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The Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice among Retirees: Evidence from the German Social Health Insurance

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Abstract

We investigate two determinants of the price sensitivity of health plan demand among retirees in the German social health insurance (SHI): the size of the choice set and the salience of premium differences. We use variation in the choice set over time and between regions, and an increase in the salience of premium differences introduced by a recent reform that changed how premiums are framed. Using information on health plan switches in the German Socio Economic Panel, augmented with information on individuals' choice sets we find that retirees are less likely to react to potential savings from switching when they have more plans to choose from and when differences between premiums are less salient. The results imply that simplifying choices could save retirees money and also improve the functioning of the health insurance market.

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1. Introduction

Consumer choice of health insurance has become a core principle in many health insurance markets in the United States and European countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland (Thomson et al., 2009). In the U.S., choice is a central element in the health insurance exchanges established under the Affordable Care Act and in the context of employer-sponsored insurance. Choice is intended to encourage competition between health plans in order to lower premiums and increase welfare (e.g., Dafny et al., 2013). The market's ability to generate and distribute these benefits, however, depends on a price sensitive demand, which in turn is a function of consumers' willingness and competence to choose. There is growing evidence that consumers have difficulties in making good health insurance choices (Kling et al., 2012; Sinaiko and Hirth, 2011). Poor choice quality is a particular concern for retirees who may be relatively less responsive to prices in their choice of health plan (Buchmueller, 2006, 2000; Buchmueller et al., 2013) and, as a consequence, might pay more for health insurance than necessary (Abaluck and Gruber, 2011; Heiss et al., 2013; Ketcham et al., 2013).

In this paper, we examine determinants of retirees' price sensitivity in the German Social Health Insurance (SHI), a competitive health insurance market in which individuals choose among a large number of health plans. The SHI provides an ideal setting for studying plan choices. Because of a high degree of standardization, consumers mostly choose on price and there is limited risk of confounding due to unobserved plan attributes that tend to complicate other studies on health plan choices (Sinaiko and Hirth, 2011). Moreover, prices are posted as contribution rates on income so that price variations are transparent in this market.

In spite of the high degree of standardization, high price transparency, and freedom of choice, large premium differences across plans have persisted in the SHI, suggesting that price sensitivity is low. We examine how price sensitivity in the SHI varies with two factors by exploiting changes in the environment in which consumers select SHI plans. First, we evaluate the importance of the complexity of choice by leveraging market dynamics from 2005 to 2011 which repeatedly changed the size of the choice sets of plans across administrative health insurance regions. Second, we examine the importance of the salience of premium differences, using a 2009 reform that replaced the plan-specific contribution rate with a uniform rate and the option for plans to set supplemental fees or rebates. These supplemental fees or rebates directly reflect the premium differences across plans that consumers have to bear. Before 2009, the part of premium differences borne by the consumers was not directly observable from the posted contribution rates – as explained in greater detail below. Therefore, the 2009 reform increased the prominence of consumer-relevant premium differences.

Data come from the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP), a long-running panel with detailed information on individual characteristics and health plan choices. We augment these data with information on health plan premiums and information on the regions in which the plans operate. The regional information allows us to construct individuals' full choice sets and calculate the amount of savings that they could reap from switching to a different health plan at different points in time. We then analyze how sensitive retirees are to these potential savings, and whether the sensitivity varies with the size of the choice set and with the salience of premium differences using a linear probability model of switching with time, region and individual fixed effects, as well as individual and regional time-varying characteristics as controls. We use instrumental variables to account for the potential endogeneity of the size of the choice set and compare groups of retirees who were only affected by part of the 2009 reform in a difference-in-difference analysis.

Our findings indicate that retirees' probability of switching plans increases with their potential savings. We also find that retirees are more sensitive to prices when the salience of price differences increases, and less price sensitive when the choice is more complex, i.e., when the number of available options increases. In a descriptive analysis, we further find that, on average, switchers pay relatively lower premiums in their new plan compared to their old plan and that these savings are larger if there are fewer options in their choice set. These results imply that simplifying choices might increase the sensitivity of retirees to savings potentials, even in the already relatively simple setting of the German SHI.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes the related literature on health plan choice. Section 3 describes key features of the SHI and the reforms that generated the empirical variation for our study. Sections 4 and 5 present the data and estimation methods, respectively. We discuss results on price sensitivity of switching in section 6 and on savings from switching in section 7. In section 8, we present several robustness checks. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

2. Related literature

Prior research has identified economic and psychological factors that could influence the price sensitivity of health plan choice among retirees. Economic factors include search costs due to imperfect information and transactions costs in switching plans, e.g. as consumers have to investigate alternatives and fill out paperwork (Handel, 2013; Maestas et al., 2009). Low price sensitivity persists even in insurance markets that are largely homogenous and where individuals can easily switch plans, such as the Dutch, Swiss and German health insurance

systems (Frank and Lamiraud, 2009; Schut et al., 2003) or the U.S. Medigap program for the elderly (Maestas et al., 2009; Starc, 2011), suggesting that even small search or transactions costs may be important. The behavioral literature focuses on psychological factors such as cognitive biases or heuristics that influence decisions, including choice overload or status quo bias (Loewenstein, 1999; Tversky and Shafir, 1992). These factors can inhibit switching and result in low price sensitivity (Frank and Lamiraud, 2009). Both economic and psychological factors may be particularly important for retirees, as the costs of acquiring information could increase after retirement due to lower access to support networks (Buchmueller et al., 2013) and as cognitive biases become more likely with increasing age (Besedes et al., 2012). These findings suggest that changes to the environment in which individuals make plan choices can reduce economic or cognitive costs and thus affect their price sensitivity (Kling et al., 2012).

A growing empirical literature on health plan choices highlights the importance of these factors to price sensitivity and switching. The U.S. literature on the non-elderly tends to study plan choice in single and large employer groups (Handel, 2013; Strombom et al., 2002) or in laboratory settings (Schram and Sonnemans, 2011), with only few studies on large, individual insurance markets (such as Ericson and Starc, 2012; Kling et al., 2012). Studying employees at a large firm, Handel (2013) finds evidence that switching costs are large and heterogeneous, while Strombom et al. (2002) find evidence of status quo bias among incumbent employees and large variations in price sensitivity, including that older, less healthy individuals are relatively less price sensitive. Schram and Sonnemans (2011) use an experiment to examine plan choices and find that positive switching costs reduce switching rates but improve the quality of switches. In an observational study of the Massachusetts Connector, an individual insurance markets for non-elderly consumers, Ericson and Starc (2012) find evidence that is consistent with either a simple “choose the cheapest plan” heuristic or heterogeneity in consumer preferences. In studying enrollment and initial plan choice in the U.S. Medicare prescription drug program (Medicare Part D), Heiss et al. (2007) find that elderly consumers respond to incentives to enroll in the program, but may have difficulty discriminating among available plans. Furthermore, Heiss et al. (2013) find that individuals on average choose Part D plans with about 300 USD higher expected costs compared to the least-cost plan specified by the Medicare Plan Finder tool, suggesting that consumers might not be optimizing effectively.

Kling et al. (2012) also consider Medicare Part D and find that many elderly Medicare recipients do not use information that contrasts benefits of different plans even if it is readily available. In an experiment, they find that providing personalized cost information has large and statistically significant effects on switching rates which, in turn, are associated with sizeable savings for consumers. Similarly, research in public finance suggests that even small changes in

the salience of prices or taxes can significantly influence consumers' price sensitivity (Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009).

Despite this emerging literature, there is limited evidence on the impact of specific features of the choice environment on the price sensitivity of retirees that could be used by policy-makers to facilitate improved choice and modify market dynamics. Frank and Lamiraud (2009) study switching in Switzerland's health plan market which, like the German SHI market, has relatively homogenous plans but persistent price dispersion. They find that switching rates decline in the number choices. However, Frank and Lamiraud rely on average savings from switching instead of constructing individual specific potential savings from switching. In a study closely related to ours, but focusing on the non-elderly, Schmitz and Ziebarth (2013) evaluate the importance of the salience of price differences in the German SHI, which changed abruptly with a reform in 2009 (see below for details on this reform). They find that the probability to switch health plans increased six fold after the reform for individuals subject to premium increases. However, Schmitz and Ziebarth mainly focus on price changes of the current plan, whereas the relevant measure is the change in a plan's price relative to that of its competitors.⁴

Our study extends the literature on the effect of the choice environment on the price sensitivity of health plan choice in several ways. First, we study the price sensitivity of retirees in a large, individual market and thereby complement earlier work on the Medicare prescription drug program and the market for Medigap supplemental insurance. Second, we study changes in the choice environment that provide insights into the mechanisms underlying consumer price sensitivity and, unlike some experimental studies, offer evidence of real-life and actionable policies to mediate this sensitivity. Third, the German SHI provides a productive setting to study price sensitivity as plans are highly standardized (reducing the risk of unobserved plan attributes that may affect choices) and as the market is strictly regulated, reducing the risk of confounding due to concurrent attempts by firms to risk-select or influence consumers (Bauhoff, 2012; Starc, 2011).

⁴ Schmitz and Ziebarth focus on employees who can choose among plans in their region of residence and region of employment, but the latter is not observed in the GSOEP, which they also use. In addition, the data do not contain information on whether individuals have access to restricted "employee only" plans that are offered by some self-insured firms. Those are available to some employees directly or through their working spouses and could thus be part of an individual's choice set. Although we use the same data, our focus on retirees alleviates this problem, as retirees can only choose among plans in their region of residence and cannot choose to join their or their spouse's former employers' plans unless they – or their spouse – have remained in this plan since retirement. As we observe individuals' current plan, we can construct the full choice set for retirees with non-working or privately-insured spouses (see Data Appendix).

3. Background on the German Social Health Insurance (SHI)

The SHI is a competitive health insurance market in which individuals choose between a large number of health plans under guaranteed-issue and community-rating. Until recently, benefits were largely standardized and there were no provider networks, leaving premiums as the predominant attribute upon which consumers choose.⁵ Switching costs in the SHI are small: individuals merely cancel their old health plan by sending a brief letter and fill out a one page application form for the new plan which mainly collects address information (Bauhoff, 2012). Since 2002 individuals can switch to a new plan once they have been with their current plan for at least 18 months or when their current plan raises its contribution rate or levies or increases a supplemental fee.⁶ The SHI is financed mostly through member contributions, which are posted as a contribution rate on income, nominally split with employers or, in the case of retirees, with the pension plan. The population of SHI members consists of several overlapping strata. Although SHI membership is mandatory for a large share of the population, some individuals (those with incomes above a cutoff that shifts yearly) can choose to join the SHI on a voluntary basis. In addition, the SHI consists of employees as well as retirees and unemployed.

A major focus of recent SHI reforms has been the political goal of “premium equity,” i.e. that members pay similar premiums for similar coverage. Since benefits and networks are largely standardized, the reforms aimed to foster convergence in premiums through market forces or by fiat. An initial reform in 1996 allowed SHI members to choose their plan, introducing competition that led to some convergence and consolidation in the market. A later reform, in 2009, then forced convergence by introducing a uniform contribution rate. However, there is still room for differences in premiums across plans, as plans are allowed to levy supplemental fees or issue rebates. These add-on fees or rebates are likely to increase the salience of premiums differences for reasons we explain below. In our analysis, we use the variation in the size of the choice set which followed the reform in 1996, and the change in the salience of price differences generated by the reform in 2009.

Size of the choice set. The number of available plans has changed considerably over time and region since the SHI was opened to competition. Prior to 1996, most members were

⁵ Since 2007, the SHI allows health insurers to offer alternative plans (so-called *Wahltarife*) that deviate from the regulated benefit package and have different cancellation policies. In our data, we do not observe in all waves whether individuals have selected such an alternative plan. To check whether our results are influenced by individuals who have chosen alternative plans and might not be able to switch, we exclude all those individuals who ever report having chosen an alternative plan in a sensitivity analysis.

⁶ Individuals who newly retire and were already members of the SHI before retirement do not have to make an active choice of plan when entering retirement. By default, they stay in their old plan or face the same switching procedures as active employees or older retirees, i.e., they have to cancel their old plan and apply to the new plan.

assigned to a plan based on their employer, industry or trade group. The 1996 reform initially dramatically expanded the choice set and led to a prolonged period of mergers that captured economies of scale (McGuire and Bauhoff, 2007). As plans can operate nationally or only in certain regions, health plan mergers also introduced variation in the number of available health plans across geographic regions. Figure 1 shows changes in the size of the regional choice sets from 2005 to 2011. Importantly, since individuals cannot easily alter their own choice set, the time and regional variation in the choice set is plausibly exogenous from the individual perspective. As detailed below, we address possible concerns about endogeneity of the changes in the choice set by employing administrative payment rates as an instrumental variable (Chernew et al., 2008).

Salience of price differences. Before 2009, premiums were posted as plan-specific contribution rates on income and – for most individuals – deducted from labor or pension incomes. 98% of retirees in our sample did not pay the full premium as part of it was borne by the pension fund (see Data Appendix 2 for calculation of premiums).⁷ The 2009 reform replaced the plan-specific contribution rate with a uniform rate and gave plans the option to set supplemental fees or rebates.⁸ While the premium based on the uniform rate is still split between retirees and their pension fund as before 2009, the differences in premiums across plans are now fully borne by the retirees. That is, the supplemental fees or rebates directly indicate the difference in premiums that is relevant for all consumers. Furthermore, retirees pay/receive fees or rebates directly to/from their health plans. Thus, the 2009 reform increased the salience of price differences for several reasons. First, the plan-specific contribution rate was replaced with a uniform rate and deviations from that rate. The majority of plans introduced neither a rebate nor a supplemental fee until the end of 2011 (see Table 1). Therefore, a rebate or supplemental fee directly indicates that a plan is cheaper or more expensive than the majority of other plans. Second, these fees or rebates are borne entirely by the enrollees and thus identical to the relevant premium differences across plans for retirees, whereas differences in contribution rates prior to 2009 did not directly translate into differences across plans in the individuals' part of premiums. Before 2009, to translate differences in contribution rates to differences in premiums individuals had to know the values of their different types of income and which parts of the premium were split with the pension fund. Third, paying the supplemental fees directly to the health plan exposed some individuals

⁷ The premiums based on pensions are split between retirees and their pension fund. For other type of income (e.g. income from self-employment) retirees have to bear the full premium themselves.

⁸ Until 2011 these fees or rebates could be cast in absolute value or as percent on income. Since 2011, however, they have to be specified in absolute value.

to a new and more explicit payment mode. This plausibly increased their awareness of premium differences compared to the pre-2009 situation when premiums were deducted from pensions.

Table 1 and Figure 2 further illustrate how this reform changed the framing of premium differences and the variation in contribution rates across plans. As Figure 2 shows there were no supplemental fees or rebates in January 2009. As early as February 2009, however, plans started issuing rebates. The first supplemental fees were introduced in September 2009, but more plans followed in 2010. Table 1 illustrates, for a selected sample of plans, the development in contribution rates, supplemental fees and rebates, and demonstrates how the 2009 reform has simplified the choice environment.

4. Data

The German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP), a long-running panel dataset representative of the German population, allows us to construct individuals' full choice sets and – based on these – their potential savings from switching. We augment the GSOEP with external data on plans' contribution rates and operating region that is only fully available since 2005, limiting our analysis to the years 2005 to 2011.

Table 2 displays means and standard deviations of the variables that we use in our analysis. The data are an unbalanced panel of individuals who receive pension income or report to be retired, are at least 65 years old, and are members of the SHI. The main outcome of interest is whether individuals switch their health plan between two adjacent years. We construct this measure based on the health plan names that individuals report in adjacent interviews.⁹ The variable *switch* is coded as 1 in year t if an individual reports different health plans in the GSOEP interviews t and $t+1$. In case differences in health plan names in two adjacent interviews result from a change in the health plan's name or from a merger, the difference is not coded as a switch.

In the SHI, health plan switches can occur any time during the year. The exact timing of switching, however, is not observed in our data. Health plan switches between the interviews in 2008 and 2009 could thus have occurred before or after January 1, 2009. Since the 2009 reform became effective on that date, we exclude the 2008 data (i.e., switches between interviews in 2008 and 2009) from our analysis; this also alleviates concerns of anticipatory effects. Table 2

⁹ We were not able to match all reported health plans to actual health plans because the self-reported health plan information was not always exact. In a robustness analysis we exclude all observations for which the true health plan was uncertain.

contains data for the years 2005-2007 and 2009-2010. Information from the GSOEP interview in 2011 is used to construct the 2010 switching indicator.

The first row of Table 2 reports the fraction of retirees who switch to a new health plan. Switching rates are generally very low among retirees in the SHI. On average, only 2.7% of retirees in our sample switch to a new health plan between two interviews.¹⁰ While column (1) and (2) show means and standard deviations for the entire sample of retirees, columns (3) and (4) restrict the sample to those individuals who are allowed to switch. As discussed above, SHI members are only allowed to switch to a different plan if they have either been with the same health plan for at least 18 months, or if their current health plan increases its contribution rate or introduces or increases a supplemental fee. As we do not observe the exact timing of switching, we cannot precisely condition on the 18 months window. Instead we exclude all observations from our analysis for which we see a switch in one of the two prior years ($t-1$ or $t-2$) unless the individual's plan increases its contribution rate or introduces or increases a supplemental fee between the interviews in t and $t+1$. As only very few individuals switch every year, excluding those that are not allowed to switch reduces the sample by less than 1% of observations. In columns (5) – (8) we split the sample based on pre-2009 payment modalities. Individuals in columns (5) and (6) had to pay part of their premium directly to their health plan already prior to 2009 and are therefore only affected by the change in framing of premium differences since 2009. Individuals in columns (7) and (8) did not pay directly to their health plan prior to 2009. For these individuals the 2009 reform thus changed both framing and payment modalities. We allow for different effects of the 2009 reform across these two groups to separately identify the effect of framing and payment modalities on switching.

Our measure of health plan switching captures switches between two adjacent interviews. As interview months vary across individuals and years in the GSOEP, the question spans different number of months for different individuals. Table 2 indicates that the average number of months at risk, i.e., the average number of months during which individuals could have switched, is roughly 12. We use this information as a control variable since the likelihood that individuals switch plans might increase with the time between interviews.

In addition to whether individuals switch, crucial variables for our analysis are the number of plans that individuals can choose from and the potential savings that they could realize by switching. Both variables derive from individuals' choice sets, which we construct based on information on individuals' region of residence in the GSOEP and information on

¹⁰ Switching rates for the overall SHI between 1997 and 2004 were between 4 and 6 percent (Andersen and Grabka, 2006).

which plans are available in the specific regions stemming from the German consumer reports (*Stiftung Warentest*). Details on the construction of the choice set can be found in the Data Appendix 1. Table 2 shows that on average across years and regions individuals can choose from about 100 plans.¹¹ However, as Figure 1 shows, there is substantial variation across space and time. Furthermore, many of these plans are rather small. We merge these data with information on the number of enrollees in each health plan from *dfg Krankenkassenatlas* to calculate regional market shares. On average across regions and time only about 14 plans have market shares that are larger than 1%.

For each individual in the GSOEP, we calculate potential savings from switching to the cheapest plan in their choice set. For the years 2005 through 2008 we first calculate the difference in percentage points between the contribution rate of a consumer's current health plan and the cheapest plan in his or her choice set. We then transform these values into Euros by multiplying the part of the contribution rate that is borne by retirees with the relevant income (see the Data Appendix 2 for details). By using the part of the contribution rate that is borne by retirees, we construct a savings measure that does not reflect total savings but instead only captures the part of savings that would accrue to the individual consumer. Since 2009, premium differences are no longer hidden in the contribution rates but cast as supplemental fees or rebates. These are paid entirely and directly by the consumers. For this period we calculate consumers' potential savings as the sum of the supplemental fee of an individual's current plan and the maximum rebate in his or her choice set (for individuals in plans with supplemental fees) or the difference between the maximum rebate and the individual's plan's rebate (for individuals in plans with rebates). Figure 3 displays the development of the distribution of potential savings over time and shows that the 2009 reform has decreased the spread in potential savings.

The potential savings measure based on individuals' current plans' premiums ignores possible equilibrium effects and might be sensitive to outlier plans. Following Frank and Lamiraud (2009) we use the standard deviation of premiums – weighted by number of enrollees in each plan – in an individual's choice set as another measure of potential savings in a robustness analysis. This measure captures the expected savings from switching to a random plan for individuals whose current plan has above mean premiums.

Table 2 further displays means and standard deviations for a set of socio-demographic and economic variables, such as age, sex, educational attainment, household composition,

¹¹ The number of plans can vary over the course of the year as plan exists and entries may occur every month. We use the maximum number in individuals' choice sets between two adjacent interviews in our analysis.

income, health, and additional private health insurance, as well as regional characteristics, capturing regional health care supply, economic conditions, and costs of hospital treatments for health plans. All regional variables are lagged by one period. They are used as controls and instruments in the following analyses. The GSOEP also contains information on cognitive ability for a subset of individuals, which may be related to switching propensity and the quality of choice (Buchmueller, 2006, 2000; McWilliams et al., 2011). Cognition is measured in a word-fluency and a symbol correspondence test. We generate a measure of low cognition that captures if an individual gets fewer than the median number of correct responses in each of the two tests. Overall, 28% of the 3,405 individuals for whom this measure is available have low cognition. As this is only available for a few individuals, we cannot use it as a control in our main analyses. However, in a sensitivity analysis, we use it to investigate whether there are heterogeneous effects of the size of the choice set and of the salience of premium differences on the price sensitivity across groups with high or low cognition.

5. Methods

We examine how retirees' price sensitivity is affected by the size of the choice set and the salience of premium differences. The former changed gradually over time and across plan regions since the SHI was opened to competition in 1996. As further explained below, we use administratively set payment rates for hospital stays to isolate exogenous variation in the size of the choice set. The salience of premium differences changed abruptly through the 2009 reform. We use the variation over time and between groups introduced by this reform in a difference-in-differences design as explained further below.

We estimate the effects of both features in a unified model allowing to both examine the effect of each feature controlling for the other, and to examine interactions between the changes. Our approach follows earlier work (e.g., Frank and Lamiraud, 2009) and evaluates the probability that individual i in region r switches plans in year t in a linear probability model:

$$\Pr(\text{switch}_{irt} = 1) = \alpha PS_{irt} + \beta CE_{irt} + \gamma(PS_{irt} * CE_{irt}) + \delta X_{it} + \vartheta r_{rt} + \theta_t + c_i \quad (1)$$

The parameters of interest are included in the coefficient vector γ on the interaction between individual i 's potential savings PS_{irt} from switching to the cheapest health plan in the choice set and measures of the two features of the choice environment captured by the vector CE_{irt} .

In our main specification the vector CE_{irt} contains three variables: the number of health plans that individual i in region r and year t can choose from, and separate indicators for the two years after the 2009 reform (2009 and 2010). The coefficient on the interaction of the number of plans and potential savings captures whether individuals react differently to potential savings when the size of their choice set varies, everything else equal. The coefficients on the interaction between the post-reform indicators and potential savings measure whether individuals react differently to the same amount of savings after the uniform contribution rate and supplemental fees and rebates were introduced in 2009. As there were only few plans that introduced supplemental fees or rebates in 2009 and to allow for adaptation effects, we allow the reform effects to vary between 2009 and 2010.

We further control for individual's observable time-varying characteristics (X_{it} , such as age, household size, and health) and observable time-varying regional characteristics (r_{rt} , such as regional GDP and measures of regional health care supply) that are displayed in Table 2. We also include time effects that affect individuals in all regions equally (θ_t) and, in the most comprehensive model, we include individual fixed effects to account for individuals' specific time-invariant propensity to switch (c_i). The standard errors are clustered by region to allow inference robust to region-specific unobserved shocks, as well as by individual to allow for serial correlation in individual shocks over time. As there are only 17 health insurance regions, we adjust for the low number of clusters by using a t-distribution with 15 degrees of freedom for inference on our coefficients (Cameron et al., 2008; Cohen and Dupas, 2010).

The identifying assumption for the estimation of the effect of the size of the choice set is that the variation in the size of the choice set in any time period is uncorrelated with residual influences on plan switching. This could be violated by the existence of regional shocks that affect individuals' probability to switch and health plan mergers, exits and entries. To address this concern, we include time-varying regional influences, such as economic activity in the health plan region as controls in equation (1). In addition, we instrument for the size of the choice set using lagged values of administratively set payment rates per hospital case (following Chernew et al., 2008) interacted with the prior year's number of hospital cases in the region.¹² These measures vary between regions and over time. Since they determine relative costs they are likely to affect the plans' decisions to enter or exit regions. They are also plausibly exogenous as they do not have a direct impact on individual decisions to switch plans and

¹² The SHI transfers funds between plans to compensate for the variation in health care costs due to different risk pools. The risk adjustment formula is applied prospectively and accounts demographic and morbidity factors. Although the formula accounted for differences between East and West Germany before 2007, it did not account for persistent regional differences (see Bauhoff, 2012).

should also not be correlated with other influence on switching, in particular as we control for economic activity and health care supply in the region.

The introduction of the uniform contribution rate with the possibility of supplemental fees and rebates in 2009 affected all SHI members, thus there is no natural control group that is entirely isolated from the reform. However the coefficient on the interaction of $PS*CE$ in equation (1) estimates the difference in switching between individuals along the continuum of potential savings PS . Our approach thus resembles a differencing approach that relies on the pre- and post-2009 differences among individuals with the same amount of potential savings. The identifying assumption is that, without the reform or another change in the choice environment, individuals with the same potential savings would have had the same probability to switch before and after the reform. In column (1) of Appendix Table 1 we show a placebo test for the pre-reform years 2005-2007. We find no statistically significant differences in the sensitivity to potential savings across these years, suggesting that it is plausible to assume that in the absence of the reform in 2009 individuals would have reacted similarly to potential savings also after 2009.

We further separate the concurrent change in the framing and payment modalities by identifying the effect of the latter in an explicit difference-in-difference design. We make use of the fact that those retirees who had income beyond their public pension (e.g., a private pension or income from self-employment) had to pay part of their contributions directly to the health plans already before the 2009 reform. For these individuals, the reform only changed the framing of prices but not the payment modality. We exclude this group from the main analysis, which therefore estimates the overall effect of the changes in framing and payment modalities. We then add this group to the analysis sample to estimate the effect of the payment modalities by comparing the change in the price response between the two groups of retirees. To implement this test we estimate equation (1) with the full vector CE as described above, and include an indicator identifying the two groups of retirees and an interaction of this indicator with the post reform *year* indicators. This provides an estimate of the “payment modality” effect. The identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the change in payment modalities for some retirees, both groups of retirees would have reacted similarly to the change in framing and that the responsiveness to potential savings would have changed in the same way over time for both groups of retirees. As discussed below we find similar trends in switching rates and in the sensitivity to potential savings among both groups of retirees prior to the reform in 2009.

6. Results

Table 3 presents the main results, coefficient estimates and standard errors for the parameters α , β , and γ in equation (1) estimated using linear probability models. The estimates are multiplied by 100 for exposition and thus reflect percentage point changes in the probability to switch to a different health plan.

Column (1) in Table 3 shows the results with all controls and column (2) adds individual specific fixed-effects to the model. The results presented in column (3) use lagged values of administrative payment rates interacted with the number of hospital cases in the region as an instrument for the size of the choice set. The interactions of these values and potential savings are used as an instrument for the interaction term of the number of health plans and potential savings. Column (4) extends the baseline model and includes the interaction of the size of the choice set and the post-reform year indicators and the interaction of this variable with individuals' potential savings to analyze how the two features of the choice architecture interact. Column (5) uses the same instruments as column (3) and adds additional interactions of the instrument for the additional variables that involve the number of health plans. For both IV models, the Angrist and Pischke (2009) F-statistics are included at the bottom of the table and suggest that the instruments are not weak.

Across all specifications, retirees are more likely to switch health plans if they can save more from switching though this coefficient is only marginally significantly different from zero in some specifications. In the fixed effects specification in column (2), for example, the p-value is 0.112. The magnitude of the fixed effects estimates in column (2) suggest that prior to 2009 one additional Euro/month in potential savings increased the probability that an individual switches by about 0.27 percentage points at the reference number of plans, which is set to 58 (the minimum in the data). Given that the average switching rate is at 2.7%, this is not a small effect in relation to the frequency of switching. The coefficient on the interaction between potential savings and the size of the choice set indicates that this effect is significantly and substantively smaller when more plans are available. For example, the fixed effects model in column (2) predicts that, at the average number of 100 plans in the sample, the probability to switch to a different plan increases only by 0.04 percentage points ($0.2652 - (100 - 58) \cdot 0.0054$) for an additional 1 Euro in potential savings. This result is in line with findings by Frank and Lamiraud (2009) and supports the hypothesis that retirees are less price sensitive when the choice is more complex.

Most specifications show a large increase in the sensitivity to potential savings in 2010. One additional Euro of monthly savings from switching increases the probability to switch in

2010 by an additional 0.55 percentage points in the fixed effects model in column (2). Increasing the salience of premium differences thus seems to increase the price sensitivity of demand for health plans in 2010. For 2009, however, the coefficient on the interaction is statistically significantly negative in some specifications. A potential reason could be that consumers were first waiting to see how the market would develop in the new environment before making new health plan choices. The increased sensitivity to potential savings in 2010 is qualitatively in line with Schmitz and Ziebarth's (2013) finding that the reform increased switching for employees who saw their premium increase. Our estimates focus on retirees and, unlike Schmitz and Ziebarth's, are net of any concurrent effect of changes in menu length on switching around the time of the 2009 reform.

The results in columns (4) and (5) for the models with interaction effects between the two features further demonstrate that a larger choice set mutes retirees' reaction to potential savings before and after 2009. The results also demonstrate that the 2009 salience reform changed the impact of the size of the choice set on the price sensitivity. Before 2009, an additional plan in the choice set decreases the probability to react to a 1-Euro increase in potential savings by 0.005 percentage points. By contrast, in 2010 the impact is 0.09 percentage points ($0.005+0.0893$). The stronger impact of the number of plans after the choice environment has been simplified is surprising. The post-2009 impact is stronger even when taking into account the higher propensity to switch after 2009. Put in terms of the response to 1 Euro of potential savings and for a choice set of 75 plans – roughly the average number of available plans in 2010 – the probability to switch is 0.16 percentage points before 2009 but 0.66 percentage points in 2010. Relative to these numbers the increase by one plan leads to a 3% decrease in the probability to switch before 2009 and a 13% decrease in 2010.

Table 4 investigates heterogeneity in these results among different groups of retirees. The first column shows results for a model in which the choice set variables are interacted with an indicator for whether individuals have already paid part of their premium directly to their health plan prior to the 2009 reform because they received income outside their public pension. For these individuals the reform thus only changed the framing, not the payment modalities. Appendix Table 1 columns (2) and (3) show that the trends in switching rates and the sensitivity to potential savings prior to the 2009 reform were similar for the two groups, lending credibility to the identifying assumption of our difference-in-differences design. Column (1) of Table 4 shows that the estimated coefficients on the interaction between potential savings and the post reform year-indicators are positive but not significantly different from zero for the group of individuals who already paid directly to their health plan prior to the

reform. This suggests that the payment modalities effect was not very important and that the increase in price sensitivity after the 2009 reform mainly works through the change in framing.

Table 4 also investigates heterogeneities with respect to health, education, income and cognition. Few of the interaction terms of potential savings, the changes in the choice environment and the group indicator are significant, suggesting that these groups are not relatively less sensitive to potential savings when more health plans are available than their reference groups, and also have not benefitted more from the increase in salience due to the 2009 reform. The only significant finding is that individuals with lower than median education appear less sensitive to potential savings than those with more education. In contrast to studies on the U.S. Medicare Advantage program (McWilliams et al., 2011), and possibly due to low statistical power, we do not find a differential effect by cognition.

Overall our results suggest that large number of choices can decrease the price sensitivity of health plan choice among retirees, even in a setting like the German SHI, in which differences between health plans are limited and switching between plans is easy. Furthermore, framing of premiums seems to be an important determinant of the price sensitivity of health plan choice among retirees.

7. Are potential savings realized?

So far we have focused on whether individuals switch health plans, conditional on the amount of money they can save from switching. We have not taken into account the specific destination plan and thus we implicitly assumed that switchers realize their potential savings. In this section, we descriptively assess whether retirees in the SHI who switch health plans actually pay less than those who stay in their old plan. We further analyze how much switchers save from switching in absolute value and how this compares to their potential savings.

To analyze whether those who switch do better than those who stay we compare the development of premiums over time for switchers and stayers. Column (1) of Table 5 shows coefficients of an OLS regression of the premium change over time (premium of baseline plan in t – premium of next year's plan in $t+1$, where the plans may be identical) on the number of available plans, post-reform year indicators (2009, 2010), and the interaction of these variables with an indicator for whether individuals switch health plans. The dependent variable is positive if an individual paid a higher premium in t than in $t+1$, *i.e.*, a positive value measures how much he/she saved in $t+1$ compared to the plan in t . Importantly, these differences do not reflect changes in income over time. Although premiums generally depend on income, we

calculate both premiums based on the income in t . Premium differences thus only reflect differences in contribution rates and/or supplemental fees or rebates, not changes in income over time. For comparison the mean and median premiums before 2009 are shown in the bottom rows of the table.

The results suggest that, on average, switchers do better than stayers. While retirees who stay in their old plan on average have to pay 1.8 Euros/month more in year $t+1$ than in year t , individuals who switch pay about 3 $(-1.8+5.07)$ Euros/month less in $t+1$. The coefficient on the interaction term between switching and the size of the choice set is negative, suggesting that switchers save less compared to stayers when more plans are available. Both switchers and stayers see their premiums decrease in 2009 and 2010. Switchers' advantage over stayers narrows in 2009.

Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 focus on switchers' realized savings. These are measured as the difference between the old plan's premium and the new plan's premium at the same point in time, i.e., these realized savings capture the difference between the premium that an individual would have had to pay had she stayed in her old plan and her actual premiums in the new plan. In contrast to the first measure, this measure is always 0 for stayers and takes into account changes in the old plan's premium over time. As in the first exercise, premiums for both plans are calculated based on the income reported in t and thus premium differences only reflect changes in contribution rates and/or rebates and supplemental fees, but not changes in income. The realized savings measure may be positive or negative for switchers. A positive value indicates that the switcher would have paid more in her old plan than she pays in the new plan and thus that she saved from switching (ex post). A negative value indicates that the switcher loses money from switching (ex post). This can happen either because individuals switch to a plan that is already more expensive at the time they switch or as the old and/or new plan change premiums after an individual has switched. For example, if the individual's old plan decreases its premium to a level lower than the new plan's premium after the individual has switched, the individual will realize ex post losses from switching. As we do not observe the exact timing of switches in our data, we cannot distinguish whether individuals made an ex ante choice to switch to a more expensive plan or whether they were surprised by changes in the plans ex post. We calculate switchers' ex post savings for each month between two adjacent interviews and use the average monthly savings as dependent variable in the regression presented in column (2) of Table 5.

Column (2) of Table 5 shows coefficients of an OLS regression of this measure on the choice environment variables. In column (3) the dependent variable in the OLS regression is the

ratio of realized over potential savings, which measures the percent of potential savings that are realized. Column (2) indicates that on average switchers pay 6.1 Euros less per month in their new plan than they would have paid in their old plan, and column (3) suggests that this reflects 53% of potential savings. Switchers save less when more plans are available but they also save less and realize a lower fraction of their potential savings after the 2009 reform. This suggests that a larger choice set not only reduces switching rates but also worsens the average quality of the choices among switchers. After the 2009 reform, however, more individuals switch but the quality of switches may be lower on average.

Overall, the analyses suggest that switchers do better than stayers and that the average switcher saves from switching. Averages, however, might hide important heterogeneity. Figure 4 displays the cumulative distribution functions of realized savings among four different groups of switchers: Those who switched before 2009 facing choice sets with up to 85 plans; those who switched before 2009 with choice sets of more than 85 plans; those who switched in 2009 or 2010 with choice sets with up to 85 plans; and those who switched in 2009 or 2010 with more than 85 plans. With more than 85 plans almost 50% of switchers before 2009 selected a plan in which they ended up paying more than they would have paid in their old plan, while the other half of switchers saved money from switching. In the group of switchers with fewer than 85 plans prior to 2009, only about 25% of individuals switched to plans in which they ended up paying more, while 75% of individuals saved from switching. With fewer plans, a larger fraction of switchers thus saved from switching prior to 2009. While Table 5 suggests that in 2009 and 2010 switchers realized lower savings on average (relative to the period before 2009), the cumulative distribution functions show that a lower share of them switched to more expensive plans. However, a relatively large fraction (30% for those who choose between up to 85 plans and 55% of those who choose between more than 85 plans) switched to a plan that is as expensive as their old plan, while the rest (around 50% of those with up to 85 plans and 25% of those with more than 85 plans) save from switching.

Overall, the results suggest that fewer plans allow a larger share of switchers to realize savings and that the change in framing in 2009 might have prevented a larger share of individuals from switching to more expensive plans.

8. Sensitivity Analyses

Table 6 reports on the sensitivity of our main results. All results presented in this table are based on linear probability models of health plan switching with individual fixed effects, as in column (2) of Table 3.

The results in the first column of Table 6 exclude retirees for whom we were not able to identify their current or next health plan with certainty. Excluding these 100 cases does not change our results.

In column (2) we present results that exclude all individuals who ever report having selected an alternative plan. Since 2007, insurers in the SHI may offer alternative plans that differ slightly from the standardized plans, e.g. the plans can have deductibles and pay rebates in case enrollees do not use any health care services in a given year. Individuals who choose an alternative plan are often only allowed to switch to a different plan once they have been with the alternative plan for at least 3 years. Switching rates among individuals in alternative plans might thus be lower and individuals in these plans are not able to react to their potential savings. Unfortunately, we only observe whether individuals have selected an alternative plan in 2008, 2009 and 2010, and thus cannot take selection into alternative plans into account for all years. Excluding all observations of individuals who report being in an alternative plan in any of the years 2008, 2009 or 2010, however, does not change our results.

In our main analysis, we treat individuals from the same household as independent observations, as long as these individuals report being paying health insurance members. Individuals who report being insured via another member of their family are excluded as they do not make a health insurance choice themselves – they are covered by the primary member’s plan. However, health insurance choices within a household may not really be independent of each other. This may result in correlation across error terms within households, which can be addressed by clustering the standard errors at the household rather than the individual level.¹³ A bigger concern could be that some households effectively make only one (joint) health insurance choice, whereas we count multiple choices for the household and thus essentially increase our sample size. In our sample, about 40% of respondents share a household. Including each household only once with a randomly chosen member thus reduces our sample size by 20%. This is a very conservative restriction because we exclude individuals in multiple-member households who may be making independent decisions. Column (3) of Table 6 displays results based on the smaller sample. The coefficient estimates are of similar magnitudes, but not always significantly different from zero.

In column (4), we use categories for the number of plans instead of the actual number of plans to capture the size of the choice set. This provides a basic test of the inverted-U hypothesis that has been associated with decision overload (Frank and Lamiraud, 2009), i.e.,

¹³ Clustering at the household level does not change the results (available upon request).

whether switching probabilities initially increase and then, upon reaching an inflection point, decrease in the number of choices. The coefficients on the interaction of potential savings and having between 82-100 plans to choose from or having more than 100 plans to choose from compared to a reference group of fewer than 82 plans are negative, indicating that individuals react less to potential savings when more plans are available. However, these estimates are not significantly different from zero. Since using these categories instead of the actual number reduces the variation considerably, and given that the effect in the main analysis was already weak, it is not surprising that we cannot detect an effect in this analysis. Moreover, the choice sets in Germany are quite large and the inflection points may occur at smaller choice sets. While Frank and Lamiraud (2009) estimate a similar monotonic decrease in the switching probability for choice sets that include 30 to 70 plans in Switzerland, McWilliams et al. (2011) find that the probability of enrollment in U.S. Medicare Advantage plans peaks for choice sets of 15-30 plans.

In column (5) we restrict the number of plans to larger plans, as consumers may not consider smaller fringe players in their decisions (Frank and Lamiraud, 2009). Instead of the total number of plans we only use plans with at least 1% market share in the regional market. The results in column (5) suggest that a larger number of larger health plans reduces the price sensitivity of health plan choice. The coefficient is significant and much larger than in the main analysis (-0.05 compared to -0.005). This suggests that indeed individuals pay more attention to plans with higher market share and that a larger number of large plans reduces switching rates.

In column (6) of Table 5 we follow Frank and Lamiraud (2009) and use the (weighted) standard deviation of average premiums as a measure for potential savings. This measure has the advantage that it is less sensitive to small outlier plans and is less affected by equilibrium effects. However, it is also less well able to capture each individual's situation and instead reflects what an average person in a plan with above average costs could expect to save when switching to a random plan. It is thus not surprising that none of the coefficients on the interaction terms that include the potential savings measure are significantly different from zero at conventional significance levels.

9. Discussion

Our study examines policy changes in the choice environment of the German SHI to identify determinants of the price sensitivity while examining the impact and heterogeneity associated with actual policy interventions that are available to regulators. We focus on two features of the choice environment, the size of the choice set and the salience of price differences, and evaluate how exogenous variation in these two features affects retirees' price

sensitivity of plan choice in a large individual-level panel. We also examine possible heterogeneities in these effects across retirees with respect to observable characteristics, such as physical health status, income, education, and cognitive ability. Understanding the impact of the choice environment and its heterogeneities might help to target interventions to support retirees' health plan choices and increase their ability to capture the benefits of competitive insurance markets.

Our results indicate that the choice environment can impact how much retirees react to the amount of money that they can save from switching. In particular, they react more to the savings if there are fewer (large) plans that they can choose from. They also react more to potential savings if those savings are more salient, a finding in line with related research on the salience of taxation (Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009). Our results also indicate that the increase in salience mainly acts via a change in the framing of premium differences. In particular, if the difference to a cheaper plan is cast as a supplemental fee, it seems to be easier for retirees to understand that they are paying more than necessary. This finding underlines the potential importance of "comparison frictions" (Kling et al., 2012) and suggests that modifying the framing of premiums may be a feasible policy to reduce these frictions and increase consumers' price sensitivity.

We also find that on average retirees realize savings when switching plans, and that 50% of switchers save from switching. Furthermore, switchers perform better (capture a higher share of the feasible savings) when the plan menu is smaller and after the 2009 reform increased the salience of price differences. The 2009 reform also decreased the share of switchers who select a plan that is more expensive but has the same (standardized) benefits. This suggests that, at least from a basic consumer perspective, there was initially "too much choice" in the SHI and that the policy changes increased both the switching rates and the quality of choices.

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Tables

Table 1: Reform 2009

Health Plan	Plan-specific Rate				Uniform Rate		
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Gemeinsame BKK Köln	15.3%	15.3%	16.2%	16.6%	15.5%	14.9% + €8	15.5% + €8
BKK für Heilberufe	14.8%	14.8%	15.7%	16.2%	15.5%	14.9% + 1%	15.5% + €10
hkk	13.5%	13.5 %	14.1%	14.1%	15.5% - €5	14.9% - €5	15.5% - €5
Techniker Krankenkasse	13.7%	13.7%	14.4%	14.7%	15.5%	14.9%	15.5%
Average share of plans with rebates	-	-	-	-	1.4%	2.9%	4.1%
Average share plans with supplemental fees	-	-	-	-	0%	10.1%	10.9%

Notes: Contribution rates (as % on income) for February of the respective year. Since 2009 there is a uniform contribution rate for all plans, but plans can levy supplemental fees or issue rebates. Until 2011 the latter could be framed either as % on income or in absolute values. Since 2011, the law requires absolute values. There were no supplemental fees or rebates in January 2009. The first plans (hkk and IKK Südwest) introduced rebates in February 2009. The first supplemental fee was introduced in September 2009 by Gemeinsame BKK Köln. The lower panel displays unweighted averages across 17 health plan regions.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics – Retirees

	Entire Sample		Allowed to switch		Paid directly		Did not pay directly	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Individual level variables								
Switches plan	0.027	0.16	0.027	0.16	0.020	0.14	0.029	0.17
Months at risk	12.0	1.37	12.0	1.37	12.0	1.57	12.0	1.34
Allowed to switch	0.99	0.098	1	0	1	0	1	0
Potential savings Euros/month	10.9	9.81	10.9	9.79	16.9	16.7	9.89	7.49
# Plans	97.9	17.0	97.9	17.0	101.2	17.3	97.3	16.9
# Plans with market share > 1%	13.8	1.41	13.8	1.41	13.9	1.45	13.8	1.40
Plan merges	0.13	0.33	0.13	0.33	0.13	0.33	0.13	0.33
Age (years)	73.2	6.18	73.2	6.18	72.7	5.60	73.3	6.27
Female	0.53	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.31	0.46	0.57	0.49
Education (years)	11.2	2.30	11.2	2.29	12.7	2.86	11.0	2.08
German national	0.89	0.31	0.89	0.31	0.92	0.26	0.89	0.32
Eastern German	0.33	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.16	0.36	0.36	0.48
# Kids in household	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.10	0.01	0.11
Household size	1.79	0.62	1.79	0.62	1.88	0.53	1.77	0.63
Married	0.65	0.48	0.65	0.48	0.75	0.43	0.63	0.48
Bad or very bad health	0.33	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.24	0.43	0.35	0.48
Household income (in 1000 Euros)	25.8	17.0	25.8	17.0	36.2	24.6	24.0	14.5
Supplemental private insurance	0.15	0.36	0.15	0.36	0.31	0.46	0.12	0.32
Voluntary SHI	0.041	0.20	0.041	0.20	0.25	0.43	0.0038	0.061
Retires this year	0.01	0.076	0.01	0.075	0.01	0.13	0.003	0.058
Low cognition (N=3405)							0.28	0.45
Regional variables - lagged								
Doctors/capita	1.91	0.61	1.91	0.61	1.96	0.61	1.90	0.61
Hospitals/capita	0.024	0.004	0.024	0.004	0.025	0.004	0.024	0.004
Hospital beds/capita	6.32	0.58	6.32	0.58	6.26	0.56	6.34	0.58
GNP/capita	33964.5	17239.7	33963.4	17237.4	36998.1	16554.3	33429.1	17300.6
Instruments - lagged								
Administrative payment rate	2739.0	110.6	2739.0	110.4	2740.8	113.0	2738.6	110.0
# Hospital cases (in 1000)	1432.4	769.8	1432.4	770.1	1659.2	774.1	1392.5	762.5
N	13904		13768		2061		11707	

Notes: Retirees (aged 65+) in SOEP years 2005-2007, 2009-2011, unbalanced sample.

Table 3: Linear Probability Model for Health Plan Switching Among Retirees

	(1) Controls	(2) FE	(3) IV	(4) Full Int	(5) Full Int IV
Potential Savings (PS)	0.1733 ⁺ (0.112)	0.2652 ⁺ (0.157)	0.4279* (0.210)	0.2513 ⁺ (0.155)	0.2148 (0.164)
PS × 2009	0.2012 ⁺ (0.118)	-0.2592* (0.125)	-0.3104** (0.142)	0.3191 (0.461)	0.1882 (0.520)
PS × 2010	0.8327** (0.293)	0.5457* (0.307)	0.4310 (0.309)	2.0132* (0.963)	1.9117* (0.941)
# Plans	0.1897** (0.080)	0.2282** (0.085)	0.3856*** (0.115)	0.1157* (0.062)	0.3817 (0.252)
PS × # Plans	-0.0026 (0.002)	-0.0054* (0.003)	-0.0087* (0.004)	-0.0051* (0.003)	-0.0045 (0.003)
# Plans × 2009				0.0969 (0.098)	0.2428 (0.195)
# Plans × 2010				0.4134 (0.298)	0.5994 (0.430)
PS × # Plans × 2009				-0.0180 (0.013)	-0.0136 (0.015)
PS × # Plans × 2010				-0.0893* (0.050)	-0.0826 ⁺ (0.048)
Ind. F.E.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Angrist & Pischke F					
# Plans			62.02		5.35
PS × # Plans			155.17		210.76
# Plans × 2009					13.03
# Plans × 2010					13.37
PS × # Plans × 2009					37.80
PS × # Plans × 2010					51.28
N	11707	11707	11707	11707	11707
adj. R ²	0.013	-0.343	-0.344	-0.337	-0.340

*** $p < 0.01$ ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.1$ + $p < 0.15$

Notes: Retirees (aged 65+) in SOEP years 2005-2007, 2009 and 2010 who are allowed to switch plans and did not pay part of their health plan premium directly to their health plan already prior to 2009. Coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors in parentheses allow for serial correlation over time as well as clustering within regions. p-values are calculated using a t-distribution with number of region-2 as degrees of freedom to correct for small number of clusters. Additional controls as shown in table 2. IV estimations are just identified using lagged regional administrative payment rate interacted with number of hospital cases, and their interaction with all variables that are interacted with number of plans in the respective model. The variable # plans is rescaled as the original value minus 58 (the minimum number of plans in the data).

Table 4: Heterogeneities

Group=	(1) Direct payers	(2) Poor health	(3) Low educ	(4) Low income	(5) Low cogn.
Potential Savings (PS)	0.2629 ⁺ (0.159)	0.3832 (0.256)	0.3829** (0.134)	0.4427 ⁺ (0.287)	0.4808 ⁺ (0.304)
PS × 2009	-0.2664* (0.126)	-0.4430** (0.176)	-0.1582 (0.131)	-0.5570** (0.244)	-0.1956 (0.254)
PS × 2010	0.5332 ⁺ (0.309)	0.6382* (0.333)	0.6284* (0.337)	0.3210 (0.347)	0.7499 (0.578)
# Plans	0.2070** (0.081)	0.2561** (0.108)	0.2638*** (0.078)	0.2810 (0.195)	0.2046 (0.174)
PS × # Plans	-0.0053* (0.003)	-0.0078 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.0068** (0.003)	-0.0085 ⁺ (0.006)	-0.0090 ⁺ (0.006)
Group × 2009	-5.0253 (5.484)	-2.7119 (3.530)	-0.0445 (3.024)	-4.5272 (3.864)	6.3184 (7.223)
Group × 2010	-6.6129 (5.452)	-0.0066 (5.111)	-3.2860 (6.192)	-2.6145 (6.683)	13.5594 (13.230)
Group × PS	-0.2024 (0.139)	-0.2201 (0.310)	-0.6262** (0.281)	-0.3295 (0.293)	0.1193 (0.979)
Group × PS × 2009	0.6703 (0.608)	0.3680 (0.347)	-0.6437 ⁺ (0.417)	0.5312 ⁺ (0.325)	0.1201 (0.667)
Group × PS × 2010	0.2775 (0.511)	-0.2005 (0.432)	-0.5519 (0.826)	0.4347 (0.380)	-0.2563 (1.267)
Group × # Plans	-0.1533 (0.134)	-0.0443 (0.145)	-0.1857 ⁺ (0.113)	-0.0745 (0.211)	0.4050 (0.332)
Group × PS × # Plans	0.0043 ⁺ (0.003)	0.0047 (0.006)	0.0076 (0.005)	0.0055 (0.005)	-0.0035 (0.018)
Ind F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Switching rate pre 2009					
Group	0.018	0.026	0.031	0.025	0.016
Reference	0.025	0.025	0.023	0.026	0.019
<i>N</i>	13723	11707	11707	11707	3405
adj. <i>R</i> ²	-0.343	-0.343	-0.340	-0.342	-0.314

*** $p < 0.01$ ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.1$ + $p < 0.15$

Notes: Retirees (aged 65+) in SOEP years 2005-2007, 2009 and 2010 who are allowed to switch plans and (except for column 1) did not pay part of their health plan premium directly to their plan prior to 2009. Coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors in parentheses allow for serial correlation over time as well as clustering within regions. p-values are calculated using a t-distribution with number of region-2 as degrees of freedom to correct for small number of clusters. Additional controls as shown in table 2. The variable # plans is rescaled as the original value minus 58 (the minimum number of plans in the data).

Table 5: Savings from Switching

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Switchers and Stayers Premium t - Premium t+1	Switchers Realized Savings	Switchers Realized/Potential Savings
# Plans	0.001 (0.010)	-0.107*** (0.028)	-0.011*** (0.005)
2009	0.331 (0.302)	-2.115*** (0.799)	-0.161 (0.144)
2010	1.686*** (0.426)	-1.962 (1.392)	-0.380 (0.262)
Switch	5.068*** (1.356)		
Switch \times # plans	-0.097*** (0.028)		
Switch \times 2009	-1.625* (1.010)		
Switch \times 2010	-1.235 (1.121)		
Constant	-1.838*** (0.597)	6.121*** (1.523)	0.526** (0.280)
<i>N</i>	11701	333	333
Monthly premium pre 2009			
Average	86.57	92.57	
Median	78.21	86.19	

*** $p < 0.01$ ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.1$ + $p < 0.15$

Notes: Clustered standard errors on individual and regional level in parentheses. p-values adjusted for small number of clusters.

Table 6: Sensitivity Analyses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	No uncertain	No alternative plan	Only one HH member	Plan categories	Only large plans	SD of premiums
Potential Savings (PS)	0.2322 ⁺ (0.141)	0.2863 ⁺ (0.167)	0.2481 (0.176)	0.1225 (0.124)	0.7055** (0.293)	2.6858 (2.207)
PS × 2009	-0.2091 ⁺ (0.126)	-0.2481* (0.117)	-0.2936* (0.157)	-0.2073 ⁺ (0.122)	-0.1333 (0.105)	0.6213 (2.808)
PS × 2010	0.6157* (0.292)	0.5457 ⁺ (0.315)	0.3395 (0.255)	0.6233* (0.339)	0.8790** (0.383)	24.5113 ⁺ (15.487)
# Plans	0.2102** (0.076)	0.2398** (0.092)	0.2120** (0.094)		0.3272 (0.267)	0.2101 (0.142)
82-100 Plans				0.3890 (1.223)		
>100 Plans				2.6787 ⁺ (1.732)		
PS × # Plans	-0.0049* (0.003)	-0.0058* (0.003)	-0.0051 ⁺ (0.003)		-0.0528** (0.022)	-0.0441 (0.044)
PS × 82-100 Plans				-0.0869 (0.140)		
PS × >100 Plans				-0.1396 (0.123)		
Ind F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Add controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	11607	10807	9261	11707	11707	11701
adj. R ²	-0.343	-0.342	-0.350	-0.343	-0.344	-0.350

*** $p < 0.01$ ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.1$ + $p < 0.15$
Notes: Based on specification (2) in table 3, coefficients are multiplied by 100, clustered standard errors on individual and regional level in parentheses. p-values adjusted for small number of clusters.

Figures





Figure 2: Contribution Rates, Supplemental fees and Rebates



Notes: Based on plans that are common to the choice sets in all regions. Source: Finanztest

Figure 3: Potential Savings over Time





Figure 4: Realized Savings from Switching



Appendix

Table 1: Pre-trends Analyses

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Pr(switch=1)	Pr(switch=1)	Pr(switch=1)
Potential Savings (PS)	-0.0002 (0.000)		-0.0002 (0.000)
2006	-0.0120 ⁺ (0.008)	0.0003 (0.005)	-0.0120 ⁺ (0.008)
2007	-0.0029 (0.007)	0.0008 (0.005)	-0.0029 (0.007)
PS × 2006	0.0010 ⁺ (0.001)		0.0010 ⁺ (0.001)
PS × 2007	0.0003 (0.001)		0.0003 (0.001)
Direct payer		-0.0087 (0.007)	-0.0120 (0.008)
Direct payer × 2006		0.0042 (0.010)	0.0220 ⁺ (0.014)
Direct payer × 2007		-0.0010 (0.010)	0.0162 (0.014)
PS × direct payer			0.0003 (0.000)
PS × direct payer × 2006			-0.0013 [*] (0.001)
PS × direct payer × 2007			-0.0009 ⁺ (0.001)
Constant	0.0262*** (0.005)	0.0248*** (0.003)	0.0262*** (0.005)
<i>N</i>	7266	8514	8514

*** $p < 0.01$ ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.1$ + $p < 0.15$

Notes: Retirees (aged 65+) in SOEP in years 2005, 2006 and 2007. Coefficients after OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Direct payer indicates whether retiree paid part of premium directly to health plan prior to 2009.

Data Appendix

1. Construction of the choice set

Since 1996, individuals can choose among all plans that operate in their region of residence and their region of employment. Furthermore, individuals who work for certain employers and their spouses can choose a plan offered by their employer. These so-called “closed” plans can only be chosen by employees of specific companies, e.g. employees of Deutsche Bank and their spouses can choose among all plans in their region of residence and their region of employment, as well as Deutsche Bank’s closed plan, the BKK Deutsche Bank. In order to construct the full choice set (of employees) one would thus have to observe their region of residence, their region of employment, and their own and their spouse’s current employer. In this paper, we focus on retirees who are older than 65 and who are not employed. In this population, we do not need to observe the region of employment to construct individuals’ full choice sets. Employer-specific closed plans are also less of a worry for retirees. These plans are only part of a retiree’s choice set if (a) their last plan before retirement was a closed plan and they have remained in this plan since, i.e. the plan is their current plan; (b) their spouse is a member of a closed plan; or (c) their spouse works at an employer that offers a closed plan. In our data, we can observe (a) and (b) but not (c). For our main analysis, we construct the choice set as the set of all plans that operate in each individual’s region of residence plus their own and their spouses current plan (if the latter are closed plans). Our approach might not capture the full choice set for retirees who have younger spouses that are still working and are working at an employer that offers a closed plan, as in scenario (c). We will explore excluding individuals with spouses who are still working as a robustness analysis.

2. Construction of potential savings measure

The premiums that retirees pay for health insurance in the SHI depend on a health plan's contribution rate and on the retirees' income. The relevant income definition includes pensions (social security as well as company and private pensions) and other types of income (such as income from self-employment). For retirees who decide to stay in the SHI as voluntary members, the contribution rate applies to all types of income, e.g. including dividends and rents. These retirees could also choose to get insurance in the private system but decided to stay in the SHI.

Prior to 2009 Reform:

To construct potential savings prior to 2009, we calculate the difference in the contribution rate of an individual's health plan to the cheapest available plan in his choice set for each month during the relevant period at risk. Using this measure we calculate the *maximum monthly potential savings in Euros* that individuals could have gotten from switching by multiplying each respondent's maximum difference in contribution rates with the relevant monthly income that an individual had during the first of the two adjacent years. By using the maximum monthly savings we likely overstate the actual savings that individuals could have gotten in the average month. This may occur because contribution rates fluctuate across the year and we do not observe at what point in the year individuals switch health plans. If they switch in a month in which they could only get less than the maximum savings, we essentially underestimate their sensitivity to savings.

In the multiplication of the difference in contribution rates and income we further take into account that (a) for some types of income retirees bear only half of the contribution rate while the pension fund bears the other half, and that (b) only income below statutory thresholds counts towards premiums. Specifically:

- a) For some types of incomes retirees only bear half of the contribution rate while the other half is paid by the pension fund or an employer (social security). For other types of income (income from self-employment, private pensions) the retiree bears the full contribution rate. For social security we thus only use half the difference between contribution rates to construct potential savings.¹
- b) Only income up to a statutory threshold - the so-called *Beitragsbemessungsgrenze* - is used to calculate premiums. We take this into account when calculating the potential savings and cap the maximum potential savings amount at the differences in

¹ Since July 2005, individuals have to pay an additional 0.9% of their income for premiums. As this additional premium is equal for all plans it is differenced out in the savings measure.

contribution rates between an individual's own plan and the cheapest plan in the choice set multiplied by the threshold.

Post-2009 Reform:

Since the 2009 reform, all health plans have the same uniform contribution rate. Differences in premiums arise from plan-specific supplemental fees and rebates. Health plans that require additional resources must implement fees whereas those needing fewer resources can issue rebates. To construct our measure of potential savings we calculate the relevant income measures as before the reform, and how much an individual would save by switching from his current plan to the cheapest plan in the choice set in each month during the period at risk. As prior to the reform, we choose the maximum monthly savings in this period and use it as measure of potential savings.