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The Roots of Islamist Armed Struggle, 1968-2007

Daniel Meierrieks^{*} and Tim Krieger[†]

Abstract

This contribution studies the influence of poor politico-economic factors, unfavorable demographic conditions, state failure, modernization, secularization, globalization and the perceived dependency of the Islamic world from the West on the onset of armed Islamist activity for 155 countries between 1968 and 2007. Its empirical findings show that the onset of militant Islamism is robustly associated with the discrimination of Islamic minorities, state weakness, the presence of large (secular and possibly predatory) governments, military dependence from the U.S., external cultural influences and the availability of a large pool of potential recruits (as indicated by a large, Muslim population). Poor economic conditions, modernization and authoritarianism share no association with the onset of Islamist militancy. The latter findings imply that democratic reforms and economic development—while often advocated countering Islamist violence—appear to be rather ineffective tools of conflict prevention.

Keywords: Islamism, terrorism, insurgency, modernization, globalization, democracy, underdevelopment

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1. Introduction

In defiance of recent counter-terrorism successes (e.g., the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011), militant Islamism is still very much alive. For instance, the years 2011 and 2012 saw the emergence of new armed groups with Islamist agendas in Algeria (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), Yemen (Ansar ash-Shari'a), Syria (Al-Nusra Front to Protect the Levant) and Mali (Ansar Dine). In fact, as shown in Figure 1, the emergence of new Islamist groups has become increasingly more likely after the end of the Cold War, consistent with the notion of a new and ongoing wave of Islamist violence that has replaced the previous wave of left-wing violence rooted in the antagonisms of the Cold War (e.g., Robison et al., 2006). Such armed campaigns do not only threaten domestic security but may also have international ramifications, given that they may spill-over to foreign countries that are-to a greater or lesser extentinvolved in domestic conflict. For instance, recent years saw (foiled) attempts by the Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union (2007 bomb plot) and the Yemeni group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (2009 Christmas Day bombing plot) to attack targets in Germany and the U.S., respectively. In addition to security concerns, armed Islamist activity may also impair domestic and international political and economic development (e.g., a country's human rights situation, its economic growth), particularly when affected countries—as it is common in the "heartlands" of militant Islamism, the Middle East and parts of Africa and Asia-suffer from low levels of politico-economic robustness and are constantly under siege from terrorism (e.g., Piazza and Walsh, 2009; Meierrieks and Gries, 2012).

—Figure 1 here—

The emergence of militant Islamism has been regarded—as we show below in more detail—as a response to poor economic development, demographic pressures, political repression, state failure, the social strain linked to the experience of modernization, secularization and

globalization and the perceived dependency of the Islamic world from the West, particularly the United States. Considering the continuing threat of militant Islamism to domestic and international security and politico-economic development, we provide a comprehensive analysis that puts the diverse hypotheses about the roots of Islamist armed struggle to an empirical test. As one important innovation, we create a unique dataset from multiple sources to identify armed (terrorist and insurgent) groups with Islamist agendas. We analyze the role of various politico-economic, demographic, cultural and military factors in the onset of militant Islamist activity, using a host of independent variables and performing a variety of robustness checks.

To preview our main results, we find that militant Islamism is associated with the discrimination of Islamic minorities, state weakness, the presence of large (secular and possibly predatory) governments, military dependence from the U.S., cultural globalization and the availability of a large pool of potential recruits (as indicated by a large, Muslim population). By contrast, we do not find that Islamist rebellions are linked to poor economic conditions, modernization (as indicated by the growth of the economy and urban areas and the expansion of education) and political systems that inhibit political participation. Our results imply that domestic and international policy efforts ought to be more successful in curtailing the emergence of militant Islamism when they reduce minority discrimination, strengthen state capacity, foster institutional reforms of large governments and try to moderate the potentially inflammatory effects of globalization and international dependencies. Democratic reforms and economic development—remedies for Islamist violence often recommended by policymakers—appear to be less effective.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the various hypotheses about Islamist rebellions. Afterwards, we discuss the data and empirical methodology used in the empirical tests of these hypotheses. Then, we present our empirical

results, also discussing the robustness of our findings. We then differentiate between Islamist terrorism and insurgency as an extension to our empirical research, before the final section concludes.

2. Hypotheses about Islamist Rebellions

Juergensmeyer (2006: 143) argues that religion may complicate a secular conflict, transforming it into a *cosmic war* "through its abiding absolutism, its justification for violence, and its ultimate images of warfare that demonize opponents and cast the conflict in transhistorical terms." Indeed, militant Islamism involves, inter alia, demonizing the enemy ("Soldiers of God versus the Infidels"), justifying violence through religious authorities (fatwas) and earning spiritual gains for acts that are usually considered morally wrong.¹ However, Juergensmeyer (2006: 141) also stresses that religiously-charged conflict is in most cases related to "real grievances [...] [such as] alienation, marginalization, and social frustration [...] [where] religion is the medium through which these issues are expressed." This implies that militant Islamism is motivated by *identifiable grievances* and associated with *concrete political aims*, which are "framed" religiously. Ultimately, this view suggests that, similar to other insurgents, the perpetrators of Islamist violence are subject to a specific calculus that involves the (opportunity) costs and benefits of violence and use violence as a means to maximize political utility. This calculus, though, may differ from the calculus of secular insurgents in some respects, e.g., as the spiritual benefits of religiously motivated violence need to be taken into account.

¹ The religious underpinnings of Islamist violence are also discussed in Venkatraman (2007). As noted by Juergensmeyer (2006), though, religiously motivated violence is not restricted to Islamist militancy but also affects other religious movements (Christianity, Judaism etc.).

Indeed, as shown in Table 1, Islamist groups have a number of "this-worldly" political objectives.² Crucially, these very objectives throw a light on the social conditions that favor the emergence of Islamist violence. For instance, armed struggle for regime change may suggest the existence of grievances related to politico-economic factors (e.g., economic underdevelopment, political repression), with Islamist ideology offering an alternative to these social deficits. Below, we can relate—arguing with rational-choice theory—the emergence of Islamist armed struggle to a number of (unfavorable) socio-economic, politico-institutional, demographic and global factors.

—Table 1 here—

2.1 Economic Development

As noted by Krueger and Maleckova (2003), poor economic conditions have been repeatedly named as causes of militancy in the name of Islam. It is argued that unfavorable economic factors coincide with fewer alternatives to violence, e.g., in the form of unemployment (meaning comparatively low opportunity costs of violence) and stronger incentives to change the status quo violently (meaning comparatively high benefits from violence). Following this line of reasoning, militant Islamism is more likely to flourish in countries plagued by economic underdevelopment, leading to the following hypothesis (H1):

Hypothesis 1: Poor economic conditions favor the onset of militant Islamism.

2.2 Discrimination and Mobilization

² Note that Islamist groups oftentimes have several (overlapping) objectives. For instance, while the *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan* primarily target Pakistan's Shia community (acting as a social domination group), they also challenge the existing politico-economic order of Pakistan (thereby also acting as a regime change group).

Some scholars argue that it is not poverty per se that leads to violence. For instance, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) find that terrorist participation in the—religiously-charged—Arab-Israeli conflict has little to do with poor socio-economic status. Rather, relative deprivation may matter. Gurr (1993) argues that minority discrimination—i.e., deep grievances due to unequal treatment vis-à-vis the majority—may lead to political violence, presumably as the specific calculus of minorities makes violence a particularly attractive option (e.g., because non-violent opportunities are particularly sparse for minority group members). Indeed, Islamic minorities in Islamic and non-Islamic countries are oftentimes subject to (idiosyncratic) politico-economic discrimination. Examples include the Moros on the Philippines, the Caucasus Muslims in Russia and Sunnite or Shia minorities in Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Gurr (1993) also stresses that group size and a strong sense of community among a minority may further aid mobilization for political violence. Again, the relative size and spatial concentration of Islamic minorities—e.g., in Southern Thailand, Western China and the urban centers of Western Europe—and their dissociation from the beliefs and culture of the majority may facilitate the emergence of militant Islamist groups. In sum, we expect support for the following hypothesis (*H2*):

Hypothesis 2: The existence of an Islamic minority favors the onset of militant Islamism.

2.3 Political Development

The emergence of violent Islamism may also be linked to poor political development. For instance, Freeman (2008: 43) argues that "the ideology of global jihad can be coupled with grievances over illegitimate, authoritarian regimes. Salafi jihadi ideology promises a return to a more legitimate polity based on sharia, rather than the corruption of authoritarianism." From the perspective of a (potential) Islamist, a lack of political representation limits the means to achieve change non-violently, while the replacement of the existing political order with a "God-given"

one promises extraordinary benefits from armed struggle. This leads to the following hypothesis (*H3a*):

Hypothesis 3a: Autocratic regimes favor the onset of militant Islamism.

Political conditions may not only be direct causes of militant Islamism—related to grievances due to authoritarianism—but may also as permissive factors condition its emergence due to non-political reasons. For instance, Piazza (2008) argues that weak states invite rebellions by providing opportune breeding grounds. For one, they are unable to completely control their territory, making it easier for Islamist groups to organize their activities. For another, weak states are also less likely to provide their citizens with public goods (infrastructure, security, education etc.), enabling militant groups to create "parallel states" in "stateless areas" by providing such public goods and services, thereby legitimating and strengthening their rebellion. Empirically, we therefore test the following hypothesis (*H3b*):

Hypothesis 3b: State weakness is associated with a higher risk of Islamist rebellion.

2.4 Modernization and Secularization

Islamist armed struggle can also be seen as a response to modernization and secularization, given that these social forces (by providing public goods, empowering women etc.) tend to jeopardize traditional sets of norms and values and the associated distribution of political power and economic resources, all of which are strongly shaped by religion (e.g., Mousseau, 2011). It may therefore be in the interest of (potential) Islamists to use violence to restore the pre-modern and – secular order, where their share of the resource pie was larger. What is more, modernization and secularization have oftentimes produce ill results, particularly in the developing world, including, inter alia, unemployment due to rural migration and technological change, insufficient secular institutions that fail to provide social services and instead are plagued by rampant corruption, too rapid urbanization involving urban poverty and failed expectations that result

from an expansion of higher education (e.g., Freeman, 2008; Mousseau, 2011). Islamist organizations may build on grievances associated with failed modernization and secularization to rally support propagating "an alternative ideology that makes sense of the failures of modernization and provides the believer with the tools to restore social and economic stability [...] [by following] the just and equitable laws of sharia" (Freeman, 2008: 50). In sum, we expect support for the following hypothesis (*H4*):

Hypothesis 4: Modernization and secularization favor the onset of Islamist armed struggle.

2.5 Globalization and Dependency from the West

Finally, the emergence of militant Islamism has been related to globalization. As argued by Cronin (2003: 45), globalization may represent "an onslaught to less privileged people in conservative cultures repelled by the fundamental changes that these forces are bringing—or angered by the distortions and uneven distributions of benefits that result." That is, globalization may involve the import of Western ways of living (e.g., consumerism, women empowerment) that trigger a response by traditionalist segments of society seeing their politico-economic clout tumble. It may also incur economic losses on parts of the population (e.g., by forcing previously protected markets to open up), making it easier for Islamist groups to muster support among the losers of globalization by rallying anti-market resentment. Closely related to the issue of globalization is the sense of military inferiority and dependency of Islamic countries from the West, particularly the United States. For one, this dependence seems to enable to inflow of Western ideas, thereby amplifying the perceived external threat to the Islamic identity. For another, it may facilitate recruitment by Islamist groups, given that it is likely to create feelings of humiliation and occupation due to Western involvement that is regarded as serving the purpose of stabilizing un-Islamic governments, as argued by Pape (2003). Indeed, Haddad and Khashan (2002: 825) who study the support for Islamist militancy among Lebanese Muslims find that "most Arabs and Muslims continue to see militant Islam as a consequence of Western incursions against them, as well as a result of the abuses of local political elites whom they installed in power against public will." This suggests that globalization and dependency may indeed fill the ranks of militant (anti-Western) groups, leading to our final hypothesis (*H5*):

Hypothesis 5: Globalization and military dependency are associated with a higher risk of Islamist rebellion.

3. Data and Methodology

We compile data on Islamist rebellions and a host of variables indicating politico-economic development, discrimination, mobilization, modernization, globalization and foreign dependency for 155 countries between 1968 and 2007. As in Collier and Hoeffler (2004), we measure our dependent and independent variables at five-year intervals for reasons of data availability. We empirically compare those episodes that saw Islamist rebellion with those that were conflict-free in order to identify the determinants of Islamist militancy. As described below in more detail, we are able to identify a maximum of 95 episodes of Islamist armed struggle in a sample of over 1000 five-year episodes. The summary statistics for our empirical analysis are reported in Table 2. A list of countries is given in the appendix.

-Table 2 here-

3.1 Dependent Variable

To the best of our knowledge, no dataset measuring the onset of Islamist rebellions exists. However, there are a number of reliable academic sources that track the patterns of political instability and violence and provide information on the ideological profile of groups involved in domestic conflicts. We use these sources to construct a dependent variable measuring the onset

of Islamist rebellion. Here, we define such rebellions as organized political violence associated with Islamist political claims. That is, we mainly study political violence in its most common forms (terrorism, insurgency and guerilla warfare), while not considering unorganized Islamist violence (e.g., in the form of riots, intercommunal violence or "lone wolf" activity) and Islamist political movements that do not resort to violent activity through armed wings (such as the Islamic-leaning Turkish Justice and Development Party). We opt for "pooling" terrorism and civil war data given that it is conceptually difficult to differentiate between the two. Tilly (2004: 6) argues that "terror actually occur as complements or as byproducts of struggles in which participants [...] are engaging simultaneously or successively in other more routine varieties of political claim making [...] [and] wider political struggles". Such struggles may be linked to the political goals of armed groups (e.g., territorial or regime change) and usually need more conventional means of warfare (i.e., open rebellion including territorial control) to be enforced. Indeed, as found by Piazza (2008) and Findley and Young (2012), terrorism usually overlaps with other forms of state failure and political violence, most commonly larger civil wars. Many armed Islamist groups use terrorism as a strategy within a civil war (e.g., the Groupe Islamique Armé in Algeria), while other Islamist groups (e.g., al-Qaeda and some of its affiliates) employ terrorism to further internationalize and globalize these very civil wars (Crenshaw, 2001).

Our first source to compile a dataset on the onset of armed Islamist activity is Jones and Libicki (2008) who list the the emergence of over 600 terrorist and insurgent groups between 1968 and 2006. Here, we identify groups with Islamist claims, also using information from the *START Terrorist Organization Profiles*³ and other auxiliary sources (web pages, lexica etc.). We also use these sources to carefully exclude a number of groups from the list of Jones and Libicki

³ See http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/.

(2008), e.g., because it also includes groups that only serve as front groups or armed wings of already existing organizations (e.g., the *Popular Resistance Committees* and its armed wing, the *Salah al-Din Battalions*, are listed as separate groups). Note that we include separatist groups when Islamism plays a key role in their armed struggle such as in Thailand or the Philippines (Chalk, 2001), while we exclude separatist groups in Islamic countries with clearly secular/leftist agendas (such as the Turkish *PKK*).

We then add further information on Islamist rebellion from other reliable sources, namely an update of the *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset* (Gleditsch et al., 2002), a civil war list provided by Nicholas Sambanis, the *Political Instability Task Force* list on internal wars and government failure, the list on major episodes of political violence by the *Center for Systemic Peace* and the *Global Terrorism Database* (*GTD*).⁴ In sum, we are able to identify over 150 armed groups with Islamist agendas whose activity can be attributed to 95 onsets of Islamist rebellion.⁵ As shown in Figure 1, the onset of Islamist militancy has become more likely over

⁴ For the corresponding raw data see http://pantheon.yale.edu/~ns237/index/research.html, http://systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm and http://start.umd.edu/gtd/. Similar to the approach of De La Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2012), data on a group solely listed in the *GTD* is only considered when the group is associated with a series of attacks and/or is responsible for mass casualties. For instance, due to these criteria we also include information on the *Lebanese Resistance Regiments (AMAL)* in our dataset.

⁵ Some groups are active in the same conflict during the same period (e.g., in the Russian Caucasus or in Kashmir). Given our level of data aggregation (5-year-country data), we consequently relate their activity to a single conflict onset or a single wave of violence associated with a conflict.

time. Geographically, many conflict onsets are located in the Islamic world, but there are also onsets in Europe, Asia and Africa. A full list of the Islamist rebellions covered by our dataset is given the appendix.

Finally, we are well aware of some methodological problems associated with the construction of our dataset. First, using multiple data sources may involve difficulties, e.g., due to different coding rules. Second, some rebellions may be coded incorrectly, e.g., due to deficient information on the country of origin of a group or its ideological affiliation. Third, there are some studies (e.g., De La Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca, 2012) which treat terrorism and civil war as distinct phenomena. As shown below, we run several robustness checks to counter such criticism. First, we re-run our empirical analysis relying only on the Jones and Libicki (2008) data. Second, we re-do our empirical efforts skipping a number of critical conflict cases from our datasets. Third, we also differentiate between terrorism and civil war (insurgency) to see whether these phenomena can be treated equally or should be considered separately.

3.2 Independent Variables

In our baseline model⁶, our main indicator of economic development is (logged and inflationadjusted) *per capita income*. The data are drawn from the *PENN World Table* (Heston et al., 2009). Consistent with *H1*, we expect favorable socio-economic conditions to reduce the risk of onset of armed Islamist struggle.

In order to assess the effect of ethno-religious discrimination on the emergence of militant Islamism, we extract information from the *Minorities at Risk Dataset* (Minorities at Risk

⁶ Note that we introduce and describe a host of further explanatory variables below when we study the effect of politico-economic development, modernization, globalization and foreign dependency in more detail.

Project, 2009) on the presence of an *Islamic minority* in a country. For one, such minorities may develop grievances due to politico-economic discrimination on religious grounds and consequently provide a large recruitment pool for militants (e.g., as in the Caucasus). For another, these minorities may also be subject to persecution and violence on behalf of militant Islamist groups when they have beliefs that differ from those of the Muslim majority (e.g., the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan). Furthermore, we control for the overall potential for Islamist mobilization in a country, controlling for a country's (logged) *population size* and its *Muslim population share*. Data on these variables is drawn from the *PENN World Tables* and the replication dataset of Fearon and Laitin (2003). Following *H2*, we expect all of these measures to positively correlate with the risk of armed Islamist activity.

We examine the effect of a country's regime type on militant Islamism through a dichotomous variable indicating whether a country is a *democracy* (taking into account the presence of opposition parties, free elections etc.), with the data being extracted from the dataset of Cheibub et al. (2010). While this measure is rather minimalist, the dataset has no missing data and ought to indicate the possible effect of political exclusion on militant Islamism verbalized in *H3a*.

Consistent with *H3b*, we furthermore expect weak states to make Islamist insurgencies more likely, e.g., as they lack the military capacity to counter insurgencies. State capacity is indicated by the *Composite Index of National Capability* (which includes information on a country's economic, military and demographic power in relation to the rest of the world) extracted from an update of the *National Material Capability Dataset* (Singer, 1987).

As in Robison et al. (2006), we measure the size and intrusiveness of the (secular) state through the *government share* (i.e., the ratio of government to total economic activity), using data from the *PENN World Table*. In line with *H4*, secularization ought to have a stimulating effect on violent Islamist activity, as it endangers traditional ways of lives.

As in Neumayer and Plümper (2011), military dependence is operationalized by *ratio of U.S. military assistance to domestic military spending*, with higher values corresponding to stronger dependence from the United States. Data on U.S. military aid are from USAID (2011), while domestic military spending data come from the *National Material Capability Dataset*. We take the logarithm of this variable to correct for skewness. Consistent with *H5*, we expect it to correlate positively with the onset of militant Islamist campaigns which could then be regarded as a response to the exercise of external politico-military control on the part of the United States.

Finally, in some specifications we also consider the effect of *external conflict* (measured by a dummy variable indicating involvement in international conflict), *rough terrain* (the percentage of a country that is mountainous) and *oil* (indicated by a dummy variable indicating an oil exporting country) on the risk of Islamist rebellion onset, given that these variables have also been named as potential determinants of civil conflict and terrorist activity (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011). These variables come from the *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset* and the replication data of Fearon and Laitin (2003). We also include *regional dummies* in some specifications to control for the possible effect of region-specific historical, cultural and socio-economic traits on conflict onset, as in Fearon and Laitin (2003).

3.3 Empirical Methodology

As discussed above, our dependent variable is a binary dependent variable coded as *1* for the positive outcome of an *onset of armed Islamist rebellion* in a country during a five-year episode and *0* for a negative outcome (non-event). Given this trait of the dependent variable, we use a *binary logit regression model* to examine how a set of explanatory variables affects the

probability of a conflict onset occurring (e.g., Long and Freese, 2006). This empirical approach is commonly used to study of the onset of civil wars, as in Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004). As part of our robustness checks, we also employ alternative estimation techniques (e.g., probit, multinomial logit). Throughout our empirical efforts, we routinely control for time dependence by using t, t^2 and t^3 (where t refers to the time since the last conflict onset was observed) in our model specifications, given that Carter and Signorino (2010) have shown that this approach adequately models time dependence.⁷ We include these *time controls* as we expect countries with past Islamist rebellions to be more vulnerable to future conflict, which would otherwise violate the independence assumption of our ordinary logistic regression model and yield to misleading results (Carter and Signorino, 2010).

4. Empirical Results

4.1 Baseline Results

The empirical results of our baseline model are reported in Table 3. In short, they suggest that Islamist rebellions are more likely in countries that have large and Muslim populations, Islamic minorities, large governments and are militarily dependent from the United States. State capacity deters Islamist militancy, while per capita income and democratic institutions show no statistically significant association with it. These findings are robust to the inclusion of further controls and to the in- and exclusion of time and regional controls. What is more, as shown

⁷ We use the approach by Carter and Signorino (2010) due to its simple implementation and interpretability. Using cubic splines to smooth the relationship between conflict onset and time, we arrive at similar findings.

below, these results remain valid when we control for a host of additional variables indicating politico-economic development, modernization, globalization and international dependency.

—Table 3 here—

Our findings show no support for *H1*. There is little evidence that poor economic conditions feed into Islamist violence. For instance, this supports Krueger and Maleckova (2003) who find that economic variables show little association with terrorist activity in the Middle East.

By contrast, we find that the presence of Islamic minorities and of large, Muslim populations promotes Islamist militancy, supporting *H2*. Minority presence is likely to coincide with politico-economic discrimination, leading to the development of grievances that favor rebellions. Here, minority mobilization—and Islamist mobilization in general—is obviously aided by the presence of large, Muslim populations. In fact, these results vindicate the findings of Gurr (1993) and Piazza (2011) who likewise show that discrimination, especially when combined with a sufficient mobilization potential, creates grievances and may facilitate political violence.

Our findings also show that democracy does not deter Islamist violence (rejecting H3a). This seems to buttress our line of reasoning that it is not (aggregate) politico-economic factors per se that matter to the calculus of armed Islamist groups, but politico-economic discrimination that is only felt by an (isolated) minority community.

In contrast, we find that state strength is negatively related to Islamist violence, supporting *H3b*. For instance, this finding is in line with Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2008) who stress that state failure—coinciding with, e.g., poor military and administrative capacity—is an important permissive factor in explaining the onset of armed struggle.

Government size—as an indicator of secular government influence on the economic and social life—seems to trigger Islamist militancy, vindicating *H4*. It seems likely that Islamist

groups are able to muster popular support by rallying against the role of government in society which is likely to be seen as corrupt, illegitimate and anti-traditionalist, as previously suggested by Robison et al. (2006).

Finally, we find support for *H5*, as we show that military dependence from the U.S. coincides with Islamist rebellion. This finding seems to be in line with, e.g., Pape (2003) and Neumayer and Plümper (2011) who similarly argue that Western military influence undermines the legitimacy of domestic governments and feeds feelings of humiliation, dependency and occupation, triggering an anti-government and anti-Western response.

Finally, we also examine the role of time in the onset of Islamist rebellions.⁸ Following Carter and Signorino (2010), we use our first model specification reported in Table 3 to predict the probability of rebellion as a function of time, holding all other variables at their means or medians. As shown in Figure 2, there is some evidence of cyclical behavior, where the emergence of new groups becomes less likely after onset of militant activity, but then again becomes more likely after some time (after 10 years). For one, this pattern may be a consequence of an organizational split due to group-internal conflict over political objectives, strategies or the distribution of rents and resources. For instance, the Philippines saw the emergence of *Abu Sayyaf* as a more radical Islamist splinter of the *Moro Islamic Liberation Front*, which in turn had splintered from the *Moro National Liberation Front* due to politico-military differences (Chalk, 2001). For another, the effect of time on Islamist rebellion may be associated with the end of one insurgent group (e.g., due to military efforts) and the emergence of new groups with similar goals after some time when underlying grievances have not been sufficiently ameliorated.

⁸ We do not show the findings for the time controls due to space constraints. Also, these controls are not jointly significant in a number of model specifications.

For instance, in the 1980s Nigeria saw militant activity by the *Maitatsine Movement*, while the 1990s and 2000s witnessed the emergence of new militant groups (e.g., *Boko Haram*) with similar goals (i.e., the introduction of Sharia law to counter corruption, government mismanagement and other social deficits).

—Figure 2 here—

4.2 Economic Development

In the following, we want to assess whether our main findings are robust to the inclusion of further variables indicating politico-economic development, modernization, globalization and Western dependency. We first introduce further economic variables to our baseline model, namely *aggregate investment* (measured as the ratio of investment to real GDP) extracted from the *PENN World Table, income inequality* (indicated and the by the Gini coefficient) and the *age dependency ratio* (i.e., the ratio of dependents younger than 15 to the working-age population) as a measure of socio-economic pressure due to a particularly young population, where data on the latter two variables are drawn from the *World Development Indicators* (World Bank, 2010).⁹

⁹ The inequality data is notoriously incomplete, so that we can only use the mean value of the Gini index for each country over our observation period (1968-2007). Consequently, the index is merely a rather rough measure of overall inequality. Also, we would like to employ a measure of (youth) unemployment to indicate socio-economic problems due to a demographic burden. However, unemployment data is not available for a large country sample. Given that the age dependency ratio is strongly negatively related to per capita income (r=-0.73) and aggregate investment (r=-0.44), we believe that this measure nevertheless captures unfavorable socio-economic circumstances associated with a youth burden.

As reported in Table 4, adding data on investment, inequality and the youth burden gives additional support for our finding that economic variables do not matter to the risk of Islamist rebellion. That is, we continue to find no evidence in support of *H1*.

—Table 4 here—

4.3 Political Development

Next, we assess whether additional political variables matter to Islamist rebellion. For one, we follow Aksoy et al. (2012) and assess whether the presence of *opposition parties without legislative representation* may make—consistent with *H3a*—a dictatorship particularly prone to violence, given that opposition parties may facilitate collective action and mobilization, while the lack of representation may induce violence to change the status quo. We construct this variable from the Cheibub et al. (2010) dataset. For another, we introduce a measure of *regime stability* (indicated by the (logged) number of consecutive years that a country has been a democracy or dictatorship) and the *presence of non-violent protest* (indicated by the number of general strikes and anti-government demonstrations in a given country and year) on the emergence of militant Islam, with the data coming from the Cheibub et al. (2010) dataset and the *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive* (Databanks International, 2009). We expect Islamist rebellion to be more likely in young regimes that experience some form of civil protest.

Consistent with our main finding, a country's regime type does not seem to matter (Table 5). One way of explaining this lack of correlation is brought forward by Dalacoura (2006). She argues that Islamist groups may reject *both* authoritarianism and democracy as forms of governance because both try to replace the "God-given" order with a man-made, secular one. For instance, Dalacoura (2006) argues that the Egyptian *al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* has opposed political participation as a means of achieving societal change (in contrast to, e.g., the *Egyptian*

Muslim Brotherhood), suggesting that their violent activity cannot be explained by political repression and exclusion.

—Table 5 here—

4.4 Modernization and Secularization

As further variables indicating modernization and secularization of society, we employ the growth rates of economic activity (*economic growth*), the urban population (*urban growth*) and the *expansion of secondary education* (i.e., the growth rate of per capita secondary education), with the data coming from the *PENN World Table*, the *World Development Indicators* and the *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*, respectively.

As shown in Table 6, however, adding these additional variables to our baseline model does not lend further support to *H4*. Rather, urban growth is found to deter Islamist rebellion, perhaps because the positive effects of urbanization (additional politico-economic opportunities, reduced influence of traditional ideas etc.) outweigh its negative consequences. This does not, however, rule out that the influence of the secular state matters to Islamist violence, given that we continue to find that government size fuels militancy. For one, other factors that indicate state-led modernization may be more important to the rise of Islamist violence. For instance, it may be interesting to study the influence of women empowerment on it.¹⁰ For another, government size may not only correlate with modernization and secularization, but also with corruption and rent-seeking behavior. Kirk (1983) argues that large governments generate large political and financial rents (e.g., through monopolies), inducing rent-seeking behavior by armed

¹⁰ We cannot control for this factor due to a lack of data. Robison et al. (2006), however, show that Islamist terrorism correlates positively with some measures of female economic participation.

groups which are excluded from the distribution of these rents due to certain barriers to entry (corruption, nepotism etc.). Then, Islamist groups may not only emerge in response to secularization due to large governments but also in an effort to capture associated rents. This alternative view is also consistent with Freeman (2008) who argues that corruption is a strong motivation of armed Islamist group which argue that Sharia laws serves as an "antidote" to it.

—Table 6 here—

4.5 Globalization and Western Dependence

Finally, we introduce further controls into our baseline model to more closely examine the role of globalization and dependency. Here, we also consider the influence of the *trade share* (i.e., the ratio of imports and exports to real GDP) from the *PENN World Table*, of an index of cultural globalization that measures cultural proximity to the West (the index contains information book trade and on the number of McDonald's restaurants and Ikea shops per capita) extracted from the *KOF Globalization Index Dataset* (Dreher, 2006) and of the *political proximity between the respective country of interest and the U.S.* (operationalized by an affinity index reflecting the similarity of state preferences based on their voting positions in the United Nations General Assembly) taken from an update of Gartzke (1998).

Consistent with *H5*, we—by and large—find that the onset of militant Islamist campaigns correlates positively with the exercise of external military, cultural and politico-economic influence. As shown in Table 7, exposure to globalization seems to fuel militancy. For one, economic pressures due to international integration may facilitate recruitment efforts of insurgent groups and strengthen their popular support when resorting to anti-globalization rhetoric. For another, the inflow of Western ideas—which usually coincides with economic integration—may reinforces the (perceived) threat to Islam due to the projection of external (mainly, American) culture onto the Islamic world. In fact, as argued by Freeman (2008), Islamist groups try to

muster support by styling themselves as saviors of the Muslim identity from un-Islamic influences. The pressures of globalization and associated (perceived) threats to Islamic identity seem to create grievances—i.e., feelings of humiliation, frustration, helplessness and occupation due to being at the mercy of the West, particularly the U.S.—that raise the benefits from violence (e.g., additional spiritual and identity gains), while lowering its opportunity costs (e.g., by restricting economic activity as a consequence of globalization), swaying the calculus of armed Islamist groups in favor of rebellion. Interestingly, we do not find that political proximity to the U.S. (measured by similarity in voting behavior at the UN) affects the onset of conflict. However, many leading recipient of U.S. military aid (e.g., Iraq, Somalia and Pakistan) often vote against the U.S. at the UN, presumably to inexpensively tap into anti-American resentment at home. The reality of military dependency from the U.S. seems to affect the insurgents' calculus more strongly than the oftentimes meaningless voting behavior at the United Nations.¹¹

—Table 7 here—

4.6 Additional Robustness Checks

Additional Independent Variables. As a first robustness check, we add further explanatory variables to our baseline specification. However, also controlling for the effect of population density, medical care (operationalized by the number of doctors per capita), domestic per capita military spending, urbanization as the ratio of urban to total population and the literacy rate does not affect our baseline findings reported in Table 3 (results available upon request). What is

¹¹ It may, however, be an intriguing topic of future research to study the relationship between UN voting behavior on issues that are important to Islamist groups (e.g., the Arab-Israeli conflict) and the emergence of Islamist violence direct at domestic governments and the United States.

more, these additional controls themselves do not affect the risk of the onset of Islamist rebellion, suggesting that our baseline model is well specified.

Alternative Estimation Methods. As another robustness check, we run our baseline model using different econometric methods. As shown in Table 8, however, our results are largely robust to the use of probit, rare events logit and random-effects (panel) logit and probit regression techniques.

—Table 8 here—

Alternative Dependent Variables. Finally, we re-define our dependent variable to assess whether our findings are robust to changes in the dependent variable. First, we limit our dependent variable to cases of Islamist rebellion reported by Jones and Libicki (2008). This approach ought to rule out issues related to the construction of our main dependent variable from multiple sources. Second, we drop a number of critical cases from our dataset. For instance, we drop cases that may merely represent the second wave of militant groups associated with an already ongoing Islamist rebellion (e.g., in the cases of Afghanistan and Kashmir). We also skip those cases that refer to comparatively small Islamist groups that may not operate fully independently (e.g., the 7-7 *Conspirators* of the United Kingdom) or which cannot be attributed to an Islamist cause or specific country with certainty (e.g., the Syrian *Jund al-Sham*).¹² As reported in Table 8, using these alternative definitions of our dependent variable, we arrive at findings that are very similar to our baseline results, further raising confidence in these findings.

5. Extension: Islamist Terrorism and Insurgencies

¹² See the appendix for a list of cases we include in this part of our robustness anaylsis.

Previously, we treated terrorist and insurgent activity by armed Islamist groups as having identical roots, arguing—in line with Tilly (2004) and Findley and Young (2012)—that terrorism is merely a specific strategy used in conflict that are understood by Islamist groups as part of domestic and internationalized civil wars. This approach also accommodates for the fact that many (large) guerilla groups have started as (small) terrorist organizations. Yet, De La Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2012) argue that terrorism and insurgency cannot overlap *by definition*, arguing that the former is a non-territorial conflict and the latter involves territorial control by armed groups. Also, Jones and Libicki (2008) find that terrorist and insurgent groups differ with respect to their methods, size, level of popular support and persistence. Potentially, this implies that there are also differences in the factors determining Islamist terrorist and insurgent activity.

To empirically examine this hypothesis, we split our dataset on Islamist rebellion in two, where the corresponding events of conflict onset now either correspond to an onset of a terrorist campaign or a larger insurgency.¹³ Similar to Jones and Libicki (2008), we consider the lethality of a conflict and the size of associated groups as indicators whether an organization is coded as a terrorist or insurgent group. For instance, we consider the *Turkish Hizballah* as a terrorist group (given that the group is relatively small and innocuous), while we consider the Somali group *Al-Shabaab* as an insurgent group due to its large size and military clout.

Methodologically, we run multinomial logit and binary probit regressions, using our baseline specification. The multinomial logit model rests on the crucial assumption—as voiced by De La Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2012)—that terrorism and insurgencies are distinct alternatives in the eyes of armed Islamist organizations, so that we are able to estimate separate binary logits for each pair of outcome

¹³ See the appendix for a list of cases we coded as insurgencies.

categories (Long and Freese, 2006).¹⁴ Here, we are particularly interested in the factors determining the choice of an armed group for terrorism or larger-scale violence in comparison to non-violence as the base category. By contrast, for the probit regressions we simply run two regressions, considering either the onset of terrorism or an insurgency as a positive outcome coded 1.

The empirical results are reported in Table 9. Most results are similar to those reported in Table 3. Variables indicating mobilization, government size and dependency are found to matter to terrorism and insurgency onset alike, while democracy and per capita income do not seem to robustly matter to both. As one minor deviation from our baseline results, we find that state capacity—as a permissive factor—only deters the onset of terrorism but not of insurgencies. In sum, it seems appropriate to "pool" data on small and large Islamist rebellions, as we have done before, given that both seem to be determined by a similar set of variables, i.e., underlying grievances.¹⁵

—Table 9 here—

6. Conclusion

What drives Islamist militancy? Rivaling narratives link its emergence to poor politico-economic factors, unfavorable demographic conditions, state failure, modernization, secularization,

¹⁴ For the multinomial logit model we consequently create a new variable that contains three categories, namely peace (coded 0), terrorism onset (coded 1) and insurgency onset (coded 2).

¹⁵ More formally, we also run a Wald test proposed by Long and Freese (2006) to test whether the categories terrorism onset and insurgency onset can be collapsed into a single category for the multinomial logit model. Indeed, this test suggests (p=0.11) that the two categories can be combined into a single category of Islamist rebellion onset.

globalization and the perceived dependency of the Islamic world from the West. We have brought these theories to an empirical test, employing data for 155 countries between 1968 and 2007.

We find that Islamist rebellions are more likely when there is a potential for mobilization (in the form of large, Muslim population and/or Islamic minorities). We find that neither national politico-economic conditions nor modernization failure matter to armed Islamist activity. Rather, such factors are only expected to be relevant when they are directly related to experiences of discrimination among Islamic minorities. We also find that government size positively correlates with conflict onset, suggesting that the secular influence of the modern state, but also the existence of corrupt, predatory institutions associated with big governments particularly in less developed countries promotes Islamist violence. Military dependence from the U.S. and the exposure to trade and foreign culture also seems to fuel Islamist militancy. Finally, state weakness is found to make rebellion more likely as a permissive, rather than direct factor. In sum, our findings-robust to a number of methodological and data changes-suggest that the ranks of armed Islamist groups are filled by grievances due to perceptions of occupation (evoked through, e.g., discrimination or foreign military or cultural influence), discontent with secular forms of governance (e.g., due to corruption) and the (perceived) threats to Islamic identity and culture (through trade and cultural globalization) rather than economic hardship, political repression and modernization strain.

Which countries are in danger of experiencing Islamist rebellions in the near future? To give a tentative answer to this question, we calculate the probability of Islamist rebellion onset for the post-Cold War era. As shown in Table 10, many countries in the Islamic world were—rather unsurprisingly—prone to Islamist violence during this period. Also, a number of countries that border the Islamic world (e.g., China, Russia) were exposed to the risk of such conflict,

which seems to be a particularly dangerous to a number of relatively young and/or weak countries in Central Asia and Africa (e.g., Kazakhstan, Kenya), given the politico-economic costs such conflict may trigger. Finally, some Western countries (e.g., France, Germany) also were at risk, presumably due to a relatively high mobilization potential among their Islamic minorities. In line with these findings, recent Islamist activity in, e.g., France (2012 Toulouse and Montauban shootings) and Kazakhstan (2011 Taraz suicide attack) seem to indicate that Islamist violence continues to threaten not only the Islamic world but also other parts of the world.

—Table 10 here—

What can be done to mitigate the risk of armed Islamist activity? Throughout this contribution, we have argued that Islamist groups have concrete political objectives related to real grievances. That is, while there is a clear transcendental dimension to the roots and ambitions of their armed struggle, which may aggravate conflict resolution, this does not rule out that Islamist militancy may be marginalized through political action that sways the rebels' calculus in ways that make religiously-motivated violence less likely. Here, our empirical findings suggest that domestic and international efforts ought to lower the attractiveness of militant Islamism by reducing minority discrimination, strengthening state capacity, fostering institutional reforms of large governments (corruption control) and by moderating the potentially inflammatory effects of globalization and international dependencies. Democratic reforms and economic development—oftentimes core features of "nation-building"—appear to be far less effective. At the same time, future research should try to identify those factors that determine the survival of armed Islamist groups as well as the emergence of new Islamist groups that rival existing groups or follow older (defunct) groups with similar political objectives. While our research has produced policy advice to

prevent or marginalize Islamist militancy, such future research should help to end Islamist violence once it has erupted.

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Figures



Figure 1: Onset of Islamist Rebellions, 1968-2007



Figure 2: The Effect of Time on the Onset of Islamist Rebellions

Tables

Category	Main Political Objectives	Examples
Regime Change Groups	Regime Change: Establishment of an Islamic state	Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front (Turkey, 1970) Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Egypt, 1978)
Separatist Groups	Territorial Change: Secession from an existing nation state and subsequent creation of an Islamic state	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines, 1977) Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat (Russia, 2002)
Transnational Jihadi Groups	Regime and Territorial Change on Transnational Scale: Creation of a (global) caliphate superseding existing nation states/regimes	al Qa'ida (Afghanistan, 1988) Jemaah Islamiya (Indonesia, 1993)
Social Domination Groups	Social Domination: Preservation of the god-given order (status quo) and exercise of "religious cleansing"	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Pakistan, 1985) Front Pembela Islam (Indonesia, 1997)
Limited Policy Change Groups	Policy Change: Use of violence to achieve a limited policy goal without further territorial or extensive political claims	Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners (France, 1985) Muslims Against Global Oppression (South Africa, 1996)

 Table 1: Forms and Main Objectives of Islamist Insurgencies

Variable	N*T	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Islamist Insurgency Onset	1106	0.086	0.280	0	1
GDP p.c. (logged)	1106	8.443	1.152	5.287	11.483
Population Size (logged)	1106	8.997	1.531	5.130	14.083
Muslim Population Share	1106	0.280	0.379	0.001	0.998
Islamic Minority	1106	0.165	0.371	0	1
State Capacity	1106	0.514	1.393	0.002	18.492
Democracy	1106	0.403	0.476	0	1
Government Size	1106	18.363	9.752	3.153	69.487
Military Dependence (logged+1)	1099	1.547	1.816	0	8.753
External Conflict	1106	0.027	0.109	0	1
Mountainous Terrain	1098	16.910	21.618	0	94.300
Oil Exporting Country	1105	0.142	0.349	0	1
Investment Share	1106	19.837	11.631	-2.990	82.178
Income Inequality	1073	42.247	7.293	26.646	64.340
Age Dependency Ratio	1105	64.470	23.625	20.025	110.557
Regime Age (logged+1)	1106	2.834	0.885	0.875	4.920
Non-Violent Protest	1106	0.672	1.304	0	11.2
Opposition Parties and No Legislation	1106	0.068	0.208	0	1
Economic Growth	1106	2.024	4.486	-20.240	44.361
Secondary School Enrollment Expansion	1095	1.429	2.744	-12.685	14.745
Urban Growth	1105	3.242	2.465	-12.581	16.753
Trade Openness	1106	71.072	45.455	1.906	434.393
Cultural Proximity and Globalization	1098	21.869	26.742	1	97.059
Voting with U.S. at the UNGA	1106	-0.190	0.326	-0.759	0.766

 Table 2: Summary Statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GDP p.c.	0.172	0.170	0.181	0.152	0.195	0.184	0.171
-	(0.175)	(0.177)	(0.182)	(0.196)	(0.230)	(0.241)	(0.179)
Population Size	0.994	0.998	0.997	0.989	0.939	0.941	1.024
-	(0.171)***	(0.168)***	(0.173)***	(0.166)***	(0.201)***	(0.202)***	(0.171)***
Muslim Population	2.678	2.688	2.655	2.634	2.115	2.124	2.769
_	(0.396)***	(0.374)***	(0.384)***	(0.408)***	(0.529)***	(0.523)***	(0.394)***
Islamic Minority	1.834	1.847	1.823	1.810	1.593	1.595	1.903
	(0.375)***	(0.374)***	(0.366)***	(0.401)***	(0.379)***	(0.366)***	(0.383)***
State Capacity	-0.165	-0.164	-0.169	-0.161	-0.186	-0.182	-0.161
	(0.068)**	(0.069)**	(0.072)**	(0.069)**	(0.071)***	(0.071)**	(0.071)**
Democracy	-0.197	-0.194	-0.204	-0.155	-0.109	-0.137	-0.256
	(0.396)	(0.399)	(0.413)	(0.464)	(0.414)	(0.384)	(0.377)
Government Size	0.040	0.041	0.041	0.040	0.041	0.042	0.042
	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.013)***
Military Dependence	0.253	0.253	0.250	0.262	0.205	0.206	0.266
	(0.076)***	(0.075)***	(0.076)***	(0.089)***	(0.076)***	(0.075)***	(0.077)***
External Conflict		-0.167					
		(1.099)					
Mountainous Terrain			0.003				
			(0.008)				
Oil Exporting Country				0.145			
				(0.688)			
Time Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Regional Dummies	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Mean VIF	1.38	1.37	1.36	1.41	1.38	1.38	1.38
Wald χ^2	166.31	170.04	171.63	182.63	207.21	198.00	163.16
$(\text{Prob.} > \chi^2)$	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Pseudo R^2	0.409	0.409	0.407	0.409	0.419	0.416	0.404
Log Pseudolikelihood	-191.270	-191.249	-191.188	-191.206	-187.865	-188.825	-192.688
Number of Observations	1099	1099	1090	1098	1098	1098	1099

Notes: Constant not reported. Robust standard errors clustered over countries in parentheses. Mean VIF (=Variance Inflation Factor) does not account for collinearity due to time and regional controls. Time controls = cubic polynomial approximation with t, t^2 and t^3 (Carter and Signorino, 2010). Regional dummies = Western countries, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (Middle East as reference group). Results for time controls and regional dummies not reported). **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

 Table 3: Determinants of Islamist Rebellions (Baseline Model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GDP p.c.	0.134	0.137	0.069	-0.062
	(0.174)	(0.179)	(0.206)	(0.234)
Population Size	1.007	1.051	0.986	1.052
	(0.179)***	(0.189)***	(0.171)***	(0.194)***
Muslim Population	2.733	2.716	2.789	2.830
_	(0.417)***	(0.463)***	(0.387)***	(0.440)***
Islamic Minority	1.835	1.686	1.874	1.703
-	(0.382)***	(0.407)***	(0.382)***	(0.410)***
State Capacity	-0.179	-0.174	-0.182	-0.197
	(0.074)**	(0.082)**	(0.070)***	(0.081)**
Democracy	-0.212	-0.156	-0.287	-0.253
-	(0.401)	(0.437)	(0.409)	(0.442)
Government Size	0.042	0.036	0.041	0.041
	(0.012)***	(0.014)***	(0.012)***	(0.015)***
Military Dependence	0.249	0.227	0.260	0.221
· •	(0.074)***	(0.081)***	(0.078)***	(0.079)***
Investment	0.015		. *	0.021
	(0.015)			(0.015)
Income Inequality	. /	-0.002		0.018
		(0.023)		(0.029)
Age Dependency Ratio		. *	-0.010	-0.012
			(0.010)	(0.013)
Mean VIF	1.40	1.43	1.67	1.81
Wald χ^2	165.28	193.52	170.50	185.62
$(\text{Prob.} > \chi^2)$	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Pseudo R^2	0.410	0.407	0.410	0.412
T TO 1 1'1 1'1 1	-190.763	-182.989	-190.788	-181.448
Log Pseudolikelihood				

 Table 4: Determinants of Islamist Rebellions (Economic Development)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GDP p.c.	0.207	0.170	0.219	0.251
	(0.196)	(0.173)	(0.168)	(0.184)
Population Size	1.002	0.990	1.008	1.012
	(0.177)***	(0.175)***	(0.169)***	(0.177)***
Muslim Population	2.707	2.684	2.691	2.724
	(0.403)***	(0.420)***	(0.386)***	(0.420)***
Islamic Minority	1.851	1.833	1.817	1.832
	(0.384)***	(0.373)***	(0.368)***	(0.376)***
State Capacity	-0.154	-0.165	-0.160	-0.150
-	(0.065)**	(0.068)**	(0.068)**	(0.064)**
Democracy	-0.233	-0.204	-0,164	-0.201
	(0.415)	(0.418)	(0.398)	(0.438)
Government Size	0.040	0.040	0.043	0.043
	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***
Military Dependence	0.256	0.253	0.257	0.260
_	(0.076)***	(0.075)***	(0.075)***	(0.076)***
Regime Age	-0.120	. *	· •	-0.110
-	(0.180)			(0.180)
Non-Violent Protest		0.011		0.007
		(0.096)		(0.095)
Opposition Parties and		. *	0.764	0.743
No Legislature			(0.627)	(0.638)
Mean VIF	1.41	1.39	1.36	1.40
Wald χ^2	184.75	165.78	166.89	186.52
$(\text{Prob.} > \chi^2)$	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Pseudo R ²	0.409	0.409	0.411	0.411
Log Pseudolikelihood	-191.066	-191.263	-190.604	-190.430
Number of Observations	1099	1099	1099	1099

 Table 5: Determinants of Islamist Rebellions (Political Development)

$\begin{array}{c} 0.183\\ (0.174\\ 0.990\\ 0.990\\ 0.990\\ 2.608\\ (0.176\\ 2.608\\ 0.40\\ 1.802\\ 0.382\\ 0.382\\ 0.040\\ 0.040\\ 0.040\\ 0.238\\ 0.040\\ 0.238\\ 0.238\\ 0.072\\ 0$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	19 178) 05 178)*** 05 102)*** 22 393)*** 172 343 103) 40 112)*** 52 186)***
(0.174) (0.990) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.382) (0.382) (0.392) (0.392) (0.040) $(2)^{***}$ (0.01) (0.238) (0.174)	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	74) (0.1) 72)*** (0.1) 72)*** (0.1) 88 2.70 99)*** (0.4) 49 1.82 85)*** (0.3) 73 -0.1 70)** (0.0) 89 -0.3 95) (0.4) 10 0.04 12)*** (0.0) 53 0.22 82)*** (0.0)	178) 05 178)*** 05 102)*** 22 393)*** 172 393)*** 172 073)** 344 103) 40 012)*** 52 086)***
$\begin{array}{c} 0.990\\ (0.176\\ 2.608\\ 7)^{***} & (0.40\\ 1.802\\ 0)^{***} & (0.382\\ 3 & -0.172\\ 0)^{**} & (0.069\\ 5 & -0.234\\ 5) & (0.392\\ 0.040\\ 2)^{***} & (0.01\\ 0.238\\ 0)^{***} & (0.072\\ 0.072$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	05 178)*** 05 102)*** 22 393)*** 172 373)** 344 103) 40 112)*** 52 186)***
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	72)***(0.1 8 2.70 99)***(0.4 19 1.82 85)***(0.3 73 -0.1 70)**(0.0 89 -0.3 95)(0.4 10 0.04 12)***(0.0 82)***(0.0	178)*** 05 402)*** 22 393)*** 172)73)** 344 40 30 40)12)*** 52)86)***
$\begin{array}{c} 2.608 \\ (0.40 \\ 1.802 \\ 0.382 \\ 0.382 \\ 0.382 \\ 0.382 \\ 0.382 \\ 0.382 \\ 0.382 \\ 0.382 \\ 0.382 \\ 0.040 \\ 0.234 \\ 0.040 \\ 0.238 \\$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	05 402)*** 22 393)*** 172 173)** 172 173)** 344 40 30 40 112)*** 52 186)***
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	402)*** 22 393)*** 72 73)** 344 403) 40 112)*** 52)86)***
$\begin{array}{c} 1.802 \\ (0.382 \\ -0.172 \\ 0.069 \\ 0.040 \\ 0.040 \\ 0.238 \\ 0.238 \\ 0.238 \\ 0.238 \\ 0.238 \\ 0.238 \\ 0.238 \\ 0.238 \\ 0.077$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	22 393)*** 172 173)** 344 103) 40 112)*** 52 186)***
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	393)*** 172 173)** 344 403) 40 112)*** 52 186)***
$\begin{array}{cccc} 3 & -0.17. \\ (0.069) & (0.069) \\ 5 & -0.234 \\ (0.39) & (0.39) \\ (0.040) \\ (2) & (0.01) \\ (0.238) \\ (0.07) & (0.07) \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccc} 73 & -0.1 \\ (70)^{**} & (0.0 \\ 89 & -0.3 \\ 95) & (0.4 \\ 10 & 0.04 \\ 12)^{***} & (0.0 \\ 53 & 0.24 \\ 82)^{***} & (0.0 \\ 10 & 0.04 \\ 10 & 0.0$	172)73)** }44 103) 40)12)*** 52)86)***
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccc} (70)^{**} & (0.0)^{**} & (0.0)^{**} & (0.0)^{**} & (0.0)^{**} & (0.0)^{**} & (0.0)^{***} & (0.0)^{***} & (0.0)^{***} & (0.0)^{****} & (0.0)^{****} & (0.0)^{*****} & (0.0)^{*****} & (0.0)^{******} & (0.0)^{***********} & (0.0)^{************************************$)73)** 344 403) 40)12)*** 52)86)***
$\begin{array}{cccc} 5 & -0.234 \\ (0.39' \\ 0.040 \\ 2)*** & (0.01 \\ 0.238 \\ 0)*** & (0.07. \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cccc} 4 & -0.2 \\ 7) & (0.3 \\ 0 & 0.04 \\ 1)^{***} & (0.0 \\ 3 & 0.25 \\ 4)^{***} & (0.0 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cccc} 89 & -0.3 \\ 95) & (0.4 \\ 10 & 0.0 \\ 12)^{***} & (0.0 \\ 3 & 0.25 \\ 82)^{***} & (0.0 \\ 10, 0.0 \\ 1$	344 103) 40)12)*** 52)86)***
5) (0.39' 0.040 2)*** (0.01 0.238 0)*** (0.07/	7) (0.3 0) 0.04 1)*** (0.0 3 0.25 4)*** (0.0	95) (0.4 40 0.04 12)*** (0.0 53 0.25 82)*** (0.0	403) 40)12)*** 52)86)***
0.040 2)*** (0.01) 0.238 0)*** (0.07/) 0.04 1)*** (0.0 3 0.25 4)*** (0.0	40 0.04 112)*** (0.05 53 0.24 82)*** (0.00	40)12)*** 52)86)***
2)*** (0.01) 0.238	1)*** (0.0 3 0.25 4)*** (0.0	12)*** (0.0 53 0.25 82)*** (0.0)12)*** 52)86)***
0.238	3 0.25 4)*** (0.0	53 0.25 82)*** (0.0	52)86)***
))*** (0.07)	4)*** (0.0	82)*** (0.0)86)***
$(0.0)^{2}$		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	- /
Ź		-0.0)20
l)		(0.0))24)
-0.06	5	-0.0)49
(0.06)	1)	(0.0))63)
	-0.1	26 -0.1	26
	(0.0	(0.0)77)*
1.36	1.43	3 1.39	9
9 169.3	161	.22 163	.74
))*** (0.00(0)*** (0.0	(0.0)***)00)***
, (0.000	0.41	0.4	11
0.407		9.839 -18	7.150
0.407 014 -188.5	530 -189		
	9 109.3))*** (0.00 0.407	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

 Table 6: Determinants of Islamist Rebellions (Modernization)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GDP p.c.	0.066	-0.010	0.181	-0.110
-	(0.187)	(0.197)	(0.175)	(0.209)
Population Size	1.089	0.994	0.978	1.126
-	(0.186)***	(0.161)***	(0.176)***	(0.202)***
Muslim Population	2.667	2.798	2.631	2.888
-	(0.385)***	(0.377)***	(0.429)***	(0.397)***
Islamic Minority	1.754	1.861	1.833	1.796
-	(0.385)***	(0.351)***	(0.374)***	(0.357)***
State Capacity	-0.159	-0.183	-0.163	-0.180
1	(0.065)**	(0.065)***	(0.067)**	(0.064)***
Democracy	0.008	-0.288	-0.159	-0.130
2	(0.427)	(0.400)	(0.413)	(0.452)
Government Size	0.040	0.037	0.039	0.040
	(0.013)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.014)***
Military Dependence	0.268	0.275	0.255	0.287
- 1	(0.080)***	(0.083)***	(0.077)***	(0.085)***
Trade Openness	0.010	× ,		0.009
1	(0.004)**			(0.004)**
Cultural Globalization		0.014		0.012
		(0.007)**		(0.007)
Voting with U.S. at the		× ,	-0.199	0.381
UNGĂ			(0.538)	(0.605)
Mean VIF	1.42	1.55	1.37	1.58
Wald γ^2	199.40	185.54	170.80	199.82
$(\text{Prob.} > \chi^2)$	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Pseudo \tilde{R}^2	0.419	0.415	0.409	0.425
Log Pseudolikelihood	-187.730	-187.208	-191.189	-184.031
Number of Observations	1099	1089	1099	1089

Notes: Constant not reported. Robust standard errors clustered over countries in parentheses. All specifications include time controls (results not reported). UNGA=United Nations General Assembly. *p<0.1; *p<0.05, **p<0.01.

 Table 7: Determinants of Islamist Rebellions (Globalization and Dependency)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP p.c.	0.097	0.165	0.267	0.124	0.077	0.163
•	(0.085)	(0.173)	(0.185)	(0.091)	(0.185)	(0.158)
Population Size	0.511	0.958	1.121	0.549	1.085	0.838
*	(0.098)***	(0.169)***	(0.207)***	(0.100)***	(0.182)***	(0.167)***
Muslim Population	1.467	2.599	3.188	1.627	2.637	2.824
-	(0.198)***	(0.391)***	(0.616)***	(0.301)***	(0.423)***	(0.405)***
Islamic Minority	0.942	1.784	1.957	0.987	1.639	1.565
	(0.188)***	(0.371)***	(0.392)***	(0.196)***	(0.422)***	(0.351)***
State Capacity	-0.081	-0.154	-0.176	-0.084	-0.161	-0.083
	(0.040)**	(0.068)**	(0.108)	(0.056)	(0.070)**	(0.062)
Democracy	-0.044	-0.193	-0.224	-0.054	-0.102	-0.278
	(0.216)	(0.392)	(0.431)	(0.220)	(0.416)	(0.470)
Government Size	0.020	0.039	0.048	0.023	0.038	0.027
	(0.007)***	(0.012)***	(0.016)***	(0.008)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)**
Military	0.122	0.248	0.228	0.114	0.317	0.225
Dependence	(0.038)***	(0.075)***	(0.083)***	(0.042)***	(0.111)***	(0.083)***
Estimation Technique	Probit	Rare Events	Random-Effects	Random-Effects	Logit	Logit
-		Logit	Logit	Probit	-	-
Dataset	Full Dataset	Full Dataset	Full Dataset	Full Dataset	Only Jones and	Critical Cases
					Libicki (2008)	Dropped
Wald χ^2	168.39	161.74	91.83	108.26	140.92	150.42
$(\text{Prob.} > \chi^2)$	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***
Pseudo R^2	0.411				0.397	0.359
Log Pseudolikelihood	-190.550		-190.091	-190.058	-160.300	165.335
Number of	1099	1099	1099	1099	1099	1099
Observations						

Notes: Constant not reported. Robust standard errors clustered over countries in parentheses (expect for random-effects regressions). All specifications include time controls (results not reported). Mean VIF is 1.38 for all specifications. See the main text for discussion of estimation techniques and different datasets. **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

 Table 8: Determinants of Islamist Rebellions (Alternative Methods and Datasets)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	(Terrorism)	(Insurgency)	(Terrorism)	(Insurgency)
GDP p.c.	0.220	-0.020	0.242	0.144
-	(0.097)**	(0.112)	(0.307)	(0.253)
Population Size	0.699	0.230	1.428	0.663
-	(0.097)***	(0.095)**	(0.317)***	(0.228)***
Muslim Population	1.468	0.988	1.767	2.296
*	(0.323)***	(0.237)***	(0.778)**	(0.741)***
Islamic Minority	0.427	1.041	0.958	2.373
	(0.242)*	(0.230)***	(0.524)*	(0.514)***
State Capacity	-0.151	-0.010	-0.404	-0.071
	(0.056)***	(0.041)	(0.191)**	(0.075)
Democracy	0.016	-0.156	0.059	-0.186
	(0.178)	(0.284)	(0.396)	(0.622)
Government Size	0.025	0.013	0.056	0.031
	(0.010)**	(0.008)*	(0.017)***	(0.015)**
Military Dependence	0.085	0.111	0.150	0.271
	(0.048)*	(0.048)**	(0.105)	(0.110)**
Estimation Technique	Probit	Probit	Multino	mial Logit
Mean VIF	1.38	1.38	1	.38
Wald χ^2	160.00	77.81	6024.26	
$(\text{Prob.} > \chi^2)$	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.00)0)***
Pseudo R ²	0.371	0.321	0.	405
Log Pseudolikelihood	-124.124	-131.830	-23	1.402
Number of	1099	1099	10	098
Observations				

Notes: Constant not reported. Robust standard errors clustered over countries in parentheses. Probit models include time controls. Multinomial logit model includes time and regional controls (which are highly significant for this specification), as discussed below Table 1 (results not shown). Base category is the absence of Islamist armed struggle for the multinomial logit model. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table 9: Islamist Terrorism and Insurgencies

Country	Mean Probability of	Actual Outcome
	Islamist Rebellion	
Islamic World		
Afghanistan	45.74	Rebellion
Azerbaijan	42.57	No Rebellion
Egypt	76.47	Rebellion
Israel	20.98	Rebellion
Morocco	42.93	Rebellion
Pakistan	89.51	Rebellion
Syria	33.78	Rebellion
United Arab Emirates	1.84	No Rebellion
Periphery of Islamic W	Vorld	
Bulgaria	6.00	No Rebellion
Chad	12.46	No Rebellion
China	58.30	Rebellion
Ethiopia	14.92	No Rebellion
Kazakhstan	13.70	No Rebellion
Kenya	7.50	No Rebellion
Nigeria	17.98	Rebellion
Russia	67.66	Rebellion
Sudan	13.99	No Rebellion
Western World		
France	18.32	No Rebellion
Germany	13.88	No Rebellion
United Kingdom	11.92	Rebellion

 Table 10: Assorted Predicted and Actual Islamist Rebellions (1993-2007)

Appendix A. List of Countries

Afghanistan	Congo (Republic)	Hungary	Morocco	Spain
Albania	Costa Rica	India	Mozambique	Sri Lanka
Algeria	Cote d'Ivoire	Indonesia	Namibia	Sudan
Angola	Croatia	Iran	Nepal	Suriname
Argentina	Cuba	Iraq	Netherlands	Swaziland
Armenia	Cyprus	Ireland	New Zealand	Sweden
Australia	Czech Republic	Israel	Nicaragua	Switzerland
Austria	Denmark	Italy	Niger	Syria
Azerbaijan	Djibouti	Jamaica	Nigeria	Tajikistan
Bahrain	Dominican	Japan	Norway	Tanzania
	Republic	-	-	
Bangladesh	Ecuador	Jordan	Oman	Thailand
Belarus	Egypt	Kazakhstan	Pakistan	Togo
Belgium	El Salvador	Kenya	Panama	Trinidad &
				Tobago
Benin	Equatorial Guinea	Kuwait	Papua New	Tunisia
			Guinea	
Bhutan	Eritrea	Kyrgyzstan	Paraguay	Turkey
Bolivia	Estonia	Laos	Peru	Turkmenistan
Bosnia &	Ethiopia	Latvia	Philippines	Uganda
Herzegovina				
Botswana	Fiji	Lebanon	Poland	Ukraine
Brazil	Finland	Lesotho	Portugal	United Arab
				Emirates
Bulgaria	France	Liberia	Qatar	United Kingdom
Burkina Faso	Gabon	Libya	Romania	Uruguay
Burundi	Gambia	Lithuania	Russia	Uzbekistan
Cambodia	Georgia	Macedonia	Rwanda	Venezuela
Cameroon	Germany	Madagascar	Saudi Arabia	Vietnam
Canada	Ghana	Malawi	Senegal	Yemen
Central African	Greece	Malaysia	Sierra Leone	Zambia
Republic	a 1		~ .	
Chad	Guatemala	Mali	Singapore	Zimbabwe
Chile	Guinea	Mauritania	Slovak Republic	
China	Guinea-Bissau	Mauritius	Slovenia	
Colombia	Guyana	Mexico	Somalia	
Comoros	Haiti	Moldova	South Africa	
Congo (DR)	Honduras	Mongolia	South Korea	

Appendix B. List of Islamist Rebellions

Conflict/Group Name	Main Host	Period	Source	Non-Critical Case?	Insurgency?
Anti-PDPA Insurgency (Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin)	Afghanistan	1973-1977	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Anti-Soviet Insurgency (Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan)	Afghanistan	1978-1982	UCDP/PRIO	Yes	Yes
Anti-Soviet Insurgency (Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan)	Afghanistan	1983-1987	UCDP/PRIO	No	Yes
al-Qaeda	Afghanistan	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	No	Yes
Taleban	Afghanistan	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Non-Taleban Insurgents (Saif-ul-Muslimeen)	Afghanistan	2003-2007	RAND-TOP	No	Yes
Anti-Government Insurgency (Islamic Salvation Army, GIA)	Algeria	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (later AQIM)	Algeria	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh	Bangladesh	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Anti-Government Insurgents (Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh)	Bangladesh	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Volcan Army	Chad	1968-1972	UCDP/PRIO	No	Yes
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement	China	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Uighur Separatists	China	1993-1997	GTD	No	Yes
East Turkistan Liberation Organization	China	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Takfir wa Hijra	Egypt	1968-1972	RAND-TOP	No	No
al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	Egypt	1973-1977	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Egyptian Islamic Jihad; Palestinian Islamic Jihad	Egypt	1978-1982	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Islamist Militants (al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya)	Egypt	1988-1992	UCDP/PRIO	No	Yes
Battalion of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam; Tawhid Islamic Brigades	Egypt	2003-2007	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement	Eritrea	1993-1997	UCDP/PRIO	Yes	Yes
Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement	Ethiopia	1978-1982	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners	France	1983-1987	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Students Islamic Movement of India	India	1973-1977	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Jihad Committee; Dukhtaran-e-Millat	India	1983-1987	RAND-TOP	No	No
Kashmiri Insurgency (Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen)	India	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Non-Kashmiri Insurgents (People's United Liberation Front)	India	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Kashmiri Insurgency (Lashkar-e-Jabbar)	India	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	No	Yes

Komando Jihad	Indonesia	1973-1977	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Free Aceh Movement (GAM II)	Indonesia	1988-1992	GTD	No	Yes
Jemaah Islamiya; Front for Defenders of Islam (Front Pembela Islam)	Indonesia	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Armed Islamist Groups (Laskar Jihad, Mujahideen KOMPAK)	Indonesia	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Islamic Militants (Islamic Revolution)	Iran	1973-1977	PITF	Yes	Yes
Jund Allah Organization for the Sunni Mujahideen in Iran	Iran	2003-2007	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)	Iraq	1978-1982	UCDP/PRIO	Yes	Yes
Islamic Action in Iraq	Iraq	1983-1987	RAND-TOP	No	No
Shiite Uprising (Islamic Dawa party, Iraqi Hezbollah)	Iraq	1988-1992	PITF	Yes	Yes
Tawhid and Jihad (al-Qaeda in Iraq); Ansar al-Islam	Iraq	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Anti-Government/Coalition Insurgents (Mujahideen Shura Council)	Iraq	2003-2007	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Hamas	Israel	1983-1987	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Second Intifada (al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades)	Israel	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Second Intifada (Jenin Martyr's Brigade)	Israel	2003-2007	RAND-TOP	No	Yes
Jordanian Islamic Resistance	Jordan	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Shurafa al-Urdun	Jordan	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	No	No
Lebanese Resistance Regiments (AMAL)	Lebanon	1973-1977	GTD	Yes	Yes
Hizballah	Lebanon	1978-1982	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Islamic Jihad Organization (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami); Black Hand	Lebanon	1983-1987	GTD	No	Yes
Asbat al-Ansar	Lebanon	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; Harakat al-Shuhada'a al-Islamiyah	Libya	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia	Malaysia	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group	Morocco	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Salafia Jihadia; de Fes	Morocco	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Maitatsine Movement	Nigeria	1978-1982	PITF	Yes	Yes
Hisba	Nigeria	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	No	No
Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa (Boko Haram)	Nigeria	2003-2007	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
al-Barq	Pakistan	1978-1982	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan	Pakistan	1983-1987	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Kashmiri Insurgency (Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen)	Pakistan	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	No	No

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Pakistan	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Anti-Government Islamist Groups (Lashkar-I-Omar, al-Qanoon)	Pakistan	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan	Pakistan	2003-2007	UCDP/PRIO	Yes	Yes
Moro National Liberation Front	Philippines	1968-1972	RAND-TOP	No	Yes
Moro Islamic Liberation Front	Philippines	1973-1977	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Abu Sayyaf Group	Philippines	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Rajah Solaiman Movement	Philippines	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	No	No
First Chechen War (al-Jihad-Fisi-Sabililah Special Islamic Regiment)	Russia	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Second Chechen War Insurgents (IIPB, Riyad-us-Saliheyn Martyrs'	Russia	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Brigade)	D .				••
Caucasus Emirate; Ingush Jama'at Shariat	Russia	2003-2007	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
JSM (al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba)	Saudi-Arabia	1973-1977	UCDP/PRIO	Yes	Yes
Islamic Movement for Change	Saudi-Arabia	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia	Saudi-Arabia	2003-2007	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
al-Ittihaad al-Islami	Somalia	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Islamic Courts Union, Al-Shabaab	Somalia	2003-2007	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Muslims Against Global Oppression (PAGAD)	South Africa	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
11-M Conspirators	Spain	2003-2007	GTD	No	No
Islamic Charter Front	Sudan	1973-1977	UCDP/PRIO	Yes	Yes
Muslim Brotherhood of Syria	Syria	1978-1982	UCDP/PRIO	Yes	Yes
Jund al-Sham	Syria	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	No	No
Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan	Tajikistan	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Pattani United Liberation Organization	Thailand	1968-1972	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Bersatu (United Front for the Independence of Pattani)	Thailand	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	No	No
Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (GIMP)	Thailand	1993-1997	GTD	Yes	No
Sri Nakharo	Thailand	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	No	No
South Thailand Separatists (Runda Kumpalan Kecil)	Thailand	2003-2007	PITF	No	Yes
Jamaat al Muslimeen (Group of Muslims or Society of Muslims)	Trinidad	1988-1992	UCDP/PRIO	Yes	Yes
Tunisian Combatant Group	Tunisia	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front	Turkey	1968-1972	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Turkish Hizballah	Turkey	1978-1982	RAND-TOP	Yes	No

Turkish Islamic Jihad	Turkey	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
7-7 Conspirators	United	2003-2007	GTD	No	No
	Kingdom				
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	Uzbekistan	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Jihad Islamic Group (Islamic Jihad Union)	Uzbekistan	2003-2007	RAND-TOP	Yes	Yes
Yemen Islamic Jihad	Yemen	1988-1992	RAND-TOP	Yes	No
Aden Abyan Islamic Army	Yemen	1993-1997	RAND-TOP	No	No
Mohammed's Army	Yemen	1998-2002	RAND-TOP	No	No
Ash-Shabab al-Mu'min (Houthis)	Yemen	2003-2007	PITF	Yes	Yes

Notes: Conflict/Group Name may not include all relevant cases for period due to space constraints. See the main text for a discussion of the data sources and for a discussion on how critical cases are purged from the dataset for robustness checks (Table 8) and for when a rebellion is counted as an insurgency (Table 9).