehensive overview of international reforms encouraging the adult worker model of the family. Daly (2011), Giullari/Lewis (2005) and Ingold/Etherington (2013) provide more extensive overviews as well as an in-depth discussion of reforms in various countries.

This reorientation of social policy in many countries towards the adult worker model of the family has been internationally criticised by the feministic welfare state research for generally assuming that everyone can be economically self-sufficient and not taking care responsibilities into account (Fraser 1994; Lewis 2006; Ostner 2004). Levels of childcare provision are often so low that parents cannot take up regular employment. Labour market constraints are a further obstacle, e.g., wages in typically female occupations are frequently too low for women to be economically self-sufficient.

In Germany, the policy regulations resulting from the Hartz IV reforms actually do take childcare constraints into account. Activity requirements for parents are conditional on the availability of childcare. Furthermore, UB II recipients do not necessarily need to be economically self-sufficient upon taking up employment; they can top up their earnings by an accordingly reduced level of UB II benefits. Yet, the overall goal remains to encourage benefit recipients', including parents', employment as far as possible. Thus, the German Hartz IV reforms have also been criticised (Jaehrling 2012). Spindler (2003) criticises these reforms for enforcing the adult worker model of the family and separating parents from their children. Jaehrling (2010) mentions the interference in families' division of work.

While, as described above, the legal framework regulating the conditions for UB II receipt endorses an adult worker model of the family, it is not clear to what extent this is implemented in practice. Assignments to activation and qualification measures are at the discretion of individual case managers. In principle, each adult household member who is capable of working can be assigned to an activation or qualification measure, irrespective of whether they had previously participated in the labour market or not. Whether or not women who formerly conceived of themselves as homemakers are assigned to active labour market programmes in order to increase their employment chances is an outcome of their interactions with their case-managers (Bartelheimer 2005). However, case-managers actually face structural disincentives to invest in the employability of women in couples with a traditional division of labour (Jaehrling 2010). Job Centres are evaluated via performance indicators that include not only a measure of the number of benefit recipients placed to employment, but also a measure of the reduction in benefit payments (Jacobi and Kluge 2007; Schütz 2009). In order to achieve the latter goal by enabling households to exit benefit receipt, case managers can just as well invest in the partner's employability. If case managers take the male partner's employment chances to be more promising in terms of achieving the short-term goal of enabling the household to exit UB II, it should be quite likely that they will choose to invest in the partner's over the woman's employability (Jaehrling 2010).

Normative expectations concerning gender roles held by case managers or benefit recipients themselves may likewise influence discretionary decisions on assignments to ALMPs. Such gender role expectations, in turn, may be influenced by the family policy setting as well as by general societal attitudes concerning the division of labour in the household. Both these factors differ strongly between eastern and western Germany, as is described in more detail in the next section.

2.2 Family policies and gender role attitudes in eastern and western Germany

Family policies introduced in the former West Germany (before unification in 1989) tended to support the male breadwinner model of the family. Income tax regulations provide large advantages for married one-earner couples as well as couples with unequal earnings. In addition, non-employed spouses can obtain health insurance free of additional costs via their partner's employment. For couples with children, the low level of public childcare provision in the former West Germany made it difficult for both parents to be employed. In the former East Germany (before unification in 1989), on the other hand, family policies supported, or even enforced, an adult worker model of the family. Extensive childcare was provided, and long workweeks were the norm for all adults. In 1989, East Germany had the highest official female employment rate in the world, at 89% (Rosenfeld, Trappe and Gornick 2004).

While the tax and health insurance systems are now the same in eastern and western Germany, large differences remain with respect to the childcare infrastructure, despite significant increases in childcare provision especially in western Germany across the last decade. In 2002, publicly supported childcare was available for 37% of children aged zero to two in eastern Germany, compared to 3% in western Germany. By 2012, these figures had increased to 49% in eastern Germany and 22% in western Germany. For children aged three to six, kindergarten availability rates have been quite high in both parts of Germany. Kindergarten provision rates were 105% in eastern and 90% in western Germany in 2002. In 2012 96% of children in this age group in eastern Germany and 93% in western Germany attended kindergarten. There are still however large differences in rates of full-time kindergarten attendance, which were 68% in eastern Germany compared to only 30% in western Germany in 2012 (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2004, 2012).

Policy settings often interact with societal attitudes towards gender roles (Pfau-Effinger 2004). Even today, eastern Germans hold more egalitarian attitudes towards gender roles than western Germans. On the basis of Eurobarometer data, Scheuer and Dittmann (2007) show that 53% of western Germans favoured a traditional division of labour in the household in 2006, compared to only 20% of eastern Germans.

Thus, it would seem that if couples receiving UB II express a preference to uphold a traditional division of labour in the household when faced with activation requirements,

this will be better accepted in western Germany than in eastern Germany. It is possible that case managers will more often use their discretion to enable couples to maintain such a traditional division of labour in western than in eastern Germany.

3 Theoretical considerations and previous qualitative findings on the activation of couples receiving UB II

As described above, assignments to active labour market programmes for means-tested unemployment benefit recipients in Germany are at the discretion of individual case-managers. Thus, our research question is closely related to that in studies of discretion in street-level bureaucracy. Lipsky (1980) argued that it is inevitable that front-line public service agents, referred to as street-level bureaucrats, will exercise discretion. However, he also held that this implies that the achievement of policy goals is at stake. By contrast, more recent studies on street-level bureaucracy emphasise that discretion is necessary for public service agents to successfully attend to citizens' needs as professionals in a given field (Evans 2011). Many recent studies are concerned with the introduction of managerialism ("new public management") in public services, and how this impacts street-level bureaucrats' ability to act as professionals (Evans 2011; Hjörne, Juhila and van Nijnatten 2010; Wastell et al. 2010). Instruments such as performance indicators that enable close monitoring of the achievements of public service agents have the potential to curtail discretion (Hjörne et al. 2010; McDonald 2006). In Germany, the achievements of Job Centres are indeed measured via performance indicators, for instance with reference to the number of benefit recipients placed to employment as well as to the amount by which spending on unemployment benefits is reduced (Jacobi and Kluge 2007; Schütz 2009). At the same time though, case managers' discretion in deciding how to improve benefit recipients' employability is explicitly encouraged (Bartelheimer 2005). A likely consequence is that case managers will use their discretion to reach the goals measured by the performance indicators, while other policy goals, such as encouraging an adult worker model of the family, are neglected.

Qualitative findings reported in Jaehrling (2010) indicate what factors are important in case managers' use of their discretion. The focus of her research is on parents receiving UB II. Interviews were conducted in ten Job Centres in eastern and western Germany from January to June 2008 with case managers as well as UB II recipients. She does not give more information on the selection of Job Centres and interviewees. Findings are that in the case of couples (especially parents) receiving UB II, case managers generally begin by trying to place the male partner to employment. Thus, they do not make use of the option to activate both partners, despite the formal policy directive that all adult household members should contribute to reducing the household's benefit dependency.

In the interviews, case managers name several different reasons for the strategy of focusing labour market integration efforts on the male partner (Jaehrling 2010). One

reason is that they do not want to interfere in the couples' previous division of labour in the household, and wish to respect their personal choices in this respect. In one case, an informal Job Centre-wide agreement was reported to the effect that labour market integration efforts should focus on one partner, and case managers should discuss with the couple who this is to be. In another case, the influence of the case manager's adherence to the one-earner family model became evident. The case manager was of the opinion that, if one parent is working, the other parent should not be required to participate in the labour market, even if the family's income is not sufficient to be independent of UB II. The case managers' gender role attitudes were reportedly more egalitarian in eastern Germany than in western Germany. Nevertheless, labour market integration efforts were found to focus on the male partner in eastern Germany as well. A reason that was given for this was that mothers were more difficult than fathers to place to employment in the difficult eastern German labour market. Employers were said to be reluctant to hire mothers as they expected them to more frequently be absent from work on account of their children being ill. Only in a few instances did the case managers report trying to reverse couples' previous division of labour in the household. Generally, this only occurred after initial efforts to integrate the male partner into the labour market had failed.

Although traditional gender role expectations as well as respect for couples' choices concerning the division of labour in the household became evident in the interviews with the case managers, Jaehrling (2010) concludes that structural constraints are the main reason integration efforts focus on the male partner. Since reducing UB II payments is among the goals according to which Job Centres are evaluated, focusing on the male partner may be the rational choice if his chance of finding a higher-paying job is greater.

The findings reported by Jaehrling (2010), summarised above, are in some ways comparable to evidence for the Netherlands reported by Knijn and van Wel (2001). Knijn and van Wel (2001) likewise find that a formal policy reorientation towards the adult worker model of the family was often not implemented in practice. In 1996 activity requirements for lone mothers receiving welfare benefits in the Netherlands were intensified by reducing the limit for the age of the youngest child up to which mothers were exempt from activation from eighteen to five years. Knijn and van Wel (2001) however report that both case managers and lone mothers resisted the implementation of these activity requirements.

4 Research Questions

This study analyses the assignment of women into different ALMPs. The activation of inactive people is a main goal of the Hartz IV welfare and labour market reform. All members of households receiving the newly introduced UB II are expected to contribute to reducing the household's dependency on the benefit and improve their employability through ALMP participations.

However, we have argued in the previous sections that it is not clear whether all UB II recipients are activated or assigned to ALMPs with the same intensity. We would suspect that caseworkers do take the former division of labour in the household and welfare recipients' preferences into account when assigning women to ALMPs, in contradiction to the goal of encouraging an adult worker model of the family. We expect this to apply more strongly to western Germany than to eastern Germany, since male breadwinner/ female homemaker households are more the norm there. Such arrangements should therefore be more likely to be respected in western Germany.

The qualitative findings in Jaehrling (2010) summarised in the previous section indicate that case managers do tend to respect the division of labour that couples have become accustomed to. In some cases, case managers state that they wish to respect couples' private decisions. In other cases, adherence to the one-earner model of the family becomes evident. Nevertheless, the findings of Jaehrling (2010) are not necessarily representative. Our analysis will add to the overall picture as we can take unemployed persons in all Job Centres into account and base our analyses on large-scale administrative data from the Federal Employment Agency.

Our aim is to investigate to what extent we can find quantitative support for these qualitative findings. We hope to determine whether the tendency reported by several case managers to respect couples' previous division of labour reflects a general pattern. To gain insight as to the degree to which case managers are aware of and take couples' actual previous division of labour into account, we make use of longitudinal data on both partners' past employment and earnings. Furthermore, we intend to disentangle the effects of various factors involved. Do only former homemakers experience lower transition rates into ALMPs, or is a traditional division of labour presupposed even for households that actually practiced a different division of labour? Furthermore, we will investigate the independent effect of women's own previous earnings. Some types of ALMPs tend to be targeted at benefit recipients with lower employment chances, while other ALMPs target those with better employment chances. We also control for the number and age of children in order to separate the effect of motherhood from partnership effects and the effect of the partner's former earnings. We describe the operationalization of the former division of labour in the household in more detail in the data and methods section. In a nutshell, we use an interaction between women's and their partner's cumulative earnings across the ten years prior to becoming unemployed benefit recipients².

Our first hypothesis is that ALMP entry rates will be lower for women with a partner than for single women (Hypothesis 1). We expect that case managers may often

² We first calculate the common median over women's and their partners' individual cumulative earnings across the previous ten years. We then use this median to label women and their partners as having low or high prior individual earnings. Our household categories indicate whether both partners previously had low earnings ('no breadwinner households'), both had high earnings ('dual earner households'), or whether one partner had low and the other had high earnings ('male breadwinner households' and 'female breadwinner households').

presuppose a traditional division of labour in the household, even for households where both partners previously had similar earnings, or the woman even achieved higher earnings than her partner. We differentiate four pairs of comparisons: women from former 'no breadwinner' households compared to single women with low prior earnings, women from former 'male breadwinner' households compared to single women with formerly low earnings, women from former dual earner households compared to single women with formerly higher earnings, and women from former female breadwinner households compared to previously higher-earning single women. In each comparison, we keep women's own earnings constant, to account for an independent earnings effect. As mentioned above, some ALMPs in practice generally tend to target persons with greater past employment experience and higher earnings, while others target people with very low chances of employment and lower earnings, such that persons with little employment experience and low previous earnings should be more likely to participate.

In the second hypothesis, we differentiate Hypothesis 1 for eastern and western Germany. We expect our findings to differ in important ways between both regions. The institutional framework in the former West Germany supported the male breadwinner model of the family, while in the former East Germany, the policy framework tended to support the adult worker model of the family. These different historical trajectories are reflected in more egalitarian attitudes concerning the division of labour in the household in eastern than in western Germany even today. Thus, we expect that a traditional division of labour is presupposed less often in eastern than in western Germany. Our second hypothesis is that the differences between singles and women with a partner will be smaller in eastern than in western Germany (Hypothesis 2).

In the third hypothesis we go further and distinguish partnered women with different former divisions of labour in the household. We hypothesise that case managers respect families' decisions and their former division of work. Women in former male breadwinner households will have lower entry rates into ALMPs than women in low-earning households without an apparent former division of labour (no breadwinner households). Moreover, women in former female breadwinner households will have higher entry rates into ALMPs than women in former dual earner households (Hypothesis 3).

Moreover, we likewise differentiate this hypothesis for eastern and western Germany. We also expect that households' former division of labour will be reflected less strongly in assignments to ALMPs in eastern than in western Germany. We expect that if benefit recipients express the desire to retain their former one-earner family model, case managers will more often respect this wish in western than in eastern Germany, since the one-earner family model is normatively better accepted there (Hypothesis 4).

In a second set of models, we additionally control for the partner's current employment, his current earnings, and current ALMP participation. If the partner is already demonstrating economic activity, or already attaining comparatively high earnings, the case managers may deem it less necessary to improve women's employment prospects via ALMP participation. Our hypothesis is that the partner's current employment, current ALMP participation, as well as current earnings each have negative effects on women's ALMP entry rates (Hypothesis 5).

5 Data and Method

This study makes use of large-scale administrative data, originating from employment offices as well as from notifications sent by employers to health and pension insurance funds. Longitudinal data on spells of employment, unemployment, benefit receipt, and programme participation is prepared from these sources and made available for scientific analysis as the Integrated Employment Biography data set (IEB), as well as the Unemployment Benefit II History data set.

The sample for our study consists of women who were living alone, or lived with a partner and/ or children, and who entered into a state of UB II receipt without employment at any time between the 1st of October 2005 and the 31st of December 2007. We further limited our sample to the age range 30-64 because our analyses take sample members' employment history across the last ten years into account. Our observation window ends in December 2008.

We employed event-history analysis to estimate sample members' entry rates into ALMPs. For each sample member, we included the first spell starting between the 1st of October 2005 and the 31st of December 2007 during which they were receiving UB II and were not employed. Spells are censored when sample members enter employment, stop receiving UB II, reach age 65, or at the 31st of December 2008. The models are piece-wise constant exponential models, and are generally represented by the following formula:

$$\ln h_i(t) = y(t) + \sum_{j=1}^k \beta_j x_{ij}(t) + \varepsilon_i$$

The log hazard of programme entry is given by $\ln h_i(t)$. We estimated separate models for entries into each of five different types of ALMPs. These include One-Euro-Jobs (a workfare programme), classroom training programmes, in-firm training programmes, further vocational training, and job subsidies. Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the total number of entries into each of these programmes by women's prior division of paid work in the household (our main independent variable of interest, described in more detail below). As can be seen in Table A.3, overall we observe 31,137 entries into One-Euro-Jobs in western Germany, and 24,078 in eastern Germany for the women in our sample. Overall, there were 559,021 sample members in western and 242,979 in

eastern Germany (Table 2). Looking at women's programme entries by prior division of paid work, for women in 'no breadwinner households' in eastern Germany (sample size 25,504 (Table 1)), for instance, we observe 2,441 entries into One-Euro-Jobs, and 198 entries into job subsidies (Table A.3). The log baseline hazard is represented by $y(t)$. The baseline duration (t) is the duration since the start of a spell of UB II receipt without employment, and is measured in days. The independent variables in our model are represented by $x_{ij}(t)$. The individual-level error term is represented by ε_i . In our models, we controlled for unobserved heterogeneity by explicitly estimating the distribution of the individual-level error term, for which a gamma distribution was assumed. We did not control for correlations between the errors terms in each of the five equations. Given separate equations for five different ALMPs, estimating correlations between each of the error terms would not have been feasible.

As described above, our main independent variable of interest is the couple's division of paid work prior to the start of the spell of benefit receipt without employment. We operationalised this by including an interaction between women's and their partner's cumulative earnings across the ten years preceding the spell start. In order to specify our household category variable, we calculated the common median cumulative earnings across the last ten years over the individual earnings of women and their partners. Earnings were deflated to 2005 price levels, and the median 10-year cumulative gross individual earnings for men and women in couples were 38,589 Euros. The median of 38,589 Euros thus applies to women's as well as to men's individual earnings. We employed this median to categorise persons as having relatively low or high past cumulative earnings. People with cumulative earnings above the median were categorised as having relatively high earnings, those with earnings below the median as having relatively low earnings.

We included single women in our analyses as well, as a basis of comparison. Thus, our household type variable includes the following categories: low-earning single women (single women with relatively low cumulative earnings over the last ten years), no breadwinner couples (both the man and the woman had relatively low cumulative earnings across the last ten years), male breadwinner couples (the man had relatively high and the woman relatively low cumulative earnings), high-earning single women (single women with relatively high cumulative earnings), female breadwinner households (the woman had relatively high and the man relatively low cumulative earnings), and dual breadwinner households (both the man and the woman had relatively high cumulative earnings).

As described above, we used cumulative earnings as a basis for our household categorization. Other alternatives, such as cumulative employment experience, or else average earnings when employed, would have been possible as well. However, using cumulative past employment experience would give no indication of how much a person actually contributed to the household's income, as many people in the sample

most likely worked short hours and in low-wage jobs. Using only average earnings, on the other hand, would give no indication of a person's labour market attachment. A person with high average earnings when employed may have only been employed for a very short time. We chose cumulative earnings as a basis of our household categorization since this measure serves as a combined indicator of past contributions to total household income and past employment experience.

We cumulated women's and their partner's earnings over the past ten years. We decided to use a comparatively long time-span since UB II recipients often have quite irregular employment careers. Employment histories across only a short time span may not be representative of a person's general labour market attachment. Furthermore, many UB II recipients will have been unemployed for 6-24 months before entering the sample. Those that are unemployed and are eligible for insurance-based UB I receive this benefit for 6-24 months depending on previous employment duration and age before switching to the flat-rate UB II and becoming a member of our sample. Therefore, it was important to incorporate a longer prior period of time. However, to check for the robustness of our results, we additionally estimated models using 5-year cumulative earnings as a basis of our household categorization. As can be seen in Table A.4, the results of these models are very similar to our original estimates.

The control variables we included encompass age, nationality, level of education, health status, whether the sample member is handicapped, marital status, whether the partner is currently employed in a contributory job, whether the partner is currently marginally employed, whether the partner is currently participating in an active labour market programme, the partner's current earnings, the partner's level of education, whether the couple has children, the number of children, age of the youngest child, calendar time, as well as regional-level indicators, including the unemployment rate, percentage of the unemployed receiving UB II, population density, gross domestic product (gdp) per capita, percentage of the population that is economically active, and the percentages of the economically active employed in different sectors. We did not include controls for sample members' employment history, as this would be too strongly correlated to past cumulative earnings, upon which our household categorization is based. Controlling for sample members' employment history would distort the estimates for our household category variable, which we are primarily interested in.

Raising children is an important reason for gaps in women's employment history and for the reinforcement of gender-specific divisions of labour in the household. A thus established division of labour in the household can subsequently influence to what extent women are assigned to ALMPs, if, as we have hypothesised, case managers use couples' prior division of labour in the household as a point of orientation when deciding whether to assign women to ALMPs. The relationship between the prior division of labour in the household and assignments to ALMPs is what we are primarily

interested in studying in the present paper. Children can however also have a direct influence on women's assignments to ALMPs via actual or perceived time constraints. Thus, as described above, we control for the number and age of children, such that we can be sure that our estimated effect of the prior division of labour in the household on women's assignments to ALMPs does not simply reflect the effect of time constraints associated with childcare. Moreover, in Table A.5 in the Appendix, we show that our main findings for the effect of household type on women's ALMP entries are very similar for the subgroup of childless women as for the complete sample in our main analyses. Even for childless women, partnership status and the former division of labour in the household have important effects on ALMP entries. The findings for the subgroup of women with young children aged three to five (Table A.6) are likewise very similar to those in our main analyses. For them, the differences between singles (in this case: lone mothers) and women (in this case: mothers) with a partner are even somewhat larger than in the main analyses for the complete sample.

Table 1 shows sample members' characteristics at the beginning of their spell of benefit receipt without employment, as indicated by several key independent variables. These descriptive results are shown separately for eastern and western Germany as well as by household type. Women's age distribution is quite similar across most household types in western Germany. However, a fairly high share of women in former 'female breadwinner' and 'no breadwinner households' are older than 49 years. In eastern Germany, the share of singles with relatively low prior earnings aged above 49 is comparatively low, while the share of 'female breadwinners' and 'dual breadwinners' aged above 49 is comparatively high. With respect to the level of education, women in former 'male breadwinner households' and 'no breadwinner households' have the lowest levels of education, while single women, both with relatively high and low former earnings, have the highest level of education. Women in former 'no breadwinner' and 'male breadwinner' households most frequently do not possess German citizenship. As described above, we control for these variables, as well as numerous further variables, in our models. Thus, our findings of differences between women in the various household types in entries into ALMPs do not simply reflect differences between the groups with respect to these control variables. Results of full models showing the effects of all control variables can be found in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix, which will be described in more detail below.

Since different types of ALMPs tend to target either persons with low or high employment experience, we controlled for women's own former earnings separately. This also allows direct comparisons between low-earning single women, those in former male breadwinner and in no breadwinner households on the one hand, and between high-earning single women, those in former dual earner and in female breadwinner households on the other.

Table 1
Characteristics of sample members (women aged 30-64 living alone or with a partner and/ or children) at the beginning of the spell

| | single, relatively low former earnings | no bread- winner | male bread- winner | single, relatively high former earnings | female bread- winner | dual bread- winner |
|---|--|------------------------|--------------------------|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| Western Germany | | | | | | |
| age | | | | | | |
| 30-34 | 22% | 22% | 26% | 21% | 23% | 25% |
| 35-39 | 22% | 18% | 23% | 21% | 17% | 20% |
| 40-44 | 20% | 16% | 18% | 19% | 15% | 16% |
| 45-49 | 14% | 14% | 13% | 15% | 14% | 14% |
| 50-54 | 10% | 13% | 10% | 12% | 14% | 13% |
| 55-59 | 8% | 11% | 7% | 9% | 13% | 9% |
| 60-64 | 4% | 6% | 2% | 3% | 4% | 2% |
| education | | | | | | |
| no degree | 24% | 39% | 39% | 11% | 22% | 19% |
| lower secondary degree | 46% | 36% | 40% | 48% | 46% | 50% |
| intermediate secondary degree | 18% | 14% | 13% | 26% | 20% | 22% |
| upper secondary degree (qual. for tech. college) | 4% | 3% | 2% | 6% | 4% | 4% |
| upper secondary degree (qual. for university) | 9% | 8% | 5% | 9% | 7% | 5% |
| nationality | | | | | | |
| not German | 21% | 45% | 40% | 12% | 24% | 19% |
| German | 79% | 55% | 60% | 88% | 76% | 81% |
| Total | 165,572 | 69,145 | 111,118 | 137,423 | 25,833 | 49,930 |
| % of total sample | 30% | 12% | 20% | 25% | 5% | 9% |
| Eastern Germany | | | | | | |
| age | | | | | | |
| 30-34 | 23% | 21% | 18% | 19% | 18% | 16% |
| 35-39 | 21% | 18% | 20% | 18% | 14% | 15% |
| 40-44 | 19% | 18% | 20% | 20% | 15% | 17% |
| 45-49 | 15% | 16% | 17% | 16% | 15% | 18% |
| 50-54 | 12% | 14% | 15% | 14% | 18% | 19% |
| 55-59 | 8% | 11% | 10% | 11% | 18% | 14% |
| 60-64 | 2% | 3% | 1% | 2% | 3% | 1% |
| education | | | | | | |
| no degree | 13% | 23% | 13% | 5% | 12% | 6% |
| lower secondary degree | 26% | 26% | 27% | 20% | 24% | 22% |
| intermediate secondary degree | 46% | 39% | 53% | 59% | 53% | 65% |
| upper secondary degree (qual. for tech. college) | 3% | 3% | 1% | 4% | 3% | 2% |
| upper secondary degree (qual. for university) | 12% | 10% | 5% | 11% | 9% | 5% |
| nationality | | | | | | |
| not German | 12% | 30% | 10% | 4% | 8% | 2% |
| German | 88% | 69% | 89% | 96% | 92% | 98% |
| Total | 57,082 | 25,504 | 48,803 | 54,428 | 14,301 | 42,861 |
| % of total sample | 23% | 11% | 20% | 22% | 6% | 18% |

6 Results

Our findings for our sample of women receiving means-tested unemployment benefits (UB II) generally support our first hypothesis. ALMP entry rates are generally lower for women with a partner than for single women. First, we present the results for western Germany. In our first model, we chose single women with relatively low and high earnings, respectively, as the reference categories, such that we can test Hypothesis 1. Our findings show that no matter what division of labour couples previously had, ALMP entry rates are always lower for women with a partner than for single women. Compared to formerly low-earning single women, entry rates into One-Euro-Jobs are only 71% as high for formerly low-earning women in a couple where the partner also had low prior earnings ('no breadwinner households') (Table 2). The difference between the two groups is even greater for the other programme types. In the case of job subsidies, entry rates for women in former no breadwinner households are even only 43% as high as those of formerly low-earning single women. For women in former male breadwinner households, the difference to formerly low-earning singles is even larger. For instance, entry rates into One-Euro-Jobs are only 55% as high for women in former male-breadwinner households as for formerly low-earning singles, and entry rates into in-firm training programmes and job subsidies are only 38% and 39% as high, respectively.

Among women with formerly relatively high earnings in western Germany, ALMP entry rates for those with a partner are also lower than for singles (Table 2). Former female breadwinners have ALMP entry rates ranging between 58% and 79% the level of single women. Comparing single women to women in former dual earner households, the difference is at least as large. In each of our four comparisons for western Germany, then, programme entry rates are lower for women with a partner than for single women. This is the case not only for women in former male breadwinner households, but also for households without a clear former division of labour or even female breadwinner households. Therefore, our results support Hypothesis 1 for western Germany.

In eastern Germany, the effect of having a partner is also highly significant in almost all cases (Table 2). Programme entry rates for women in former no breadwinner households are 62% - 78% as high as for single women with similarly low former earnings. However, in eastern Germany, women in former male breadwinner households do not generally have the lowest programme entry rates. Though they are consistently lower than for singles, they are usually slightly higher than for women in no breadwinner households. For former female breadwinners, ALMP entry rates are between 66% and 76% as high as for singles with similarly high former earnings. Here again, the comparison with women in dual breadwinner households does not show the same picture as in western Germany: though lower than for relatively high-earning singles, ALMP entry rates for women in dual earner households in eastern Germany are somewhat higher than for female breadwinners (Table 2). Altogether, our results

support Hypothesis 2, that the differences between singles and women with a partner would be smaller in eastern than in western Germany.

Especially in western Germany then, it seems that having a partner at all leads to lower rates of assignments to active labour market programmes. It seems that to a large extent, case managers simply presuppose a traditional division of labour in the household, even when this is not in fact the case. In western Germany, an actual former traditional division of labour further reduces women's programme entry rates.

Table 2

Relative transition rates into active labour market programmes for women aged 30 - 64 by previous household division of paid work. Singles as reference category[#].

| Western Germany | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|--|-------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| no breadwinner | 0.71 *** | 0.65 *** | 0.52 *** | 0.65 *** | 0.43 *** |
| male breadwinner | 0.55 *** | 0.56 *** | 0.38 *** | 0.45 *** | 0.39 *** |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| female breadwinner | 0.64 *** | 0.79 *** | 0.58 *** | 0.67 *** | 0.62 *** |
| dual breadwinner | 0.61 *** | 0.71 *** | 0.58 *** | 0.59 *** | 0.61 *** |
| variance of the heterogeneity distribution | 0.32 ** | 4.66 *** | 2.23 *** | 1.88 ** | 0.28 |
| Total time at risk (days) | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 |
| # programme entries persons | 31,137 | 30,742 | 9,422 | 9,936 | 5,696 |
| Pseudo-R² | 559,021 | 559,021 | 559,021 | 559,021 | 559,021 |
| | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.11 |
| Eastern Germany | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| no breadwinner | 0.78 *** | 0.76 *** | 0.61 *** | 0.78 *** | 0.62 *** |
| male breadwinner | 0.90 *** | 0.88 *** | 0.75 *** | 0.66 *** | 0.72 *** |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| female breadwinner | 0.77 *** | 0.76 *** | 0.66 *** | 0.67 *** | 0.76 *** |
| dual breadwinner | 0.90 *** | 0.78 *** | 0.86 *** | 0.79 *** | 0.94 |
| variance of the heterogeneity distribution | 0.00 | 3.66 *** | 2.71 *** | 0.55 | 5.72 *** |
| Total time at risk (days) | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 |
| # programme entries persons | 24,078 | 10,034 | 8,173 | 4,997 | 4,002 |
| Pseudo-R² | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 |
| | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.09 |

* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Further control variables: high/low individual earnings, number of children, age of the youngest child, own age, nationality, calendar time, handicap, health status, level of education, regional indicators including: unemployment rate, proportion of unemployed receiving UB II, population density, gross domestic product, proportion of population that is economically active, proportion of the economically active employed in various sectors.

[#] We included Pseudo-R2 values for all of our models. The Pseudo-R2 values given are Cox and Snell Pseudo-R2s with a Nagelkerke correction (Baguley 2012 – Online Supplement). As explained in Baguley (2012), Pseudo-R2 values are always low compared to R2 values in least squares regressions. Baguley (2012) argues that it is therefore inappropriate to compare Pseudo-R2 and R2 values, and that Pseudo-R2 can only be compared using the same measures in the same data to be at all meaningful, and recommends using these measures with extreme caution, if at all. Referring to a study by Schemper and Stare (1996), Stevenson (2009) further notes that often a perfectly adequate model may have a low Pseudo-R2, particularly when there is much censoring. This applies to our data, since we study entries into the first ALMP, and cases are censored after first ALMP entry, and of course also at the end of the observation period in December 2008.

For western Germany, our results support the third hypothesis, that case managers respect couples' former division of labour. Activation thus reflects the former division of labour in the household. Women in former male breadwinner households are less often assigned to active labour market programmes than women in households without a former breadwinner (Table 3). Table 3 shows results from the same models as in Table 2, only with switched reference categories, to display a test of Hypothesis 3. The results in Table 3 indicate that case managers in western Germany do seem to use couples' former division of labour as a point of orientation in assigning women to active labour market programmes. As can be seen in Table 3, in four of the five programmes studied here, in western Germany, differences between women in former male breadwinner and former no breadwinner households are significant. In the cases of One-Euro-Jobs, classroom training programmes, in-firm training programmes, and further vocational training, programme entry rates are 70% - 76% as high for women in former male breadwinner households as for women in former no breadwinner households. Job subsidies are the exception with a non-significant effect.

Looking at women with relatively higher earnings across the last ten years, the partner's earnings are not quite as relevant for programme assignments. In western Germany, women in former dual earner households are assigned to several of the ALMPs at somewhat lower rates than women in former female breadwinner households, but the difference is smaller than when comparing male breadwinner to no breadwinner households, and not always significant (Table 3). Perhaps this is because female breadwinner households find somewhat less normative acceptance than male breadwinner households. Altogether, these findings for western Germany provide partial support for Hypothesis 3.

Findings for eastern Germany are quite different. For eastern Germany, in contrast to western Germany, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Entry rates into active labour market programmes are not generally lower for women in former male breadwinner households than for those in former no breadwinner households. In fact, entry rates into all programmes except further vocational training are actually slightly higher for women in male breadwinner than in no breadwinner households (Table 3).

Entry rates are also slightly higher for women in former dual earner households than in female breadwinner households in eastern Germany. Thus, in the majority of cases in eastern Germany, it seems that the former division of labour in the household is not respected or is even challenged by assignments to ALMPs. This supports Hypothesis 4, that the former division of labour in the household would tend to be respected more strongly in western than in eastern Germany.

Table 3

Relative transition rates into active labour market programmes for women aged 30 - 64 by previous household division of paid work. No breadwinner and female breadwinner households as reference categories.

| Western Germany | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|--|-------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| single | 1.41 *** | 1.54 *** | 1.94 *** | 1.55 *** | 2.31 *** |
| <i>no breadwinner</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| male breadwinner | 0.77 *** | 0.86 *** | 0.74 *** | 0.70 *** | 0.91 |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| single | 1.56 *** | 1.27 *** | 1.73 *** | 1.50 *** | 1.62 *** |
| <i>female breadwinner</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| dual breadwinner | 0.95 | 0.90 ** | 1.01 | 0.88 * | 0.99 |
| variance of the heterogeneity distribution | 0.32 ** | 4.66 *** | 2.23 *** | 1.88 ** | 0.28 |
| Total time at risk (days) | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 |
| # programme entries | 31,137 | 30,742 | 9,422 | 9,936 | 5,696 |
| persons | 559,021 | 559,021 | 559,021 | 559,021 | 559,021 |
| Pseudo-R² | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.11 |
| | | | | | |
| Eastern Germany | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| single | 1.27 *** | 1.31 *** | 1.64 *** | 1.28 *** | 1.61 *** |
| <i>no breadwinner</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| male breadwinner | 1.15 *** | 1.15 *** | 1.23 *** | 0.84 *** | 1.17 * |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| single | 1.30 *** | 1.32 *** | 1.52 *** | 1.49 *** | 1.31 *** |
| <i>female breadwinner</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| dual breadwinner | 1.17 *** | 1.04 | 1.32 *** | 1.19 ** | 1.23 *** |
| variance of the heterogeneity distribution | 0.00 | 3.66 *** | 2.71 *** | 0.55 | 5.72 *** |
| Total time at risk (days) | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 |
| # programme entries | 24,078 | 10,034 | 8,173 | 4,997 | 4,002 |
| persons | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 |
| Pseudo-R² | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.09 |

* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Further control variables: high/low individual earnings, number of children, age of the youngest child, own age, nationality, calendar time, handicap, health status, level of education, regional indicators including: unemployment rate, proportion of unemployed receiving UB II, population density, gross domestic product, proportion of population that is economically active, proportion of the economically active employed in various sectors.

Contrary to Hypothesis 5, the partner's current employment mostly does not have a negative effect on women's rates of ALMP participation. In Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix, we show results from our complete models, controlling for further partner characteristics³. In western Germany, for women whose partner is currently employed in an unsubsidized contributory job, entry rates into One-Euro-Jobs, in-firm training programmes, and job subsidies are actually 10% - 23% higher than for those whose partner is not employed. Classroom training programmes are the exception, with a small negative effect. If the partner is working in a non-contributory minor employment job, findings are mixed, with positive effects on women's entry rates into in-firm training programmes and job subsidies, and partially non-significant negative effects for the other programme types. In eastern Germany, the partner's present contributory employment likewise has a significantly positive effect for One-Euro-Jobs, in-firm training programmes, and job subsidies, as well as further vocational training. The partner's present employment in non-contributory minor employment has significantly positive effects on women's entries into One-Euro-Jobs, and no significant effects for the other programme types. An explanation for the unexpected finding of positive effects of the partner's present employment could be that if one household member is already employed, even a small additional income will suffice for the household to pass the income threshold and no longer be eligible for UB II. Case workers may therefore be especially motivated to increase women's chances of employment if their partner is already employed, but not earning quite enough for the household to be independent of UB II.

The partner's present earnings likewise generally have a slightly positive, though often non-significant, effect. This is also in contradiction to Hypothesis 5. An explanation may be that if the partner has comparatively high earnings, though not high enough for the household to pass the eligibility threshold for UB II, the chances that an additional income will suffice for the household to exit UB II receipt are higher than if the partner's earnings are low. Case workers may therefore be especially motivated to activate women whose partner's current earnings are comparatively high.

A further interesting finding, which also contradicts Hypothesis 5, is that women whose partner is currently already participating in an ALMP actually have higher entry rates into ALMPs than those whose partner is not participating in an ALMP. For western Germany, the effect of the partner's ALMP participation on women's ALMP entry rate is positively significant for four of the five ALMPs studied here. Women's entry rates into One-Euro-Jobs are even almost twice as high if the partner is already participating in an ALMP. In eastern Germany, the partner's ALMP participation also has significantly

³ In the models shown in Tables 2 and 3, we did not control for partner characteristics such as marital status, the partner's level of education, the partner's current earnings, the partner's current employment, or the partner's current labour market programme participation. These control variables were omitted in order to allow direct comparisons to single women, for whom there is of course no variation on these variables. In the models shown in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix, we then included these partner characteristics in order to test Hypothesis 5.

positive effects for each programme type except in-firm training. This finding is quite surprising, since it has often been held that when dealing with couple households, caseworkers choose one of the partners on whom to focus their labour market integration efforts, while disregarding the other partner. It has been argued that this might be an explanation for women's low ALMP participation rates in comparison to men. Our findings however indicate that this explanation for women's low participation rates does not seem to hold. If the partner participates in an ALMP, this leads to higher, not lower, ALMP participation rates by women. On the other hand, partners may be people with similar characteristics (through positive assortative mating, e.g., Jepsen/Jepsen (2002)). This result could be, therefore, also interpreted as a positive correlation between unobservable factors.

Furthermore, we used several control variables for which we discuss the results in the following. First, we controlled for an independent effect of women's own cumulative earnings across the last ten years. Since some ALMPs tend to be directed towards benefit recipients with lower employment chances and some tend to target benefit recipients with better employment prospects, it was important to control for women's own previous earnings, which are closely related to their future employment prospects. Our findings show that women with low former cumulative earnings have higher transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs, but lower transition rates into each of the other four programme types. The effect of previous earnings is especially strong for job subsidies and in-firm training programmes. Entry rates into these programmes are less than 50% as high for women with low former earnings as for women with relatively high former earnings in both eastern and western Germany.

For marital status as a control variable, our results show that women who are cohabiting tend to have higher ALMP participation rates than women who are married, especially in western Germany. An explanation may be that a traditional division of labour in the household is presupposed more often for married than for cohabiting couples.

The age of the youngest child tends to have a positive effect on mothers' entry rates into ALMPs. These effects are stronger in western than in eastern Germany, which is likely to be related to differences in kindergarten and after-school care availability between western and eastern Germany, as well as to normative differences. In eastern Germany, mothers' entry rates into several ALMPs are actually fairly constant after age three of the youngest child. These differences between eastern and western Germany are discussed in more detail in Zabel (2012). For all programmes, mothers of children aged 0-2 are very unlikely to participate. This has to do with legal regulations stipulating that persons caring for children are expected to be ready for employment as soon as their children are three years old and adequate childcare is available (Sozialgesetzbuch Zweites Buch (SGB II) 2011). Thus, parents caring for children under three years of age are usually not required to participate in ALMPs. Our further

findings show that in western Germany, the number of children tends to have a negative effect on women's ALMP participation, as one might expect due to greater time constraints for those with more children. In eastern Germany, on the other hand, mothers of two children do not have significantly lower ALMP entry rates than mothers of only one child for any of the programmes. For some of the programme types, there are not even any differences between mothers of one and three children in eastern Germany.

While interpreting the effects of the age and number of children within the group of mothers is quite straight-forward in our models, comparisons between mothers and childless women are somewhat more cumbersome. The estimate for the variable 'children' gives differences between childless women and mothers of children whose characteristics correspond to the reference categories of the variables 'number of children' and 'age of the youngest child', in other words, mothers of one child aged six to nine. For comparisons between childless women and mothers of children with other characteristics, the estimates for the variables 'children', 'number of children', and 'age of the youngest child' need to be appropriately multiplied. For instance, entry rates into One-Euro-Jobs in western Germany for mothers of three children, the youngest of which is three to five years old, are 48% ($=0.80*0.76*0.79$) as high as for childless women.

With respect to the effect of age, it seems that for all programme types, women who are over 55 have much lower rates of programme entry. Perhaps case workers do not believe that their employment chances can be improved much a few years before retirement even by participating in ALMPs. Having a nationality other than German likewise has a negative effect. It is unclear why this should be the case, but perhaps language problems are an obstacle for participating in some programme types. Those who are handicapped or report health impairments generally also have lower rates of entering ALMPs. It is likely that persons with handicaps or health impairments would often only be able to participate in ALMPs for a few hours a day. Possibly, ALMP schedules are not flexible enough or perhaps the ALMPs are not suited to handicapped persons' needs in other respects. People without a school degree have the lowest programme entry rates of all. Among those with school degrees, education effects vary by programme type. Positive effects of having an intermediate or upper secondary degree rather than a lower secondary degree are found for in-firm training programmes, further vocational training, and job subsidies, while negative effects are found for One-Euro-Jobs. The reason for this is likely to be that One-Euro-Jobs usually involve quite basic tasks and are intended to improve elementary job skills for people with very low employment chances. It is probable that persons with low levels of education are among this target group more often than those with higher levels of education. In the case of in-firm training programmes and job subsidies, on the other hand, the firms involved may be interested in hiring more highly qualified persons. Further vocational training courses may informally expect a certain level of basic

education as a prerequisite for participating. The effect of the partner's level of education, though weaker, tends to mirror the effect of women's own level of education, especially in western Germany. Possibly, the partner's level of education picks up unobserved characteristics common to both partners which influence programme participation.

7 Conclusion

In this study, we investigated participation rates in active labour market programmes (ALMPs) by women in households receiving means-tested unemployment benefits in Germany. The formal conditions for benefit receipt have the potential to challenge traditional patterns of divisions of labour in the household. Even women who formerly did not participate in the labour market can be required to prepare for employment if their household becomes dependent on means-tested unemployment benefits. However, case managers have wide discretion concerning activation decisions.

We categorised households in order to determine whether the former division of labour in the household is indeed challenged in practice. The former division of labour was operationalised via each partner's cumulative earnings across the ten years prior to entering the status of unemployed benefit recipient.

For western Germany, our findings are that case managers replicate, rather than challenge, the previous division of labour in the household, supporting one of our main hypotheses. Women in former male breadwinner households have lower ALMP entry rates than women in households without a clear former division of labour. Previous qualitative research points towards the interpretation that case managers wish to respect couples' private choices when it comes to the division of labour in the household. Literature concerning the institutional framework within which case managers' decision-making process takes place calls attention to alternative explanations as well. Since Job Centres are evaluated based on indicators that include the amount by which they are able to reduce expenditures on Unemployment Benefit II, case managers may have an incentive to concentrate their activation efforts on the member of the couple with greater former employment experience and better chances of obtaining a higher-paying job. This could likewise explain why the former division of labour in the household is replicated in women's assignments to ALMPs.

Non-interference in couples' division of labour in the household may be seen positively, in the sense that couples receiving means-tested benefits in practice retain the freedom to choose their household roles despite official policy guidelines stipulating the contrary. On the other hand, this finding also indicates that opportunities to improve their employment chances may be withheld from a large group of women with little employment experience. Some women in former male breadwinner households may wish to profit from these opportunities, but are in practice denied access to ALMPs.

In eastern Germany, ALMP participation rates are sometimes actually higher for women in former male breadwinner households than in households without a clear former division of labour. Case managers in eastern Germany do not seem to accept a former homemaker role as a reason to be exempted from activation programmes. These differences between eastern and western Germany are likely to be due to historical differences in family policies, as well as differences in gender role attitudes that prevail even today.

Furthermore, our findings show that for women receiving means-tested unemployment benefits (UB II), having a partner at all negatively influences women's ALMP entry rates. Even in former female breadwinner households, women's ALMP participation rates, though higher than for women in other couple household types, are still lower than for single women. This indicates that case managers to an extent presuppose a traditional division of labour, even when there was in fact none. Again, we find differences between eastern and western Germany, in that effects of having a partner at all are stronger in western than in eastern Germany.

Altogether, it does seem that case managers use their discretion to shape how activation policies are implemented in practice. On the basis of the formal policy regulations, persons receiving Unemployment Benefit II could be indiscriminately allocated to activation programmes, independent of household type or household roles that they have become accustomed to. Our findings show, however, that in western Germany, prior household roles are replicated in activation programme participations. The differences that we find between eastern and western Germany highlight that there is much flexibility in how activation guidelines can be interpreted.

Our analyses have concentrated on women's ALMP participations. Future research could investigate the impact of the former division of labour in the household on men's ALMP participation rates as well. Are men who were previously the primary breadwinner in the household assigned to ALMPs more frequently than men with a formerly egalitarian division of labour in the household? Or is the household context irrelevant in the case of men? Furthermore, it might be interesting to model partners' assignments to ALMPs jointly. In such analyses, it would be important to take general differences in men's and women's ALMP participation rates into account, independent of partnership status. A possibility might be to study how the prior division of labour in the household affects each partner's chances of participating in an ALMP first.

8 Appendix

Table A.1
Transition rates into active labour market programmes for women aged 30-64 in western Germany

| | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|---|-------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| constant | 0.00028 *** | 0.00037 *** | 0.00012 *** | 0.00002 *** | 0.00011 *** |
| <i>0-3 months</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 3-6 months | 1.05 *** | 0.72 *** | 0.85 *** | 0.94 ** | 0.87 *** |
| 6-12 months | 1.00 | 0.59 *** | 0.64 *** | 0.78 *** | 0.64 *** |
| 12-18 months | 0.96 | 0.59 *** | 0.52 *** | 0.71 *** | 0.47 *** |
| 18-24 months | 0.92 ** | 0.56 *** | 0.39 *** | 0.66 *** | 0.38 *** |
| 24-30 months | 0.88 *** | 0.55 *** | 0.37 *** | 0.60 *** | 0.33 *** |
| 30-36 months | 0.86 ** | 0.54 *** | 0.38 *** | 0.66 *** | 0.37 *** |
| >36 months | 0.76 * | 0.56 *** | 0.36 *** | 0.39 *** | 0.20 *** |
| woman: cumulative earnings in last 10 years | | | | | |
| low | 1.12 *** | 0.74 *** | 0.44 *** | 0.67 *** | 0.28 *** |
| <i>high</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| interaction: woman's/ man's cumulative earnings in last 10 years | | | | | |
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| single | 1.53 *** | 1.57 *** | 2.13 *** | 1.66 *** | 2.45 *** |
| <i>no breadwinner</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| male breadwinner | 0.76 *** | 0.87 *** | 0.72 *** | 0.71 *** | 0.86 |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| single | 1.69 *** | 1.31 *** | 1.94 *** | 1.59 *** | 1.76 *** |
| <i>female breadwinner</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| dual breadwinner | 0.90 ** | 0.90 ** | 0.95 | 0.88 * | 0.91 |
| marital status | | | | | |
| <i>married</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| cohabiting | 1.28 *** | 1.14 *** | 1.26 *** | 0.95 | 1.29 *** |
| partner: current contributory employment | | | | | |
| <i>no</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| yes | 1.10 *** | 0.93 ** | 1.23 *** | 1.02 | 1.22 ** |
| partner: current earnings | | | | | |
| <i>low</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| high | 1.10 ** | 1.06 | 1.05 | 1.03 | 1.17 |
| partner: current almp | | | | | |
| <i>no</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| yes | 1.95 *** | 1.12 *** | 1.19 ** | 1.43 *** | 1.16 |
| partner: current minijob | | | | | |
| <i>no</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| yes | 0.93 ** | 0.95 | 1.22 *** | 0.93 | 1.27 *** |

Table A.1 continued

| | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|--|----------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| partner's education | | | | | |
| no degree | 0.94 *** | 0.92 *** | 0.80 *** | 0.92 | 0.84 ** |
| <i>lower secondary degree</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| intermediate secondary degree | 1.04 | 1.08 ** | 1.14 ** | 1.11 * | 0.95 |
| upper secondary degree (qual. for tech. college) | 0.88 ** | 1.02 | 0.95 | 1.26 ** | 1.12 |
| upper secondary degree (qual. for university) | 0.87 *** | 1.11 ** | 1.29 *** | 1.47 *** | 0.92 |
| children | | | | | |
| <i>no</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| yes | 0.80 *** | 0.86 *** | 0.69 *** | 1.00 | 1.03 |
| num. of children | | | | | |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 0.90 *** | 1.01 | 0.88 *** | 0.99 | 0.93 |
| 3+ | 0.76 *** | 0.83 *** | 0.70 *** | 0.75 *** | 0.70 *** |
| age of the youngest child | | | | | |
| 0-2 | 0.04 *** | 0.05 *** | 0.08 *** | 0.09 *** | 0.07 *** |
| 3-5 | 0.79 *** | 0.83 *** | 0.66 *** | 0.85 *** | 0.60 *** |
| 6-9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 10-14 | 1.19 *** | 1.19 *** | 1.45 *** | 1.16 *** | 1.19 *** |
| 15-17 | 1.21 *** | 1.18 *** | 1.66 *** | 1.19 *** | 1.20 *** |
| age | | | | | |
| 30-34 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 35-39 | 1.09 *** | 1.00 | 0.89 *** | 0.96 | 1.06 |
| 40-44 | 1.16 *** | 0.95 ** | 0.77 *** | 0.85 *** | 1.02 |
| 45-49 | 1.15 *** | 0.91 *** | 0.60 *** | 0.69 *** | 0.87 *** |
| 50-54 | 1.02 | 0.67 *** | 0.42 *** | 0.45 *** | 0.97 |
| 55-59 | 0.57 *** | 0.23 *** | 0.16 *** | 0.14 *** | 0.46 *** |
| 60-64 | 0.08 *** | 0.02 *** | 0.01 *** | 0.00 *** | 0.09 *** |
| nationality | | | | | |
| <i>German</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| missing | 0.56 ** | 0.81 | 0.45 | 0.53 | 0.39 |
| not German | 0.63 *** | 0.80 *** | 0.75 *** | 0.89 *** | 0.68 *** |
| calendar time | | | | | |
| <i>oct05-mar06</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| apr06-sept06 | 0.98 | 1.31 *** | 1.13 *** | 1.53 *** | 1.52 *** |
| oct06-mar07 | 1.20 *** | 1.89 *** | 1.29 *** | 2.03 *** | 1.87 *** |
| apr07-sept07 | 1.08 *** | 2.22 *** | 1.61 *** | 2.63 *** | 2.30 *** |
| oct07-mar08 | 1.04 | 2.24 *** | 1.45 *** | 2.75 *** | 2.26 *** |
| apr08+ | 1.06 * | 2.37 *** | 1.68 *** | 3.87 *** | 2.66 *** |

Table A.1 continued

| | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|---|-----------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--------------------------|
| local unemployment rate | 0.9795 *** | 1.0134 *** | 1.0205 *** | 1.0448 *** | 1.0239 *** |
| local proportion ub2 (of unemployed) | 0.9984 * | 0.9933 *** | 1.0007 | 0.9961 ** | 0.9887 *** |
| population density | 1.0000 | 0.9999 *** | 0.9997 *** | 1.0000 | 1.0000 |
| local gdp per capita | 1.0000 | 1.0000 *** | 1.0000 | 1.0000 *** | 1.0000 *** |
| % population economically active | 1.0040 *** | 1.0109 *** | 1.0096 *** | 1.0180 *** | 1.0176 *** |
| % in agriculture of economically active | 0.9584 *** | 1.0376 *** | 1.0256 *** | 1.0415 *** | 1.0158 |
| % in construction of economically active | 1.0000 | 0.9686 *** | 1.0057 | 1.0521 *** | 0.9990 |
| % in commerce, hotel, rest., transport of econ. act. | 1.0075 *** | 0.9976 | 1.0005 | 0.9897 *** | 1.0019 |
| % in finance, rent, business services of econ. act. | 0.9799 *** | 0.9954 * | 0.9695 *** | 0.9982 | 0.9759 *** |
| % in public and private services of econ. act. | 1.0024 * | 1.0193 *** | 1.0101 *** | 1.0067 *** | 0.9875 *** |
| handicap | | | | | |
| no | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| yes | 0.77 *** | 0.64 *** | 1.11 * | 0.78 *** | 0.67 *** |
| health impairment | | | | | |
| no | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| yes | 0.93 *** | 0.75 *** | 0.74 *** | 0.73 *** | 0.66 *** |
| education | | | | | |
| no degree | 0.87 *** | 0.71 *** | 0.48 *** | 0.58 *** | 0.51 *** |
| lower secondary degree | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| intermediate secondary degree | 0.95 *** | 1.12 *** | 1.40 *** | 1.70 *** | 1.49 *** |
| upper secondary degree (qual. for tech. college) | 0.83 *** | 1.05 | 1.44 *** | 1.86 *** | 1.73 *** |
| upper secondary degree (qual. for university) | 0.75 *** | 1.08 *** | 1.36 *** | 1.95 *** | 1.35 *** |
| variance of the heterogeneity distribution | 0.06 | 4.60 *** | 2.16 *** | 1.73 | 0.40 |
| Total time at risk (days) | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 |
| # programme entries persons | 31,137 | 30,742 | 9,422 | 9,936 | 5,696 |
| Pseudo-R² | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.11 |

* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table A.2
Transition rates into active labour market programmes for women aged 30-64 in eastern Germany

| | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|---|-------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| constant | 0.00041 *** | 0.00113 *** | 0.00074 *** | 0.00000 *** | 0.00035 *** |
| <i>0-3 months</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 3-6 months | 1.36 *** | 0.98 | 0.83 *** | 0.98 | 0.71 *** |
| 6-12 months | 1.31 *** | 0.93 * | 0.64 *** | 0.88 *** | 0.59 *** |
| 12-18 months | 1.23 *** | 0.94 | 0.51 *** | 0.78 *** | 0.41 *** |
| 18-24 months | 1.10 *** | 0.99 | 0.39 *** | 0.67 *** | 0.37 *** |
| 24-30 months | 1.03 | 1.04 | 0.35 *** | 0.56 *** | 0.25 *** |
| 30-36 months | 0.89 * | 1.14 | 0.33 *** | 0.65 *** | 0.29 *** |
| >36 months | 0.57 ** | 1.22 | 0.00 | 0.97 | 0.33 |
| woman: cumulative earnings in last 10 years | | | | | |
| low | 1.02 | 0.83 *** | 0.45 *** | 0.80 *** | 0.35 *** |
| high | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| interaction: woman's/ man's cumulative earnings in last 10 years | | | | | |
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| single | 1.32 *** | 1.33 *** | 1.88 *** | 1.33 *** | 1.87 *** |
| <i>no breadwinner</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| male breadwinner | 1.08 *** | 1.14 *** | 1.05 | 0.79 *** | 1.02 |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| single | 1.33 *** | 1.34 *** | 1.75 *** | 1.56 *** | 1.52 *** |
| <i>female breadwinner</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| dual breadwinner | 1.09 ** | 1.02 | 1.12 * | 1.11 | 1.08 |
| marital status | | | | | |
| <i>married</i> | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| cohabiting | 1.08 *** | 1.13 *** | 1.09 ** | 1.00 | 1.17 *** |
| partner: current contributory employment | | | | | |
| <i>no</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| yes | 1.16 *** | 1.00 | 1.18 *** | 1.14 * | 1.28 *** |
| partner: current earnings | | | | | |
| <i>low</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| high | 1.10 *** | 1.03 | 1.31 *** | 1.04 | 1.16 * |
| partner: current almp | | | | | |
| <i>no</i> | 1 | | | | |
| yes | 1.56 *** | 1.12 * | 1.04 | 1.20 ** | 1.21 ** |
| partner: current minijob | | | | | |
| <i>no</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| yes | 1.07 * | 0.91 | 1.04 | 0.96 | 1.03 |
| partner's education | | | | | |
| no degree | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.99 | 0.86 * | 0.94 |
| <i>lower secondary degree</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| intermediate secondary degree | 0.94 *** | 1.00 | 1.16 *** | 1.06 | 1.13 ** |
| upper secondary degree (qual. for tech. college) | 0.82 ** | 0.87 | 1.23 | 1.16 | 1.33 * |
| upper secondary degree (qual. for university) | 0.75 *** | 0.93 | 1.08 | 1.12 | 1.07 |

Table A.2 continued

| | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|---|------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| children | | | | | |
| <i>no</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <i>yes</i> | 1.15 *** | 1.05 | 1.08 * | 1.29 *** | 1.23 *** |
| num. of children | | | | | |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 0.99 | 1.07 * | 0.98 | 1.04 | 1.00 |
| 3+ | 0.98 | 1.02 | 0.68 *** | 0.74 *** | 0.71 *** |
| age of the youngest child | | | | | |
| 0-2 | 0.08 *** | 0.13 *** | 0.13 *** | 0.18 *** | 0.11 *** |
| 3-5 | 0.95 * | 0.99 | 0.78 *** | 0.94 | 0.73 *** |
| 6-9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 10-14 | 0.99 | 1.07 | 1.03 | 0.94 | 1.09 |
| 15-17 | 0.95 | 1.04 | 0.97 | 0.90 | 0.99 |
| age | | | | | |
| 30-34 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 35-39 | 1.16 *** | 0.95 | 0.85 *** | 0.97 | 1.05 |
| 40-44 | 1.26 *** | 0.91 ** | 0.77 *** | 0.80 *** | 0.87 ** |
| 45-49 | 1.36 *** | 0.88 *** | 0.59 *** | 0.66 *** | 0.75 *** |
| 50-54 | 1.37 *** | 0.71 *** | 0.45 *** | 0.45 *** | 0.73 *** |
| 55-59 | 1.01 | 0.29 *** | 0.18 *** | 0.14 *** | 0.37 *** |
| 60-64 | 0.16 *** | 0.02 *** | 0.02 *** | 0.00 | 0.07 *** |
| nationality | | | | | |
| <i>German</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <i>missing</i> | 0.31 *** | 0.29 ** | 0.75 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| <i>not German</i> | 0.54 *** | 0.82 *** | 0.72 *** | 0.67 *** | 0.51 *** |
| calendar time | | | | | |
| <i>oct05-mar06</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <i>apr06-sept06</i> | 1.09 *** | 1.01 | 1.23 *** | 0.99 | 1.30 *** |
| <i>oct06-mar07</i> | 0.98 | 1.14 *** | 1.30 *** | 1.53 *** | 1.33 *** |
| <i>apr07-sept07</i> | 1.12 *** | 1.36 *** | 1.53 *** | 1.50 *** | 1.74 *** |
| <i>oct07-mar08</i> | 0.93 ** | 1.10 | 1.29 *** | 1.60 *** | 1.59 *** |
| <i>apr08+</i> | 1.11 ** | 1.14 * | 1.63 *** | 2.15 *** | 1.82 *** |
| local unemployment rate | 1.0055 ** | 0.9323 *** | 0.9717 *** | 0.9661 *** | 0.9872 * |
| local proportion ub2 (of unemployed) | 0.9817 *** | 1.0086 *** | 0.9997 | 1.0362 *** | 1.0087 ** |
| population density | 1.0001 *** | 0.9996 *** | 0.9997 *** | 1.0003 *** | 0.9998 *** |
| local gdp per capita | 1.0000 | 1.0001 *** | 1.0000 *** | 1.0000 *** | 1.0000 |
| % population economically active | 1.0158 *** | 0.9604 *** | 0.9939 | 1.0222 *** | 1.0002 |
| % in agriculture of economically active | 1.0259 *** | 0.8871 *** | 1.0281 ** | 1.0762 *** | 0.9447 *** |
| % in construction of economically active | 0.9667 *** | 0.9430 *** | 0.9437 *** | 0.9784 | 0.9938 |
| % in commerce, hotel, rest., transport of econ. act. | 1.0075 *** | 1.0073 * | 0.9909 ** | 1.0326 *** | 0.9753 *** |
| % in finance, rent, business services of econ. act. | 0.9447 *** | 0.9762 *** | 1.0574 *** | 0.9292 *** | 0.9892 |
| % in public and private services of econ. act. | 1.0251 *** | 1.0358 *** | 1.0156 *** | 1.0129 *** | 0.9904 * |
| handicap | | | | | |
| <i>no</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <i>yes</i> | 0.87 *** | 0.73 *** | 0.82 ** | 0.93 | 0.59 *** |

Table A.2 continued

| | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|---|------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| health impairment | | | | | |
| <i>no</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <i>yes</i> | 0.94 *** | 0.69 *** | 0.70 *** | 0.69 *** | 0.63 *** |
| education | | | | | |
| <i>no degree</i> | 0.89 *** | 0.71 *** | 0.63 *** | 0.57 *** | 0.61 *** |
| <i>lower secondary degree</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <i>intermediate secondary degree</i> | 0.91 *** | 1.10 *** | 1.67 *** | 1.53 *** | 1.75 *** |
| <i>upper secondary degree (qual. for tech. college)</i> | 0.68 *** | 1.10 | 1.66 *** | 1.73 *** | 1.90 *** |
| <i>upper secondary degree (qual. for university)</i> | 0.61 *** | 0.78 *** | 1.40 *** | 1.66 *** | 1.73 *** |
| <i>variance of the heterogeneity distribution</i> | 0.00 | 3.68 *** | 2.46 *** | 0.53 | 4.75 *** |
| Total time at risk (days) | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 |
| # programme entries | 24,078 | 10,034 | 8,173 | 4,997 | 4,002 |
| persons | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 |
| Pseudo-R² | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.09 |

* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Table A.3
Women's entries into active labour market programmes by household type

| | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|---|----------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| Western Germany | | | | | |
| <i>single women: relatively low earnings</i> | 12,791 | 11,630 | 2,954 | 3,745 | 1,542 |
| <i>no breadwinner hh</i> | 3,469 | 3,127 | 515 | 895 | 231 |
| <i>male breadwinner hh</i> | 3,854 | 4,212 | 559 | 913 | 307 |
| <i>single women: relatively high earnings</i> | 8,721 | 8,812 | 4,380 | 3,531 | 2,903 |
| <i>female breadwinner hh</i> | 867 | 1,086 | 346 | 325 | 253 |
| <i>dual earner hh</i> | 1,435 | 1,875 | 668 | 527 | 460 |
| total | 31,137 | 30,742 | 9,422 | 9,936 | 5,696 |
| | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
| Eastern Germany | | | | | |
| <i>single women: relatively low earnings</i> | 6,996 | 2,917 | 1,890 | 1,591 | 829 |
| <i>no breadwinner hh</i> | 2,441 | 1,027 | 455 | 461 | 198 |
| <i>male breadwinner hh</i> | 5,213 | 1,956 | 1,048 | 548 | 451 |
| <i>single women: relatively high earnings</i> | 5,050 | 2,403 | 2,804 | 1,620 | 1,408 |
| <i>female breadwinner hh</i> | 1,049 | 456 | 407 | 214 | 245 |
| <i>dual earner hh</i> | 3,329 | 1,275 | 1,569 | 563 | 871 |
| total | 24,078 | 10,034 | 8,173 | 4,997 | 4,002 |

Table A.4**Robustness check using women's and their partners' 5-year earnings history.**

Otherwise same model as in Table 2.

Relative transition rates into active labour market programmes for women aged 30 - 64 by previous household division of paid work. Singles as reference category.

| Western Germany | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|--|-----------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| no breadwinner | 0.69 *** | 0.64 *** | 0.51 *** | 0.63 *** | 0.45 *** |
| male breadwinner | 0.56 *** | 0.58 *** | 0.39 *** | 0.48 *** | 0.40 *** |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| female breadwinner | 0.66 *** | 0.72 *** | 0.55 *** | 0.63 *** | 0.52 *** |
| dual breadwinner | 0.59 *** | 0.70 *** | 0.54 *** | 0.57 *** | 0.61 *** |
| variance of the heterogeneity distribution | 0.28 ** | 4.56 *** | 2.81 *** | 2.03 ** | 0.00 |
| Total time at risk (days) | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 | 157,857,901 |
| # programme entries | 31,137 | 30,742 | 9,422 | 9,936 | 5,696 |
| persons | 559,021 | 559,021 | 559,021 | 559,021 | 559,021 |
| Pseudo-R² | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.11 |
| Eastern Germany | | | | | |
| Eastern Germany | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| no breadwinner | 0.80 *** | 0.77 *** | 0.64 *** | 0.73 *** | 0.68 *** |
| male breadwinner | 0.90 *** | 0.86 *** | 0.73 *** | 0.73 *** | 0.69 *** |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| female breadwinner | 0.78 *** | 0.77 *** | 0.66 *** | 0.73 *** | 0.78 *** |
| dual breadwinner | 0.92 *** | 0.82 *** | 0.91 ** | 0.74 *** | 1.00 |
| variance of the heterogeneity distribution | 0.00 | 3.66 *** | 2.49 *** | 0.33 | 3.71 *** |
| Total time at risk (days) | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 | 61,988,486 |
| # programme entries | 24,078 | 10,034 | 8,173 | 4,997 | 4,002 |
| persons | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 | 242,979 |
| Pseudo-R² | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.09 |

* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Further control variables: high/low individual earnings, number of children, age of the youngest child, own age, nationality, calendar time, handicap, health status, level of education, regional indicators including: unemployment rate, proportion of unemployed receiving UB II, population density, gross domestic product, proportion of population that is economically active, proportion of the economically active employed in various sectors.

Table A.5
Sample restricted to childless women

Otherwise same model as in Table 2.

Relative transition rates into active labour market programmes for women aged 30 - 64 by previous household division of paid work. Singles as reference category.

| Western Germany | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|--|-----------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| no breadwinner | 0.75 *** | 0.63 *** | 0.46 *** | 0.72 *** | 0.49 *** |
| male breadwinner | 0.56 *** | 0.52 *** | 0.36 *** | 0.51 *** | 0.37 *** |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| female breadwinner | 0.67 *** | 0.74 *** | 0.58 *** | 0.72 *** | 0.60 *** |
| dual breadwinner | 0.61 *** | 0.72 *** | 0.63 *** | 0.67 *** | 0.63 *** |
| variance of the heterogeneity distribution | 0.00 | 5.30 *** | 1.45 | 0.81 | 0.00 |
| Total time at risk (days) | 79008341 | 79008341 | 79008341 | 79008341 | 79008341 |
| # programme entries | 18234 | 15477 | 5463 | 4743 | 3282 |
| persons | 275653 | 275653 | 275653 | 275653 | 275653 |
| Eastern Germany | | | | | |
| Eastern Germany | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| no breadwinner | 0.77 *** | 0.73 *** | 0.53 *** | 0.68 *** | 0.59 *** |
| male breadwinner | 0.84 *** | 0.84 *** | 0.58 *** | 0.57 *** | 0.69 *** |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| female breadwinner | 0.78 *** | 0.71 *** | 0.68 *** | 0.62 *** | 0.84 * |
| dual breadwinner | 0.89 *** | 0.74 *** | 0.85 *** | 0.76 *** | 0.98 |
| variance of the heterogeneity distribution | 0.00 | 6.49 *** | 3.52 *** | 0.80 | 6.65 *** |
| Total time at risk (days) | 36608111 | 36608111 | 36608111 | 36608111 | 36608111 |
| # programme entries | 15044 | 5489 | 4493 | 2523 | 2246 |
| persons | 138487 | 138487 | 138487 | 138487 | 138487 |

* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Further control variables: high/low individual earnings, number of children, age of the youngest child, own age, nationality, calendar time, handicap, health status, level of education, regional indicators including: unemployment rate, proportion of unemployed receiving UB II, population density, gross domestic product, proportion of population that is economically active, proportion of the economically active employed in various sectors.

Table A.6
Sample restricted to women with children aged 3 - 5.

Otherwise same model as in Table 2.

Relative transition rates into active labour market programmes for women aged 30 - 64 by previous household division of paid work. Singles (lone mothers) as reference category.

| Western Germany | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
|--|----------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| no breadwinner | 0.63 *** | 0.58 *** | 0.62 *** | 0.69 *** | 0.58 ** |
| male breadwinner | 0.44 *** | 0.55 *** | 0.42 *** | 0.45 *** | 0.38 *** |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| female breadwinner | 0.54 *** | 0.78 * | 0.73 | 0.48 *** | 0.58 ** |
| dual breadwinner | 0.59 *** | 0.71 *** | 0.57 *** | 0.48 *** | 0.51 *** |
| variance of the heterogeneity distribution | 3.34 *** | 2.65 *** | 4.46 | 2.86 | 0.00 |
| Total time at risk (days) | 16033481 | 16033481 | 16033481 | 16033481 | 16033481 |
| # programme entries | 2329 | 3206 | 676 | 1140 | 410 |
| persons | 54480 | 54480 | 54480 | 54480 | 54480 |
| Eastern Germany | One-Euro | classroom training | in-firm training | further vocational training | job subsidies |
| woman: relatively low earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| no breadwinner | 0.80 *** | 0.67 *** | 0.99 | 0.80 | 0.83 |
| male breadwinner | 0.97 | 0.99 | 1.32 ** | 0.75 ** | 0.84 |
| woman: relatively high earnings | | | | | |
| <i>single</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| female breadwinner | 0.58 *** | 0.97 | 0.60 ** | 0.90 | 0.91 |
| dual breadwinner | 0.87 | 0.89 | 0.87 | 0.96 | 1.02 |
| variance of the heterogeneity distribution | 0.00 | 4.10 *** | 6.46 *** | 0.09 | 4.34 |
| Total time at risk (days) | 4830471 | 4830471 | 4830471 | 4830471 | 4830471 |
| # programme entries | 1828 | 1018 | 744 | 584 | 332 |
| persons | 18825 | 18825 | 18825 | 18825 | 18825 |

* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Further control variables: high/low individual earnings, number of children, age of the youngest child, own age, nationality, calendar time, handicap, health status, level of education, regional indicators including: unemployment rate, proportion of unemployed receiving UB II, population density, gross domestic product, proportion of population that is economically active, proportion of the economically active employed in various sectors.

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