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Abstract:

In a social custom model of union membership with wage bargaining, higher levels of company taxes lower wages while having uncertain employment effects. A higher marginal income tax rate increases employment. Changes solely in the level of income taxation, retaining marginal rates, have ambiguous wage and employment consequences. Endogenising union membership therefore does not alter the effects of tax changes in comparison to a right-to-manage model with exogenously fixed level of density.

Keywords: Right-to-Manage, Social Custom, Taxes, Trade Union

JEL-classification: A 13, H 24, H 25, J 51

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1. Introduction

It has long been recognised in empirical work on collective bargaining that wages and union membership are determined jointly (Lee 1978, Schmidt/Strauss 1976). In theoretical work, however, this link has attained less attention. In general, it is presumed that union membership exceeds employment or that the median union member is not affected by employment variations. The membership decision is not modelled endogenously. More importantly, the co-existence of employed union workers and non-union employees, i.e., a truly open shop, is ruled out. These feature are reflected, for example, in the analysis of tax changes in models of collective bargaining - in which a fixed membership has been assumed. Does the assumption of a given membership have a decisive impact on the policy advice resulting from such models?

To provide an answer to the above question, in this paper personal income and company taxes are included into a social custom model of union membership (section 2), based on the approach by Booth and Chatterji (1993), and supplemented by wage bargaining, as the evidence on (explicit) efficient bargains is scarce (Oswald 1993). The social custom model is characterised on the one hand by a positive relationship between wages and membership when determining the individual worker's decision whether to join a union or not. On the other hand, a negative relationship between wages and membership results from wage bargaining. Both curves together determine an equilibrium wage-membership combination. Wage and employment effects of tax changes will be derived and compared to the predictions which result from a right-to-manage model with fixed membership (section 3). Extensions are discussed in section 4, while the final section contains concluding comments.

2. A social custom model with wage bargaining and taxes

Social custom models endogenise the union membership decision and allow for intermediate density levels. They thus strengthen the micro-foundations of wage bargaining models. Union membership is supposed to raise utility because there exist social norms or mores, such that conforming with the custom yields reputation to individuals who adhere to it. Workers can only gain this reputation by joining the union, hence non-members can be excluded from 'consumption'. But there is no rivalry in the consumption of membership - a high density level might instead raise the utility from joining. Union membership then represents a monopolistically supplied, semi-public good. In the subsequent analysis the focus will be on this public good interpretation, although the provision of private goods by the union is not ruled out.

The social custom model goes back to Akerlof (1980) and has been applied to trade union membership by Booth (1985), Naylor (1989, 1990), Naylor/Raaum (1993), Booth/Chatterji (1993, 1995) and Corneo (1993, 1995), inter alia. In contrast to other authors, Naylor/Cripps (1993) assume that not only union membership yields reputation.
Suppose then, that a single trade union bargains over wages with a representative firm operating in an output market with given prices. The gross wage agreed upon applies to all employees, irrespective of their union status. The union acts on behalf of the median member. All employees are identical, apart from their commitment towards the social custom and the reputation derived from being a union member. For simplicity, the reputation effect \( r^i \) for a worker \( i \) is given by

\[ r^i = \gamma M, \]

where \( M \) defines union density as percentage of all workers supplying labour. \( \gamma \) is a parameter describing the taste for unionism or commitment of worker \( i \) towards the social custom and is increasing in commitment.\(^2\) The parameter \( \gamma \) is distributed uniformly on the interval \([0, 1]\). A randomly selected worker is therefore more likely to be a union member the higher \( \gamma \), for a given wage-membership combination. The marginal member \( k \) is defined by:

\[ \gamma^k = 1 - M \]

The value of \( \gamma \) for median member \( h \) is given by \( \gamma^h = (1 + \gamma^k)/2 \). Employed union members pay a fixed membership fee \( a, a > 0 \),\(^3\) such that their income \( y \) is equal to:

\[ y = w - T(w) - a, \]

where \( w \) delineates the wage received as gross income and where \( T \) is the tax revenue per worker or the amount of taxes paid. The tax function \( T(w) \) is convex \((0 \leq T_w \leq 1, T_{ww} \geq 0)\). Moreover, the marginal tax rate is assumed to be less than unity, reflecting labour supply constraints exogenous to the model. Workers' utility is additively separable in utility from income \( y \) and reputation \( r \). Utility of an employed union member \( i \) is given by \( u(y) + \gamma M \). The utility function \( u(\cdot) \) is strictly concave.

The maximum number of workers offering their service to the firm in question, or of union members, is constant and normalised to unity. Labour demand \( N(w) \) is therefore equal to the proportion of workers employed and decreases in the wage \((N_w < 0)\). Hence, by assumption \( M \leq N \leq 1 \) holds. The firm randomly selects its employees, subsequent to the determination of the wage. For simplicity, the alternative to being among the \( N(w) \) employed workers is modelled as being without work. An unemployed worker will be refunded his or her

\(^2\) Empirical evidence for the positive impact of benevolent attitudes towards unions or their image on the probability of union membership can be found in Deery/De Cieri (1991), Haberfeld (1995), and Ingham (1995).

\(^3\) If the union provided private goods the parameter \( a \) could be understood as net cost of membership, i.e., taking into account utility from consumption of this private good. For intermediate density levels to exist, net cost need to be positive.
union fee, if s/he had been a member, and will not derive any reputation from remaining in the union. S/he receives an alternative income $\bar{w}$, yielding a net income of $z = \bar{w} - T(\bar{w})$, where $z < y$. Expected utility of a union member is given by $U^u$, expected utility of its non-union counter-part by $U^n$.\footnote{As the decision between adhering to the custom and not conforming to it is a discrete choice the problem of "level erosion" (Schlicht 1993) does not arise in the context of trade union membership. See also Romer (1984).}

\begin{align*}
U^u &= N(w)[u(y) + r] + (1 - N(w))u(z) \\
U^n &= N(w)[u(y + a)] + (1 - N(w))u(z)
\end{align*}

An individual will join the union if s/he gains utility by doing so, i.e., if $U^u > U^n$. Using the definitions of $r$ and $y$, a membership indifference curve (MIC) can be defined, which depicts combinations of wage and membership levels such that expected utility of a union member and of a non-union worker are the same:

\[ Z = N(w)[u(y) + (M - M^2) - u(y + a)] = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (5)

If a worker is indifferent between joining and not joining, changes in $N(w)$ will not affect the equality of $U^u$ and $U^n$. The irrelevance of $N(w)$ in this context arises because every worker not employed for union wage $w$ receives utility $u(z)$. The slope of the membership indifference curve is then given by:

\[ \frac{dw}{dM}_{MIC} = \frac{2M - 1}{(1 - T_w(w))[u'(y) - u'(y + a)]} \geq (\leq) 0, \text{ if } M > (\leq) 0.5. \]  \hspace{1cm} (6)

All pairs of $w$ and $M$ above (below) the membership indifference curve MIC\footnote{For empirical evidence that the probability of union membership can rise with income see Schmidt (1978) or Booth (1986).} in Figure 1 represent situations in which joining (leaving) the union yields utility gains, such that density will increase (fall). Hence, only a membership level $M > 0.5$ is stable, as indicated by the arrows. The stable arm of the membership indifference curve is upward sloping because workers with lower values of $y$ can only be 'convinced' to join if cost of membership decline relative to the wage. For a given value of $y$ and $M$ a worker is more likely to gain from union membership "is akin to the purchase of a capital asset" and hence increases in a measure of permanent income, such as the current wage.\footnote{For empirical evidence that the probability of union membership can rise with income see Schmidt (1978) or Booth (1986).}
The company under consideration uses labour as its sole input. It is subject to revenue and payroll taxes, which cannot be shifted forward. Let $t_p$ ($t_r$) be the tax rate on labour cost (revenues), where $0 < t_r < 1$, and $0 < t_p$. Profits are then given by:

$$\Pi = (1 - t_r)R(N) - (1 + t_p)wN$$

(7)

$R(N)$ defines the (strictly concave) revenue function. The wage is assumed to be determined by an asymmetric Nash-solution where $\alpha$, $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$, indicates the union's bargaining power. Taking into account the definitions of $\nu^h$ and $\nu^k$, the union's incremental utility is defined by $N(w) X$, where $X = u(y) + M - M^2/2 - u(z)$. Note that $X$ depends on the reputation effect and that the union acts on behalf of the median member. The firm's increment is given by its profits, as the threat payoff is normalised to zero. Maximising the Nash-product with respect to $w$, where $N_w = (1 + t_p)/[R''(N)/(1 - t_r)]$, yields (cf. Nickell/Andrews 1983; Oswald 1985):

$$V \equiv \frac{Nw'(1 - T_w)}{X} - \frac{1 - \alpha N^2(1 + t_p)}{\alpha \Pi} + N_w = 0$$

(8)

The second order condition requires $V_w < 0$ and hence $N_{ww} \leq 0$ as sufficiency requirement. Thus, the wage-bargaining-curve (WBC) defined by equation (8) is downward sloping in the wage-membership space.
In Figure 1 the intersection of the wage bargaining curve $WBC^0$ - which for simplicity is depicted as linear - with $MIC^0$ defines the equilibrium levels of membership ($M^0$) and wages ($w^0$). This intersection is assumed to lie to the right of $M = 0.5$. It can be shown that the WBC is downward sloping, as long as wage demands are determined by the median member or a more 'senior' one, i.e., a union member characterised by $\gamma > \gamma^h$. If $\gamma < \gamma^h$, the WBC might become upward sloping. Consequences of such a modification will be discussed in section 4.

3. Impact of tax changes

The impact of tax changes on the outcome of collective bargaining has been studied in depth, both theoretically and empirically. In the majority of cases, researchers have focused on labour demand curve models. In the analysis of such wage bargaining models with exogenously given membership a consensus has arisen that higher company taxes, which cannot be shifted forward completely, lower wages. Predictions about the consequences of alterations in personal income tax rates have undergone modifications. While Oswald (1982, 1985) and Hersoug (1984) point out the theoretical ambiguity of wage reactions resulting from an increase in the marginal tax rate, also implying a change in tax revenue $T$, the opinion now prevails that a higher marginal tax rate $T_w$ or a more progressive tax structure lower wage demands, when revenue $T$ is held constant. A sole change in the average tax rate or in the amount of income taxation entails ambiguous wage consequences. If labour demand is unaffected by tax changes employment will increase due to lower wages.

In a social custom model the wage consequences of tax changes operate (potentially) via two channels: Firstly, the impact on the WBC has to be determined, which, however, mirrors those observed in a standard wage bargaining models. An increase in the company taxes implies a shift from $WBC^0$ towards the south-west to $WBC^1$ in Figure 1. The WBC would also shift to the left if the payroll tax were wage dependent and if an increase solely in the marginal rate of the payroll tax were presumed, while its level were held constant (Lockwood/Manning 1993; Holmlund/Kolm 1995). An increase in the marginal income tax rate $T_w$ retain-

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7 Cf. Holmlund/Kolm (1995), Lockwood/Manning (1993), Lockwood et al. (1995), and Koskela/Vilmunen (1996). In general, the constancy of tax revenue refers to the initial wage, i.e., is of the ex-ante variant.
ing $T$ at its initial value for the original wage, i.e., keeping tax revenue per worker or the amount of taxes paid $T$ constant ex-ante, also shifts the WBC downwards to $\text{WBC}^1$, while a rise in the amount of taxes $T$, preserving $T_W$ at its initial level, has no clearly predictable effect.

Secondly, tax variations can also have consequences for the MIC. If the tax revenue $T$ or the amount of income taxes to be paid is raised, the MIC will shift upwards from $\text{MIC}^0$ to $\text{MIC}^2$ in Figure 1. Changes in the company taxes have no effect on $\text{MIC}^0$. If the marginal income tax rate $T_w$ rises, while $T$ remains constant for a given wage, the change from $\text{MIC}^0$ to $\text{MIC}^1$ will depict the impact of an increase in $T_w$. The overall wage effects of an increase in the marginal income tax, for example, are then given by:

$$\frac{dw}{dT_w} = \frac{V_{T_w} Z_M - Z_T V_M}{D} < 0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

where $D = Z_w V_M - V_w Z_M$ and subscripts indicate partial derivatives. Note that $Z_w > 0$ and $Z_M < 0$ for $M > 0.5$, while $V_w < 0$ from the second order condition and $V_M < 0$ from equation (8), such that $D < 0$. Moreover, $Z_T w = 0$ and $V_T w < 0$, establishing the negative wage effect of a rise in $T_w$. The other wage effects of tax changes are found to be:

$$\frac{dw}{dt_r} = \frac{V_{t_r} Z_M}{D} < 0, \text{ as } V_{t_r} < 0 \text{ (and } Z_{t_r} = 0)$$ \hspace{1cm} (11)

$$\frac{dw}{dt_p} = \frac{V_{t_p} Z_M}{D} < 0, \text{ as } V_{t_p} < 0 \text{ (and } Z_{t_p} = 0)$$ \hspace{1cm} (12)

$$\frac{dw}{dT} = \frac{V_T Z_M - Z_T V_M}{D}$$ \hspace{1cm} (13)

As $VT$ cannot be signed ambiguously, the overall wage and employment effects of an increase in $T$ cannot be ascertained. Higher levels of company taxes have ambiguous employment consequences, because lower wages compete with a shift in the firm's labour demand curve for a given wage. Higher marginal income (and payroll) tax rates will increase employment, if the level of taxation is preserved. The basic results of a standard right-to-manage model that a more progressive income tax system is beneficial for employment, and that changes in the level of company taxes and in $T$ have ambiguous employment consequences, will therefore also hold if union membership is determined endogenously.

4. Extensions

The results obtained in the previous section with respect to the impact of tax changes have all been derived for a specific social custom set-up. The question therefore to be investigated is
whether tax policy conclusions are robust to plausible extensions of the social custom aspect of
the model (see appendix for a derivations of the results stated below). It will thus be analysed
in how far the tax effects are altered if alternative assumptions with respect to the reputation
function, the taxation of alternative income, the union membership fee, the option of union
membership for unemployed workers, and finally the employees utility function are made.

Reputation Function

If reputation of member \( i \) were given by \( r^i = \gamma^i \), as in Booth and Chatterji (1995), and
not by \( \gamma^i M \), as in equation (1), the WBC can be shown to be upward sloping; a hypothesis for
which Booth and Chatterji also find some empirical validation. In such a model the wage and
membership effects of changes in company taxes remain unaltered, whereas an increase in the
marginal rate of the personal income tax has reinforcing effects on the WBC and the MIC,
such that wages and union density fall. The impact of changes in the marginal income tax rate
in a social custom model therefore depends quantitatively, though not qualitatively on the rela-
tion between reputation and union density, and - as argued above - possibly also on the median
member assumption.

Casual observations suggest that reputation from union membership might not only
depend on density, but that the reputation gain declines the higher income (or wealth) of an
employee. This feature could help to explain why, in contrast to findings by Schmidt (1978),
Schmidt/Strauss (1976) or Booth (1986), there has also been diagnosed a negative or U-
shaped relationship between the probability of union membership and pay (Haberfeld 1995,
Bain/Elias 1985). In order to investigate this possibility, assume the following reputation effect
for a worker \( i \), which is substituted for (1):

\[
\gamma^i M - \beta(w),
\]

where \( \beta(w) > 0 \) and \( \beta_w(w) > 0 \).\(^8\) Hence, the income effect is independent of the worker's
'taste' for unionism and can be proxied by gross income. Assumptions regarding the distribu-
tion of \( \gamma \) are retained. Given (1a) the MIC is defined by an appropriately modified equation (5),
based on (4a) and (4b). In the following it is assumed that the intersection of MIC and WBC
always occurs for a positive wage. The income dependent reputation effect is therefore suffi-
ciently weak to guarantee a membership equilibrium. It can be shown that the slope of the
WBC and the MIC, respectively, depend on the sign of \( E' \) and \( E'' \), where:

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\(^8\) See Akerlof (1980) and Naylor (1990) for a discussion of the features of equation (1a) and
Corneo (1997) for a critique of the general approach, in which functional forms for the reputa-
tion effect are simply imposed and "lack an explicit microeconomic foundation". \( \beta(w) > 0 \)
implies that any positive income lowers reputation from membership. For simplicity, this
assumption will be made, although the sign of \( \beta(w) \) is irrelevant for the subsequent analysis, as
long as \( \beta_w(w) > 0 \).
\[ E' = u_y (1 - T_w (w)) - \beta_w (w) \]  
\[ E'' = (1 - T_w (w)) \left[ u_y (y) - u_y (y + \alpha) \right] - \beta_w (w) \]

Three mutually exclusive, but exhaustive cases can arise, if the border-line values of \( E' \), \( E'' = 0 \) are ignored:

I: \( E'' > 0 \) and thus \( E' > 0 \)

II: \( E' < 0 \) and thus \( E'' < 0 \)

III: \( E' > 0 \) and \( E'' < 0 \)

If case I applies, which could be interpreted as situation of fairly weak reputation effect of income, the MIC will be convex and the WBC downward sloping. Increases in company taxes lower wages and membership, as does a higher marginal tax rate \( T_w \), given a constant \( T \), because there exist no first order effects of changes in \( T_w \) via the MIC. If the level of income taxes \( T \) is raised, holding \( T_w \) constant, the outcome will be ambiguous. If \( \beta_w (w) \) is sufficiently small, the predictions resulting from the social custom model analysed in sections 2 and 3 will therefore not be affected.

In case II the reputation effect of income is sufficiently strong for the MIC to be concave. In addition, the slope of the WBC cannot be signed. This implies that effects of tax changes with respect to the wage bargaining outcome cannot be predicted, irrespective of the type of tax alteration. If the income effect therefore dominates the density effect at the margin the social custom model will lose its predictive power with respect to the wage, employment, and membership effects of tax variations.

In case III the reputation effect of income on the one hand is sufficiently small to guarantee a downward sloping WBC. But on the other hand it is sufficiently large to imply a concave MIC. This constellation can be understood as situation in which the utility differential due to the payment of the membership fee for the marginal member is more than compensated for by the (negative) reputation effect of income. Hence, higher wages reduce the utility loss due to paying the membership fee by less than \( \beta (w) \) increases. The parameter constellation, however, is at the same time capturing a situation in which the median members' reputation loss due to higher income is not large enough to counter the higher utility due to an increase in wages, such that the WBC slopes downward. Under these circumstances, in which the inclusion of \( \beta (w) \) implies a qualitatively different impact for marginal and median member, a stable equilibrium will only exist for \( M < 0.5 \). Increases in company taxes decrease wages and membership. A higher marginal tax rate \( T_w \) lowers wages and promotes employment; the greater slope of the MIC and the shift of the WBC operate in the same direction. The implications of alterations in \( T \) are ambiguous.
Taxation of Alternative Income

If $\bar{w}$ does not represent income earned in another job but unemployment benefits, as it is assumed in section 2, $\bar{w}$ might not be taxed. Alternatively, $\bar{w}$ might not exceed a tax threshold. From inspection of (5) and (6) it can be noted that tax liability of alternative income $\bar{w}$ does not affect the position of the MIC. From eqs (8) to (12) it can be gathered that the exclusion of $\bar{w}$ from taxation implies $X = u(w - T(w) - a) + M - M^2/2 - u(\bar{w})$. This alteration does not affect the qualitative impact on the WBC due to changes in company taxes or the marginal income tax rate. But if the tax level $T$ is raised while $T_w$ remains unchanged, the wage (employment) effect will be positive (negative). The impact of an increase in $T$ on union density is ambiguous. Hence, the assumption of an untaxed alternative income alters the theoretical predictions of a social custom model with respect to wage effects of changes in the amount of personal income taxes paid.

Union Membership Fee

In some European countries and also in the United States union membership fees are calculated as a percentage $\rho$ of income, such that $\alpha(w) = \rho w$, where $0 < \rho < 1$. In such a set-up the properties of the WBC remain unchanged while the MIC will only be a convex parabola if the utility function $u(\cdot)$ is sufficiently concave, where 'sufficiently' is defined by $u_y(w - T(w)) < u_y(w - T(w) - \rho w)(1 - \rho)$. Given the existence of a stable membership equilibrium, theoretical predictions with respect to tax changes remain qualitatively valid, irrespective of the MIC's curvature. Similar results as those outlined for a membership fee $\rho w$ hold for a contribution which is tax deductible.

Unemployed Union Members

Suppose, a worker without union job does not have to leave the union. Instead, s/he pays the same constant membership fee $a$ as his or her employed counterpart and receives the same utility $r$ from belonging to the union. If the individual i's reputation $r^i$ is given by (1), utility from being a union member $U^U$ will be equal to:

$$U^U = N(w)[u(w - T(w) - a) + r] + (1 - N(w))[u(\bar{w} - T(\bar{w}) - a) + r] \quad (4c)$$

Utility of not belonging to the union is unchanged by the modification and therefore defined by equation (4b). Given this alteration, the WBC is horizontal in the wage-membership space, as the bargained wage is independent of union density $M$. The MIC is still a convex parabola. Assuming a stable equilibrium, an increase in company taxes or in the marginal income tax rate lowers wages and density. If $T_w$ rises employment will also increase. A higher amount of income taxes $T$ implies uncertain wage, employment and membership effects.
Utility function

Finally, the choice of the utility function as being additively separable in income and reputation, with diminishing (constant) marginal utility from income (reputation) can be questioned. Although underlying assumptions are standard in social custom models of trade union membership the impact of tax changes should clearly not depend solely on the specific utility function chosen. Suppose therefore that the reputation effect is defined by equation (1), while utility of a union member is given either by

\[ U^u = N(w)u(y, r) + (1 - N(w))u(z), \quad (4d) \]

where \( u_r(y, r) > 0 \) and \( u(y, 0) = u(y) \) or by

\[ U^u = N(w)[u(y) + v(r)] + (1 - N(w))u(z), \quad (4e) \]

where \( v_r(r) > 0 \) and \( v(0) = 0 \). Both cases captured by (4d) and (4e) presume that unemployed workers have to leave the union. The utility of a non-union worker is defined by (4b). If it is assumed instead that unemployed workers can remain in the union this might be modelled as

\[ U^u = N(w)u(y, r) + (1 - N(w))u(z, r), \quad (4f) \]

where \( u_r(i, r) > 0 \), \( u(i, 0) = u(i) \) and \( i = y, z, \) or as

\[ U^u = N(w)[u(y) + v(r)] + (1 - N(w))[u(z) + w(r)], \quad (4g) \]

where \( v_r(r), w_r(r) > 0 \), \( v(0) = w(0) = 0 \). Under either of the modified utility functions, assuming a stable equilibrium, higher company taxes lower wages and membership. Moreover, wages and membership will decline, if \( T_w \) increases while \( T \) is held constant. The impact of a sole change in \( T \) cannot be predicted.

5. Conclusions

Firstly, the result that higher company taxes and a higher marginal income tax rate lower wages and membership also holds for various modifications of the model. As has been demonstrated in sections 3 and 4, these alterations include a monopoly union model,\(^9\) a different reputation function, variable union membership fees, a tax-free alternative income, the option of union membership for unemployed workers and various alternative definitions of employees' earnings.

\(^9\) In a monopoly union model with exogenous membership and a constant labour demand elasticity, wages will remain the same and employment will decline if a payroll tax or a tax on revenues is raised (Aronsson et al. 1993, Schnabel 1993). From inspection of (5), and (8) for \( \alpha = 1 \), it can be noted that this special case also holds for the social custom model.
utility functions. The impact of changes in company taxes and the marginal income tax rate can thus be predicted with some confidence.

Secondly, the consistency of results across specifications has wider implications for the predictive power of the social custom model. In the framework employed here alterations in the level of company taxation are, for example, equivalent to shifts of the labour demand curve. Hence, results can be applied to more general shocks affecting the company's demand function, though this outcome can be model-specific (cf. Booth/Chatterji 1993, 1995). Alterations in the marginal income (and payroll) tax rate can also be interpreted more comprehensively as changes in social security contributions at the margin or as variations in the implicit marginal tax rate.

Thirdly, the consequences of tax changes derived in a social custom framework are qualitatively the same as in a standard right-to-manage model with an exogenously given membership. As long as the 'membership effect' is only of second order magnitude in comparison to a first order impact of the 'wage bargaining effect', endogenising the level of union density does not seem to affect tax policy conclusions.
References


Appendix: Derivation of results contained in section 4

Reputation Function

For a reputation function \( r^i = \rho^i \), divide the terms involving union density in equation (5) and in the definition of \( X \) by \( M \). Following the procedure in the text, the MIC is found to be linear and upward sloping. The WBC also has a positive slope.

Given a reputation effect which includes income, proxied by gross wages, as described by equation (1a), the combination of (4a) and (4b) yields a definition of the MIC. Using (14b), the slope of this indifference curve is given by:

\[
\frac{dw}{dM}\left|_{\text{MIC}} \right. = \frac{2M - 1}{(1 - T_w(w))\left[ u_y(y) - u_y(y + a) \right] - \beta_w(w)} = \frac{2M - 1}{E''} \tag{6a}
\]

The outcome of the Nash-bargain is described by the following optimality condition:

\[
\frac{Nu_y(1 - T_w) - \beta_w(w)}{C} - \frac{1 - \alpha N^2(1 + t_p)}{\alpha} + N_w = 0 \text{ for } (8a)
\]

If bargaining yields a utility gain for the union, \( C > 0 \) has to hold. The slope of the WBC in the wage-membership space is given by:

\[
\frac{dw}{dM}\left|_{\text{WBC}} \right. = \frac{N[u_y(1 - T_w) - \beta_w(w)](1 - M)}{DC^2} = \frac{NE'(1 - M)}{DC^2}, \tag{6b}
\]

employing eqs (16) and (14a). From (6a) and (6b) the three cases discussed in section 4 can be derived, if \( E', E'' = 0 \) is ignored.

Union Membership Fee

If the union fee is income dependent, (5) can be rewritten as:

\[
Z = N(w)[u(w - T(w) - \rho w) + (M - M^2) - u(w - T(w))] = 0 \tag{5c}
\]

Given the definition of the MIC in (5c), its slope cannot be determined unambiguously, unless the term in square brackets in (6c) is signed a priori.

\[
\frac{dw}{dM}\left|_{\text{MIC}, \alpha = \rho w} \right. = \frac{2M - 1}{(1 - T_w(w))\left[ u_y(w - T(w) - \rho w) - u_y(w - T(w)) \right] - u_y \rho} \tag{6c}
\]

The same is true for a utility function of workers based on the assumption that the union fee is tax deductible, such that \( Z \) is given by (5d).

\[
Z = N(w)[u(w(1 - \rho) - T(w(1 - \rho))) + (M - M^2) - u(w - T(w))] = 0 \tag{5d}
\]

The slope of the MIC for \( y = w(1 - \rho) - T(w(1 - \rho)) \) is found to be:
Unemployed Union Members

Assume, reputation resulting from being a union member accrues both to employed and unemployed workers. Moreover, both types pay a fixed contribution $a, a > 0$. Utility from belonging to the union or abstaining from it is given by (4b) and (4c). Indifference between the two states will be warranted if equality (5e) holds, where $M$ has been substituted for $r$, as in equation (5):

$$N(w)[u(w - T(w) - a) - u(w - T(w))] - N(w)[u(w - T(w) - a) - u(w - T(w))] + u(w - T(w) - a) - u(w - T(w)) + M - M^2 = 0$$

Due to concavity of the utility function $u(-)$, the term in square brackets is smaller than the term in curly brackets in the first line of (5e), such that $B < 0$, where $B$ is defined as:

$B = N(w)[u(w - T(w) - a) - u(w - T(w))] - u(w - T(w)) - u(w - T(w) - a) + u(w - T(w))]$.

Thus, the second line in (5e) has to be positive for indifference to hold. The slope of the MIC in wage-membership space is determined by:

$$\frac{d w}{d M} |_{MIC} = \frac{2M - 1}{N w B + N (1 - T_w)(u_y(w - T(w) - a) - u_y(w - T(w)))}$$

Concavity of $u(-)$ ensures that the second term in the denominator of (6e) is positive and that the MIC can be represented by a convex parabola in the wage-membership space. An increase in the marginal tax rate $T_w$, keeping constant $T$, has no impact on the wage associated with $M = 0.5$ but makes both 'arms' of the parabola steeper. This is the same as in the model without reputation for the unemployed. An increase in $T$, while $T_w$ remains unchanged, shifts the MIC downwards, in contrast to the original model of the main text. The change in slope could only be ascertained if the third derivative of $u(-)$ were signed. From (5e) it can be concluded that an increase in company taxes shifts the MIC upwards, while the alteration in its slope is ambiguous, due to the impact of taxes on labour demand.

Turning to the WBC, the union's incremental utility from an agreement is given by $N(w) X'$,

$$X' = u(y) + r - u(z') - r,$$

where $y = w - T(w) - a$ and $z' = w - T(w) - a$. The magnitude of union density $M$ therefore has no impact on the bargained wage, which is defined by equation (8b):

$$F \equiv \frac{N w}{u(w - T(w) - a) - u(w - T(w) - a)} \frac{l - \alpha}{\alpha} N w = 0$$

The WBC is horizontal in the wage-membership space. An increase in company taxes shifts the WBC downwards, as:
\[
\frac{\text{d}w}{\text{d}t_p} = -\frac{F_{tp}}{F_w} < 0, \text{ where } (18)
\]
\[
F_w = \frac{N\left(u_{yy}(w-T(w)-a)(1-T_w)^2 - u_Y(w-T(w)-a)T_{ww}\right)}{u(w-T(w)-a) - u(\bar{w} - T(\bar{w}) - a)}
\]
\[
\frac{Nu^2_y(w-T(w)-a)(1-T_w)^2}{\left(u(w-T(w)-a) - u(\bar{w} - T(\bar{w}) - a)\right)^2} - \frac{1 - \alpha N^3 (1-t_p)^2}{\alpha \Pi^2} + N_{ww} < 0 \quad (19a)
\]
and
\[
F_{tp} = -\frac{1 - \alpha N^2 (1-t_r)R(N)}{\alpha \Pi^2} + \frac{1}{R_{NN}(1-t_r)} < 0, \quad (19b)
\]
\[
F_{tr} = -\frac{1 - \alpha N^2 (1+t_p)R(N)}{\alpha \Pi^2} + \frac{1+t_p}{R_{NN}(1-t_r)^2} < 0. \quad (19c)
\]

The wage effect of an increase in T along the WBC is given by \(- F_T/F_w\), and therefore ambiguous, as \(F_T\) cannot be signed:
\[
F_T = -\frac{Nu_{yy}(w-T(w)-a)(1-T_w)}{u(w-T(w)-a) - u(\bar{w} - T(\bar{w}) - a)}
\]
\[
\frac{Nu_y(w-T(w)-a)(1-T_w)(u_z(\bar{w} - T(\bar{w}) - a) - u_Y(w-T(w)-a))}{[u(w-T(w)-a) - u(\bar{w} - T(\bar{w}) - a)]^2}
\]
\[
(19d)
\]
Finally, an increase in \(T_w\) lowers the wage along the WBC.
\[
F_{T_w} = -\frac{Nu_Y(w-T(w)-a)}{u(w-T(w)-a) - u(\bar{w} - T(\bar{w}) - a)} < 0 \quad (19e)
\]

Putting together the effects of tax changes on the MIC and the WBC respectively, one obtains the effects of tax changes on wages, employment and membership, as described in the main text.

**Utility function**

To derive the results mentioned in section 4 solve \(Z = 0\) for any of the four alternatives. The resulting MIC will either be convex or concave. Moreover, appropriate substitutions in the Nash-Product yield first-order conditions which do not include \(M\) directly, but as function of \(u\) and/or \(v\). Assuming a stable equilibrium the comparative static effects mentioned in the text can be derived, following the same methodology as has been used so far.