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Costly Intermediation and the Big Push

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Abstract: Many existing theories of financial intermediation have difficulty explaining why financial activity can generate large real effects. This paper argues that the large real effects may reflect a multiplicity of equilibria. The multiple equilibria in this paper are generated by the dynamic interactions between the savings decisions of workers and the monopolistically competitive behavior of banks. We characterize the equilibria by showing the comparative-static responses of key aggregates to changes in the pure rate of time preference, investment uncertainty, and bank costs. We find that the results depend crucially on the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply and the aggregate level of employment. Small changes in the financial system may cause the economy to shift between low- and high-employment equilibria. The high-employment, high real interest rate equilibrium is consistent with the development experience of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan with repressed financial systems.

JEL classification: E44, O41

Key words: financial intermediation, economic development, imperfect competition

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Costly Intermediation and the Big Push

I. Introduction

Financial development is generally thought to play a crucial and causative role in economic development. The importance of finance for economic development has been emphasized by economists since Schumpeter (1934), who stressed the role of “credit creation” in the process of economic growth. The finance and development nexus was further explored by Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and more recently, in the context of endogenous growth models, by King and Levine (1993). The latter show that growth is positively correlated with a variety of indicators of financial development in cross-country data, confirming the conjectures of many earlier authors.¹ Even at higher frequencies, the financial sector is generally believed to play a crucial role in determining the level and rate of change of aggregate activity. Thus Bernanke (1983) argues that the post-1930 financial crisis (which arose in a relatively free and unregulated financial system) is key to explaining the magnitude and duration of the Great Depression in the U.S. Gertler (1988) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature on the relationship between financial factors or real output growth and fluctuations.

However, one of the great paradoxes of the Asian miracle is that in many cases rapid growth seemed to occur in countries with relatively underdeveloped or repressed financial sectors. Specifically, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan experienced rapid growth rates of per capita income in the 1960's and 1970's when the financial sectors in all three countries were highly repressed. Ishi (1982) reviews the development of the Japanese financial sector through the early 1980's and

¹The evolution of the literature on the finance-development nexus since the seminal studies of McKinnon and Shaw is comprehensively reviewed by Fry (1995).
documents the key role that indirect finance through a highly regulated financial intermediary sector (primarily banks) played in postwar Japanese economic growth. The famously high savings of Japanese households were invested mainly in time deposits with financial institutions (80 percent versus only about 10 percent for securities), while the returns on these deposits have been tightly regulated since the Temporary Interest Rates Adjustment Law of 1947. Ishi also notes that “Smooth operation of the financial system has been of prime concern to government whereas competition has not” (p.121, emphasis added). A descriptive account of the role of the financial sector in the postwar development of South Korea is provided by Nam and Park (1982). They document the intimate involvement of the central government with the allocation of credit and the weak position of the Bank of Korea which contributed to poor inflation performance as the economy grew. And Liang and Skully (1982) outline the Taiwanese experience with finance and development, documenting the dominant position of government-owned commercial banks in the provision of credit. Yang (1994) sees the New Banking Law of 1989 (which was followed by the establishment of 16 new banks) as the first major step towards liberalization of the financial system in Taiwan.

The experiences of these three countries run counter to conventional wisdom and have spurred a number of economists to argue that under certain circumstances non-market allocation mechanisms may in fact produce superior outcomes for developing countries. Thus Kim (1995) examines the role of government in the credit allocation process in Korea and argues that active government involvement was crucial to the success of Korean development. In their review of

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2Inflation in Korea averaged 19.50 percent annually during the 1970's. By contrast, inflation in Japan and Taiwan during the same period was 8.20 percent and 8.90 percent respectively.
the South Korean development experience Dornbusch and Park (1987) note the positive role played by financial repressions, arguing that “Financial repression helped finance budget deficits in a relatively noninflationary way[!]...supported financial stability in other important ways...[and] mobilized resources for investment in targeted areas” (pp. 417-418). The collection of papers in Patrick and Park (1994) present a comparative analysis of the role of the financial system in the postwar development of all three countries.

In this paper we propose a simple framework for thinking about the interaction between the financial and real sectors and use the model to glean some insights into the finance-development nexus. Our model is one where intermediation is costly in the sense of absorbing real resources. We depart from standard practice in arguing that there are potential “externality effects” that make the volume of resources absorbed by the financial sector depend intimately on aggregate activity (or the number of relationships intermediaries form as proxied by aggregate employment). The idea is that the financial sector provides a mixture of many services, notably relationship banking services that are characterized by diseconomies due to capacity or congestion effects and arms-length services that are characterized by cost economies. 3 Our model generates equilibria that depend on the dominant banking technology with multiple equilibria possible under certain parameter configurations, and in this sense is reminiscent of the analysis of Cooper and Ejarque (1994) who also rely on a participation externality in the financial market to generate multiple equilibria. Since small changes in the economic environment (specifically in financial sector conditions) can move the economy from one equilibrium to another, such changes will also

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3Our characterization of relationship banking through cost technology can be thought of as complementary to the commitment view of Mayer (1988) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) who focus on the informational underpinnings of relationship banking.
be associated with large changes in real activity. In the present paper, we follow a similar strategy in generating large real responses to small changes in the financial sector based on multiplicity of equilibria. However, the source of the multiple equilibria in our model is due to the dynamic interactions between worker’s saving and bank’s monopolistically competitive behavior.

As pointed out by Gurley and Shaw (1960), the *raison d’etre* of financial intermediaries is to transform the securities issued by firms into securities that have desirable characteristics for final savers. The functions of financial intermediaries range from pooling of funds to overcome indivisibilities and providing liquidity services to diversifying borrower-specific risks and providing credit risk assessment and loan monitoring services. In this paper, we generate a role for a financial intermediary by assuming that it serves as an efficient agent for diversifying risky investments. In contrast to previous work, banks are assumed to be monopolistically competitive, attaining zero profit in equilibrium. We postulate that there is a continuum of households, each consisting of a worker and a homemaker or shopper. Household savings are intermediated, providing funds for firms to undertake investment in physical capital and production of a single homogeneous good. The financial sector consists of a discrete number of intermediaries (or, in short, banks), each of which must pay a start-up fee upon entering the industry. The start-up fee precludes individuals from direct involvement in firms and gives rise to the monopolistically competitive structure of the financial sector, with the endogenous number of banks reflecting financial product variety and innovation. We assume that the financial sector is monopolistically

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4 See Pagano (1993) and Becsi and Wang (1997) for critical surveys of the related literature.
competitive, so banks enter until all are earning zero profits.\(^5\) Bank activity consists of intermediating funds from savers to borrowers, as well as diversifying the risks of investment projects.\(^6\)

A central feature of the paper is the generation of multiple equilibria. The multiplicity arises from the synergy of worker’s intertemporal consumption-saving decision and bank’s monopolistically competitive behavior. We characterize the various equilibria by examining the comparative statics for changes in the pure rate of time preference, investment uncertainty and bank costs. We find that the results depend crucially on the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply and the aggregate level of employment. Importantly, small changes in the financial system may cause the economy to shift between low and high-income equilibrium.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic environment of the financially intermediated economy. While Section 3 solves for multiple steady-state equilibria, Section 4 characterizes the various equilibria by performing comparative-static analysis. We then elaborate on the model implications and draw conclusions in Section 5.

II. The Basic Environment

Time is discrete. There are three types of agents in the economy: households, firms and banks. A unit mass of households, each of which consists of a worker and a shopper, choose

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\(^5\)Note that Park (1994) emphasizes the limited degree of competition in the Korean banking sector even after the liberalizations of the 1980's.

\(^6\) For more a complete general-equilibrium analysis of financial development, the reader is referred to Becsi, Wang and Wynne (1997).
We focus on equilibria where individuals have financially intermediated capital accumulation. Mayer (1990) finds empirical support to this assertion in eight industrialized countries.

The goods sector is populated by a continuum of firms of unit mass, which produce a single final good from (physical) capital and labor. For simplicity, capital is assumed to depreciate fully at the end of each period. The output of each firm is subject to an idiosyncratic random shock. To facilitate production, firms arrange financing with the banking sector before the realization of this shock. Idiosyncratic risks require pooling of funds and risks and give rise to the banking sector.

Banks pool risks by offering households a safe rate of return on the interest-bearing portion of their deposit. There is a fixed cost for setting up a bank. Individual banks can affect their lending rates to firms, but competition forces them to break even, at which the mass of banks is endogenously determined. During any particular period, banks determine the total amount of funds lent to the goods sector and set the interest rate on deposits but prior to realization of the output shocks.

We describe below the optimizing behavior of households, final goods producers, and banks. We consider a continuum of households, each of which consists of a worker and a homemaker. With their wage incomes, the working members of each household can save the unconsumed portion in banks to smooth intertemporal consumption needs. Household preferences are given by a standard time separable utility functional form:

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7 We focus on equilibria where individuals have financially intermediated capital accumulation. Mayer (1990) finds empirical support to this assertion in eight industrialized countries.
That is, interest rates subscripted period \( t \) denote returns from holding instruments between periods \( t \) and \( t+1 \). This banking fee is best thought of as a shorthand for bank capital requirements. Implicitly, we are assuming that depositors are shareholders in the bank and the amount of capital that they are obliged to put up depends on the scale of economic activity (as measured by aggregate employment).

It is interesting to note that Kitagawa and Kurosawa (1994) comment on the relatively high level of bank fees in Japan as compared to the U.S.

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \ln(c_t) - \frac{N_t^{1+\delta}}{1+\sigma} \right)
\]

where \( c_t \) denotes consumption at date \( t \), \( N_t \in (0,1) \) denotes the fraction of workers in each large household, and the discount factor \( \beta = 1/(1+\rho) \) satisfies \( 0 < \beta < 1 \) where \( \rho > 0 \) is the pure rate of time preference. The representative household enters period \( t \) holding “gross” bank deposits, \( b_t \). These assets, net of a banking “club fee” to be discussed below, generate a (gross) rate of return of \( (1+r^{b}_t) \). Households also receive income from supplying labor services to the market, \( w_tN_t \). Thus the representative household faces the budget constraint:

\[
c_t + b_{t+1} = (1 + r^{b}_t)(b_t - e^{b}_t(N_t)) + w_tN_t \quad (2)
\]

with \( b_0 > 0 \) given. Here \( b_{t+1} - b_t \) is the total amount of funds supplied to the banking sector during period \( t \), which consist of interest-bearing deposits, \( b_t \), and the banking fee, \( e^{b}_t \). \(^{9}\) For analytic convenience, we assume that this fee is proportional to the amount of funds the household supplies, i.e., \( e^{b}_t = e(N_t) b_t \), where the constant of proportionality, \( e(N_t) \), depends on aggregate employment, \( N_t \), and where obviously \( 1 \geq e(N_t) > 0 \). \(^{10}\) Note that \( \bar{N}_t = N_t \) in equilibrium, but aggregate employment is exogenous as far as individual consumers are

\(^{8}\)That is, interest rates subscripted period \( t \) denote returns from holding instruments between periods \( t-1 \) and \( t \).

\(^{9}\)This banking fee is best thought of as a shorthand for bank capital requirements. Implicitly, we are assuming that depositors are shareholders in the bank and the amount of capital that they are obliged to put up depends on the scale of economic activity (as measured by aggregate employment).

\(^{10}\)It is interesting to note that Kitagawa and Kurosawa (1994) comment on the relatively high level of bank fees in Japan as compared to the U.S.
concerned. The household unit seeks to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to (2).

In fact, without loss of generality, we will consider a specific functional form for the banking fee: \( e(\tilde{N}_t) = \tilde{N}_t^\theta \), with \(-1 \leq \theta \leq 1\). For \( \theta \in (0, 1] \), the banking cost captures the effects of a “congestion externality” where aggregate employment, \( \tilde{N}_t \), increases the cost of banking. For \( \theta < 0 \), the banking cost captures the effects of a “market participation externality” in the spirit of Diamond (1982) and Cooper and Ejarque (1994). The distinction between banking cost technologies with congestion or participation externalities can be thought of as capturing differences between relationship and arms-length banking services. In particular, arms-length services exhibit economies of scale over relationships formed by banks, because they economize on manpower and training and development costs as well as on the costs of coordination and developing clienteles and good reputations that are the hallmark of relationship services. We assume that the economies depend on the number of relationships not on the value of the deposits. Also, relationships are linked to employment which captures retail banking relationships with depositors and commercial banking relationships with firms. Thus, the per unit cost of deposits rises with employment for arms-length services and falls for relationship banking services.

For each firm, production of the final good is carried out by means of a standard Cobb-Douglas technology:

\[
y_t = A_t k_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}
\]

where \( y_t \) denotes output at date \( t \), \( k_t \) is the quantity of physical capital employed in market production at date \( t \), and \( A_t \) denotes the level of total factor productivity at date \( t \). The
optimization problem faced by the final goods producer is as follows:

$$\max_{k_t, N_t} \pi_t^y = y_t - (1 + r_t^k) k_t - w_t N_t$$

(4)

where $y_t$ is given by (3) and $1 + r_t^k$ is the gross unit cost of capital (i.e., the cost from the principle and the interest of the bank loan). Since both goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive, firms in equilibrium earn zero profit.

To simplify the analysis, we treat each firm symmetrically and assume that the ex ante distribution of the production shocks $A_t$ facing each firm is the same. The shocks have stationary distribution with two possible realizations $\{(1+\delta)a, (1-\delta)a\}$ with

$$Pr(A = (1+\delta)a) = Pr(A = (1-\delta)a) = 1/2 \text{ where } a > 0 \text{ and } 0 < \delta < 1.$$  Under log utility, the certainty equivalent value of $A$, which we will denote by $\bar{A}$, is equal to

$$a \sqrt{(1 + \delta)(1 - \delta)} < a.$$  In the steady-state analysis below, we will consider only the certainty-equivalent equilibrium allocation, which enables us to focus on other relationships. Throughout the paper, we will consider an increase in production (or financial investment) uncertainty as an increase in $\delta$, i.e., it is a mean-preserving spread of the two-realization distribution. This ex ante uncertainty about production assures the existence of financial intermediation. Finally, by symmetry and unit mass, it is not necessary to distinguish individual firms from the aggregate.

Households make deposits with banks that are then lent to firms. The representative bank’s profit maximization problem is as follows:

$$\max_{D_{t+1}, L_{t+1}} \pi_t^b = E_t(1 + r^{k}_{t+1}) L_{t+1} - (1 + r^{b}_{t+1}) D_{t+1} - \Omega^b - \mu L_{t+1}$$

(5)

subject to the balance sheet constraint
The existence of such a fixed cost is consistent with empirical evidence in Sussman and Zeira (1995), who find that total bank costs per unit of extended credit has fallen with financial development. Also, having relationship externalities affect lending costs seems natural and would more closely complement the commitment view of Mayer (1988) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) who emphasize the contractual relationship of banks and firms under informational asymmetry.

However, without loss of generality, loan processing costs are assumed to be independent of the sort of externalities captured already in the banking fee.

\[
\frac{N_{t+1} e_{t+1}^b (\tilde{N}_{t+1})}{M_{t+1}} + D_{t+1} = L_{t+1} \tag{6}
\]

Here \( \mu \) denotes the unit cost of processing a loan for an individual firm, while \( \Omega^b \) is the fixed cost incurred to set up and run a bank.\(^\text{11}\) Note that with the balance sheet identity (6), it is a matter of indifference whether we specify the bank’s profit function using gross or net rates of interest. The balance sheet identity also reflects our assumption that the provision of banking services involves a real resource cost to society of \( (1 - N_{t+1}) e_{t+1}^b (\tilde{N}_{t+1}) \). Banks are risk neutral and act like mutual funds with a perfectly diversified portfolio of loans that is inaccessible to individual households because of prohibitive start-up costs. For simplicity, the amount of funds obtained from households, \( b_{t+1} \), and loans made to firms, \( k_{t+1} \), is assumed to be distributed equally over all \( M_{t+1} \) banks \( (i.e., \text{all banks are also treated symmetrically)} \). The household funds are divided into net deposits, \( D_{t+1} \), and bank capital, \( e_{t+1}^b \). Thus, equating funds inflows and outflows gives:

\[
D_{t+1} = \frac{b_{t+1} - N_{t+1} e_{t+1}^b (\tilde{N}_{t+1})}{M_{t+1}} \tag{7}
\]

\[
L_{t+1} = \frac{k_{t+1}}{M_{t+1}} \tag{8}
\]

\(^\text{11}\) The existence of such a fixed cost is consistent with empirical evidence in Sussman and Zeira (1995), who find that total bank costs per unit of extended credit has fallen with financial development. Also, having relationship externalities affect lending costs seems natural and would more closely complement the commitment view of Mayer (1988) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) who emphasize the contractual relationship of banks and firms under informational asymmetry. However, without loss of generality, loan processing costs are assumed to be independent of the sort of externalities captured already in the banking fee.
III. Equilibrium

We will proceed with the first-order conditions for households, firms and banks and use them to solve for interior equilibria. First, the first-order conditions for firm are:

$$\alpha \frac{y_t}{k_t} = 1 + r_t^k$$

(9)

$$(1 - \alpha) \frac{y_t}{N_t} = w_t$$

(10)

The (ex-ante) first-order conditions for banks can be combined to form:

$$r_{t+1}^k \left(1 - E_{r_t,s_t}^i\right) - \mu = r_{t+1}^b$$

(11)

where $E_{r_t,s_t}^i = -[L(i)/r^k(i)][d r^k(i)/dL(i)]$ is the inverse of the interest rate elasticity of the demand for bank loans. It can be shown that the financial mark-up (of the loan rate over the deposit rate) is $r^k(i) E_{r_t,s_t}^i = (1 - \alpha)(1 + r^k)$. Substituting this into the lefthand side of (11) yields $r_{t+1}^k = (r_{t+1}^b + \mu + (1 - \alpha)/\alpha$. The loan-deposit interest rate differential is thus

$$r_{t+1}^k - r_{t+1}^b = \frac{1}{\alpha} \left( (1 - \alpha)(1 + r_{t+1}^b) + \mu \right) = (1 - \alpha)(1 + r_{t+1}^b) + \mu$$

(12)

which implies $(r^k - \mu) - r^b = (1 - \alpha)(1 + r^k)$. In a perfectly competitive framework $\alpha = 1$, the mark-ups of the firms are driven to zero and the loan-deposit interest rate differential is nothing but the unit loan processing cost, $\mu$.

Equations (5), (6), (7), (8) and (12) can be combined to yield:

$$b_{t+1} = k_{t+1}$$

(13)
\[
[(1 - \alpha (1 - e(\bar{N}_{t+1}))) (1 + r_{t+1}^k)] - e(\bar{N}_{t+1}) \mu \right] k_{t+1} = \Omega^b M_{t+1}
\]  

Equation (13) summarizes the implications of the bank’s balance sheet, while equation (14) is the zero profit condition.

The necessary conditions for household optimization are standard and are given by

\[
\gamma c_t N_t^\alpha = w_t 
\]  

\[
1 = E_t \left[ \beta (1 + (1 - e(\bar{N}_{t+1})) r_{t+1}^b) \frac{c_t}{c_{t+1}} \right] 
\]  

\[
c_t = (1 + r_t^b (1 - e(\bar{N}_t))) b_t - b_{t+1} + w_t N_t 
\]

We can combine these equations to obtain

\[
(1 - \gamma N_t^{1+\alpha}) c_t = (1 + r_t^b (1 - e(\bar{N}_t))) b_t - b_{t+1} 
\]  

Finally, by unit mass and symmetry, we have

\[
\bar{N}_t = N_t 
\]

We can now define an interior, financially intermediated equilibrium:

**Definition 1.** An equilibrium with financial intermediation is a tuple of positive quantities and prices \( \{c_t, b_t, k_t, y_t, D_t, L_t, N_t, \bar{N}_t, M_t, r_t^b, r_t^k, w_t\}_{t=0} \) satisfying:

(i) Consumer optimization and budget constraints (equations (15) - (17));

(ii) Producer optimization and technology (equations (3), (9), and (10));
(iii) Bank optimization, free entry and balance sheet conditions (equations (7), (8), (11), (13) and (14));
(iv) Labor market clearing (equation (19)).

Throughout the rest of the paper, we will focus only on characterizing the properties of steady-state equilibrium with financial intermediation:

**Definition 2.** A steady-state equilibrium with financial intermediation is an equilibrium with financial intermediation with all quantities and prices converging to some positive constant values.

### IV. Characterization of Equilibrium

To characterize the equilibrium of our model in more detail we will combine the equations above that characterize the optimal decisions of households, firms and banks. From (16) we obtain the steady-state deposit rate:

$$ r^b = \frac{\beta^{-1} - 1}{1 - e(N)} = \frac{\rho}{1 - e(N)} = r^b(\rho, N) $$

(20)

In the absence of the banking cost or capital requirements, $e = 0$ and the steady-state deposit rate is simply the pure rate of time preference, $\rho$. The steady-state loan rate is then obtained using equations (12) and (20):
\[ r^k = \frac{1}{\alpha} \left( \frac{\beta^{-1} - 1 + \mu + (1 - \alpha)}{1 - e(N)} \right) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \left( \frac{\rho}{1 - e(N)} + \mu + (1 - \alpha) \right) = \epsilon^k (\rho, N, \mu) \quad (21) \]

where obviously \( \partial r^k / \partial \rho > 0 \) and \( \partial r^k / \partial \mu > 0 \). Thus, an increase in the pure rate of time preference or in banks’ loan processing cost will lead to a higher steady-state loan rate.

Next from (3) and (9) we can derive a relationship between \( k \) and \( N \):

\[ k = \left( \alpha \bar{A} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{1}{1 + r^k} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} N \quad (22) \]

Also, equations (9), (10), and (15) can be combined to form

\[ \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \frac{k}{N} = \frac{\gamma c N^\alpha}{1 + r^k} \quad (23) \]

From (12) and (20) one can derive

\[ 1 + r^b = \alpha (1 + r^k) - \mu \quad (24) \]

\[ 1 + r^k = \frac{1}{\alpha} \left( \frac{\rho}{1 - e(N)} + 1 + \mu \right) \quad (25) \]

Equation (25) gives us the locus of (gross) real returns on capital, \((1 + r^k)\), and employment levels, \(N\), which allow the banking sector to break even.

Substituting equation (25) into (22), (3) and (14) yields

\[ \left[ \left( 1 - \alpha (1 - e(N)) \right) \frac{1}{\alpha} \left( \frac{\rho}{1 - e(N)} + 1 + \mu \right) \right] - e(N) \mu \right] k = \Omega^b M \quad (26) \]

\[ y = \bar{A} \left( \alpha^2 \bar{A} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{\rho}{1 - e(N)} + 1 + \mu \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} N \quad (27) \]
Using (13) and (17) we obtain the familiar result that steady-state consumption equals the real return on capital and can be expressed as:

\[ c = \frac{r^b(1-e(N))}{1-\gamma N^{1+\sigma}} b = \frac{r^b(1-e(N))}{1-\gamma N^{1+\sigma}} k = \frac{\rho}{1-\gamma N^{1+\sigma}} k \]  

Substituting equation (29) into (23) and rearranging terms yields a key relationship for determining the equilibrium of this model:

\[ 1 + r^k = \frac{\alpha \gamma}{1-\alpha} \frac{N^{1+\sigma}}{1-\gamma N^{1+\sigma}} \]  

Equation (30) gives us the locus of real returns on capital and employment that are consistent with production efficiency. The intersection of equations (25) and (30) yields solution(s) for \( N \) that we graph in Figure 1. Once the solutions for \( N \) have been found we use the solution(s) with (26)-(27) to obtain corresponding solutions for \( k \) and \( y \). The steady-state values of \( D \) and \( L \) are then derived from equations (7) and (8).

The results can be summarized by:

**Proposition 1.** (Existence) Under proper conditions, there exists steady-state equilibrium with financial intermediation which has a block-recursive structure,

(i) steady-state equilibrium \((N, r^k)\) are determined by (25) and (30);

(ii) steady-state equilibrium \((r^b, k, y)\) are determined by (20), (26), and (27);
(iii) steady-state equilibrium \((M,c)\) is determined by (28)-(29);

(iv) steady-state equilibrium \((b, D, L, \bar{N})\) are determined by the steady-state version of equations (13), (7), (8), and (19).

The key task to characterize the steady-state equilibria in the \((r^k, N)\)-space using (25) and (30). For illustrative purposes, we will call the equilibrium “banking break-even” relationship, (25), the “BB locus” and the equilibrium “production efficiency” relationship, (30), the “PE locus” (see Figure 1). It is straightforward to verify that the PE locus is always upward sloping and convex in \(N\). When \(N = 0\), \(1+r^k|_{PE} = 0\); when \(N > 0\), \(1+r^k|_{PE} = \rho \gamma \alpha/(1-\alpha) > 0\). The shape of the BB locus, however, depends on crucially the value of \(\theta\). We need to distinguish between two cases: \(\theta \in [-1,0]\) versus \(\theta \in (0,1]\).

For the first case, there will be unique determination of \(N\). When \(\theta \in [-1,0)\), the BB locus is downward sloping from \((0, (1+\rho+\mu)/\alpha)\) to \(((1+\mu)/(1+\rho+\mu)^{-1/\theta}, 0)\). Since \((1+\mu)/(1+\rho+\mu)^{-1/\theta} < 1\) for negative values of \(\theta\), the unique solution for \(N\) is obtained within the unit interval, \([0, 1]\). On the other hand, it is obvious that for \(\theta = 0\), the BB locus is horizontal. Therefore, as long as \((1+\rho+\mu)/\alpha \leq \rho \gamma \alpha/(1-\alpha)\), an equilibrium value of \(N \in [0,1]\) can still exist.

The case with downward sloping BB locus is plotted in Figure 1, whereas for the sake of brevity, we do not present graphically the latter case (i.e., with flat BB locus).

We next turn to the case of \(\theta \in (0,1]\) that produces multiple equilibria. In Figure 2, we demonstrate that the BB locus is upward sloping; it is concave when \(N\) is small but convex when \(N\) is large; as \(N\) approaches unity, the BB curve asymptotes. The key is now to show the existence, that is, the PE and BB loci intersect within the region of \(N \in [0,1]\). This is guaranteed
when the slope of the PE locus is sufficiently steep for a given shape of the BB locus. More specifically, this requires that either the capital income share, $\alpha$, is sufficiently high or the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply, $\sigma^{-1}$, is sufficiently low. With the existence of a solution established, it is clear that the PE and BB loci intersect twice and thus multiple equilibria emerge, which will be referred to as the high-employment and intermediate-employment equilibria, respectively.\footnote{We ignore the uninteresting case where the BB locus is tangent to the PE locus.} Comparing equilibria across positive and negative values for $\theta$, it is clear that equilibrium employment (and interest rates) are lower when the BB locus is downward sloping than when the locus slopes upward. Thus, we refer to the case where $\theta$ is negative as the low-employment equilibrium.

We summarize our discussion as follows:

**Proposition 2.** (Possibility of Multiple Equilibria) *When banking costs incorporate market participation externalities, there is a single steady-state equilibrium with financial intermediation. When banking costs reflect congestion externalities, there are multiple steady-state equilibria with financial intermediation, if the capital income share is sufficiently high or the intertemporal labor supply is sufficiently inelastic.*

We are now prepared to perform comparative static exercise, in particular for the case of banking congestion externality multiple equilibria. We restrict our attention to changes in the true rate of time preference, $\rho$, production or investment uncertainty (i.e., the mean-preserving spread parameter $\delta$) and loan processing costs, $\mu$. An increase in the pure rate of time preference raises
the loan rate unambiguously, but its effect on the employment rate is uncertain. From (25)-(27), this results in a lower capital-labor ratio and output per worker, which is consistent with standard Ramsey models. According to equations (26)-(28), when uncertainty increases, δ rises and the certainty equivalent measure of productivity $\tilde{A}$ declines, thus reducing output as well as the marginal profitability of firms and by diminishing returns requiring a higher level of investment. In order to facilitate investment loans, it demands large entry of banks, thus increasing banking competitiveness.\(^{13}\)

Moreover, an increase in the loan processing cost enlarges the loan-deposit interest rate spread. Interestingly, a higher loan processing cost shifts up the BB locus and thus both $N$ and $r^k$ decrease (increase) around the high- (intermediate-) employment equilibrium. Utilizing (26) and (27), we can see that the capital-labor ratio and output per worker are higher (lower) correspondently. Finally, for either time preference or loan processing cost changes, the result on $M$ is ambiguous. This is in fact due to the two opposing effect via the size of the investment loan, $k$, and the net loan-deposit interest rate spread $(r^k - r^b - \mu)$.\(^ {14}\)

These comparative-static results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 and in the following propositions.

**Proposition 3.** (Characterization of Congestion Externality Equilibria) *When bank costs increase and the loan rate is defined in the certainty equivalent form, it will not be affected by the degree of uncertainty.*

\(^{13}\) Note that since the loan rate is defined in the certainty equivalent form, it will not be affected by the degree of uncertainty.

\(^{14}\) The comparative static effects on capital and output depend critically on the sign of $\theta$ and on the indirect effects through changes of equilibrium $N$. For example, if $\theta \leq 0$, $dk/dN > 0$ and $dy/dN > 0$, and if $\theta \in (\alpha \gamma, 1]$, $dk/dN < 0$ and $dy/dN < 0$. However, when $\theta \in (0, \alpha \gamma]$, these indirect effects may go either way depending on the size of the initial $N$. 
reflect congestion externality, the steady-state equilibria posses the following features:

(i) An increase in the rate of time preference raises the loan rate, but lowers the capital-labor ratio and output per worker; its effect on aggregate employment and banking competitiveness are ambiguous.

(ii) A mean-preserving spread of production/investment uncertainty reduces aggregate productivity and output, but increases banking competitiveness.

(iii) A higher loan processing cost reduces (raises) aggregate employment and loan rates, but increases (decreases) the capital-labor ratio and output per worker around the high-(low-) employment equilibrium.

The next proposition is straightforward to verify:

**Proposition 4.** (Characterization of Participation Externality Equilibrium) When bank costs reflect a participation externality, the steady-state equilibrium with financial intermediation responds to changes in time preferences, production/investment uncertainty, and loan processing costs in a fashion analogous to the low-employment equilibrium when bank costs capture congestion externality.

So far we have considered both types of externalities separately. However, it might be more appropriate to think of both forms of externalities coexisting at the same time with one or the other dominating for some period of time. Thus, if market participation externalities dominate congestion externalities for banking costs, then $\theta$ is negative. However, the sign may change to
positive once the congestion externality dominates. Such a structural change to financial markets may then have large real effects. As can be seen graphically, such a structural financial change causes the BB curve to move from having a negative slope to a positive one. Since one can rank employment and interest rates for all equilibria, we have the following proposition:

**Proposition 5.** (Characterization of Financial Repression Shock) *When bank costs change from reflecting participation externalities to capturing congestion costs, the steady-state equilibrium with financial intermediation jumps to one with higher employment and interest rates but with a lower capital-labor ratio and output per worker.*

This high-employment, high interest rate equilibrium may be thought of as one which arises in a financially repressed economy such as Japan, Korean or Taiwan prior to recent liberalizations.

V. Conclusions

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with financial intermediation in which multiple equilibria may emerge as a result of dynamic interactions between worker’s saving and bank’s monopolistically competitive behavior. We characterize the equilibria by considering the comparative static responses of major aggregates to changes in the pure rate of time preference, investment uncertainty and bank costs. We find that the results depend crucially on the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply and the aggregate level of employment. Small changes
in the structure of the financial system may cause the economy to shift between low and high-income equilibrium. One of the surprising results of our analysis is that the greater the club fee associated with participation in the banking system (whether due to greater capital requirements or greater resource costs associated with intermediation), the higher equilibrium employment is likely to be. In this sense, our model can partially account for rapid development in economies such as those of Japan, Korea and Taiwan that also had highly repressed financial sectors. That is, by interpreting “financial repression” in terms of congestion externalities for the banking (or more broadly, financial intermediation) sector, we can generate equilibria with high employment and high real interest rates not unlike the rapid growth experiences of Japan, Korea and Taiwan in the postwar period. Similarly by characterizing the pre-Depression banking system in the U.S. in terms of participation externalities we can generate low interest rate, low employment equilibria such as that experienced by the U.S. during the Great Depression. An alternative interpretation of these outcomes is that high employment will be associated relationship banking, while arms-length banking will be associated with low employment.

The analysis in this paper is of course highly incomplete. We have said nothing about the welfare properties of the various equilibria, nor have we tried to characterize the near steady-state dynamics associated with each. These questions remain topics for future research, although the work of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) should convince the reader that such an undertaking would be far from a trivial task. Future work would also provide a sharper, or more primitive, discussion and motivation for our posited “club fee” schedules that drive most of our results. Our guess is that by modeling the primitives of financial repression in a more rigorous manner will not change the qualitative nature of our results. Finally, it remains to be seen how well a model such
as that proposed above performs qualitatively when calibrated to match key features of the data on postwar development in Southeast Asia.
References


Kim, Hee-Sik, Selective Credit Allocation and Industrial Development in South Korea, Ph.D. Thesis submitted to the University of Hawaii (December 1995).


### Table 1
Comparative-Static Results:
High-Employment Equilibrium

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect on</th>
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<th>Uncertainty</th>
<th>Loan Processing Cost</th>
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<tr>
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<td>$0$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>$?$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k/N$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y/N$</td>
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<td>$+$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$?$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$?$</td>
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</table>

**Notes to Table:** The results reported are based on the case when bank costs reflect congestion externality.

### Table 2
Comparative-Static Results:
Low- and Intermediate-Employment Equilibria

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$?$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Notes to Table:** The results reported are based on the case when bank costs reflect congestion externalities which we refer to as the intermediate-employment equilibrium. The unique (low-employment) equilibrium that arises when bank costs reflect market participation externalities possesses the same comparative statics.
Figure 1

\[1+r^k\]

\[\frac{(\alpha \gamma \rho)}{[(1-\alpha)(1-\gamma)]}\]

\[(1+\rho+\mu)/\alpha\]

\[\left[(1+\rho+\mu)/(1+\mu)\right]^{1/\theta}\]

\[\frac{1}{\theta}\left(\frac{1+\rho+\mu}{1+\mu}\right)\]

\[\frac{1}{\theta}\left(\frac{1+\rho+\mu}{1+\mu}\right)\]

\[\frac{(\alpha \gamma \rho)}{[(1-\alpha)(1-\gamma)]}\]

\[\left[(1+\rho+\mu)/(1+\mu)\right]^{1/\theta}\]