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Services, Comparative Advantage and Agglomeration of Economic Activity: A Ricardo-Marshall Model

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Preliminary. Comments are welcome.

ABSTRACT
The last century has witnessed dramatic changes in the world economy. The service (tertiary) sector, which at the beginning of the 20th century was of little importance relative to agriculture and manufacturing, has become the dominant sector today, accounting for 80% and more of value added in advanced countries and around 70% and of employment. Innovations in transport technologies and in information and communications technologies have radically reduced the costs of trading goods and have also made an increasing share of services tradeable. We propose a tractable micro-founded Ricardo-Marshall model to study the implications of the rise of the service sector and its interaction with international trade and factor mobility for the location of economic activity. Our model highlights a tension between nontradeable producer services which exert an agglomerative force and trade costs and comparative advantage in final goods and services which act as dispersion forces.

JEL-Classification:   F12, F22, R11, R12, R13
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1 Introduction

The last century has witnessed dramatic changes in the world economy. The service (tertiary) sector, which at the beginning of the 20th century was of little importance relative to agriculture and manufacturing, has become the dominant sector today, accounting for 80% and more of value added in advanced countries (70% and more of employment). Innovations in transport technologies and in information and communications technologies have radically reduced the costs of trading goods and have made an increasing share of services tradeable. The latter development has stirred a big public and academic debate, notably in the United States, which has focused on the labor market implications associated with the offshoring of services (see e.g. Blinder 2009 and Bhagwati and Blinder 2009). In sharp contrast, the rise of the tertiary sector, although put at the center stage in the works of Clark, Fisher and Fourastié in the 20th century and, in (William) Petty’s law even centuries ago, has received only scant attention in the explosion of work that we have seen in economic geography and regional economics, in recent decades.

Our paper tries to fill this gap. We propose a tractable fully micro-founded Ricardo-Marshall model to study the implications of the rise of the service sector and its interaction with international trade and factor mobility for the location of economic activity. Our model highlights a tension between nontradeable producer services which exert an agglomerative force and trade costs and comparative advantage in final goods and services which act as dispersion forces. Four parameters are key in our model. The share of nontradeable local producer services and their substitutability give rise to an agglomerative tendency, whilst genuine comparative advantage and the costs of trading final goods and services tend to disperse economic activity.

Our paper is related to several strands of research. First, we build on the literature which has modified and generalized the canonical Ricardian model of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977), with a key theoretical innovation by Eaton and Kortum (2002), and a new methodological concept established by Dekle, Eaton and Kortum (2007). These contributions have given rise to
an evolving line of research dealing with new quantitative models of trade (see Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare 2013). The service sector that we highlight in our model was put into the spotlight in the important recent analysis by Matsuyama (2013), on which our analysis builds. Moreover, by highlighting the importance of factor mobility, Stephen Redding (2012) has brought the new quantitative models in the realm of regional economics.

The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up our model. Section 3 studies the baseline case without trade costs. The implications of trade costs are analyzed in section 4 which also contains a welfare analysis. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.

2 The Model

General set-up. Our analysis builds on the Ricardian model of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) with two regions, home and foreign, one factor of production, labor, and a continuum of final goods and services which are produced under perfect competition. We amend this model in three ways. First, following Matsuyama (2013), we assume that the production of final goods and services makes use of labor and a symmetric CES-composite of local non-tradeable intermediate producer services, each of which is produced with labor under increasing returns and monopolistic competition. It is important to notice here, that our model comprises both genuinely nontradeable intermediate services and potentially (though possibly at a cost) tradeable services which are consumed by households. Second, to make our model tractable, we impose the specification of comparative advantage in final outputs implied by Eaton and Kortum (2002). The technologies to produce final goods are characterized by an exogenous parameter which governs the dispersion of productivity across products and which is identical across

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1 Eaton and Kortum (2002) derived their technology specification, the Fréchet-distribution, in order to render the case of many countries in the Dornbusch, Fischer, Samuelson model tractable. They also indicated how this distribution maps into the two-country case (Eaton and Kortum 2002: 1747). Dekle, Eaton and Kortum (2007) exemplify the two-country case in their working paper.
regions. Hence, the distributions of technologies of the two regions are exact mirror images and the regions’ comparative advantages are perfectly symmetric. Since we also assume that the two regions have identical labor endowments, preferences and trade costs, there are no overall first-nature advantages in our model and the two regions can be considered to be identical, ex-ante.

Third, we allow for the mobility of labor across regions and study the resulting spatial equilibrium. We now turn to the detailed description of preferences and technologies from the point of view of the domestic region. Variables and parameters pertaining to the foreign region will be denoted by an asterisk (*).

Preferences. Preferences are defined over the consumption \( c(z) \) of every final good \( z \in [0,1] \) and are assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form:

\[
U\{c(z)\} = \exp[\int_0^1 \log c(z) dz]
\]

The associated perfect price index is:

\[
P = \exp[\int_0^1 \log p(z) dz]
\]

where \( p(z) \) is the consumer price of \( z \), which may comprise trade costs of the iceberg-type \( \tau \geq 1 \) for goods that are imported from the other region. Due to perfect competition, producer prices of final goods reflect unit costs.

Technologies and prices. The technology to produce final good or service \( z \) is characterized by the constant-returns unit cost function:

\[
\kappa(z) = a(z) w^\beta P_s^{\beta} \left( \int_0^1 P_s^{-\sigma} ds \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}
\]

---

\(^2\) Technologies in Eaton and Kortum (2002) exhibit another parameter, total factor productivity, which is country-specific. We abstract from this parameter of absolute advantage in order to give no region an overall first-nature advantage.
where \( w \) is the domestic wage, \( P_s \) is the perfect price index for nontradeable domestic producer services, \( p_s \) is the price of a single service \( s \), and \( \sigma \) is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two services. We assume \( \sigma > 1 \). The mass of services is given by \( n \), which is determined endogenously. The cost share of intermediate services is governed by the parameter \( 0 \leq \beta \leq 1 \) which we assume to be equal across all final goods.\(^3\) Services are produced with labor, as described below in detail. The term \( a(z) \) is an exogenous technology parameter which varies across final goods.\(^4\) The foreign analogue is represented by \( a^*(z) \). To introduce (exogenous) comparative advantage in the spirit of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977), we assume that the final goods \( z \) can be ranked in descending order of \( A(z) = a^*(z)/a(z) \). Hence, home’s (exogenous) relative technological superiority is highest for \( z = 0 \) and foreign’s relative technological superiority is highest for \( z = 1 \). Furthermore, we assume that the distribution of domestic and foreign technology parameters is perfectly symmetric in the sense that labor coefficients are exact mirror images, i.e. \( A(z = 0) = 1/A(z = 1) \) etc.

We assume that intermediate producer services are symmetric. Each intermediate service \( s \) is produced by a single firm under increasing returns and monopolistic competition. The labor input to produce quantity \( q_s \) of service \( s \) is given by \( l_s = f + mq_s \), with \( f \) and \( m \) denoting the fixed and variable labor input, respectively. Total costs are \( w(f + mq_s) \). It is well-known that with this Dixit-Stiglitz specification, the parameter \( \sigma \) is also the price elasticity of demand for services (from eq. (3)) and that monopolistic competitive service producers charge profit-maximizing producer prices

\(^3\) Here we deviate from Matsuyama (2013) who assumes that the cost share of services varies across sectors. This assumption is key for his research question, the endogenous derivation of comparative advantage. We pursue a different line of research, taking comparative advantage as exogenously given as we elaborate in the following.

\(^4\) These coefficients coincide with the (exogenous) labor coefficients in Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) for \( \beta = 0 \) .
\[ p_s = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}wm. \]  

Profits of each service producer are \( \pi_s = (p_s - wm)q_s - wf \) which, on substituting \( p_s \) from eq. (4), can be rewritten as \( \pi_s = w\left[ mq_s / (\sigma - 1) - f \right] \). In long-run zero-profit equilibrium we have \( \pi_s = 0 \). Hence, the level of output at which a service firm breaks even is given by:

\[ q_s = \frac{f(\sigma - 1)}{m}. \]  

We can now make use of eq. (4) to rewrite unit costs to produce final good \( z \) as:

\[ \kappa(z) = \left( \frac{\sigma m}{\sigma - 1} \right)^\beta a(z)wn^{-\gamma}, \]  

where the term \( \gamma \equiv \beta / (\sigma - 1) \) is an overall measure of the agglomerative associated with the service sector. This equation reveals that unit costs rise with wages and the technology coefficient \( a(z) \). Crucially, unit costs fall as the number of producer services increases. Hence, we have productivity gains associated with an increasing variety of services as in Ethier (1982). This is one of Marshall’s famous trinity of agglomeration forces.

3 General Equilibrium

**Short-run equilibrium and parameterization.** We now turn to characterize the general equilibrium of the economy in the short-run, where labor is immobile across regions. Let \( L \) and \( L^* \) denote the size of the domestic and foreign labor force, respectively. Consumers buy goods and tradeable services from the minimum cost source and, hence, compare unit cost prices in home (eq. (6)) with those in foreign, which, by analogy, are given by

\[ \kappa^*(z) = \left( \frac{\sigma m}{\sigma - 1} \right)^\beta a^*(z)w^*n^{*-\gamma}. \]  

Given the ranking of relative technology parameters \( A(z) \) there is a hypothetical cutoff \( \bar{z} \) at which unit costs in home and foreign are identical:
\[ \kappa(\bar{z}) = \kappa^*(\bar{z}) \quad \Rightarrow \quad A(\bar{z}) = \left( \frac{w}{w^*} \right) \left( \frac{n}{n^*} \right)^{-\gamma} \quad (7) \]

Goods and tradeable services in the range \( z \in [0, \bar{z}] \) are accordingly produced by domestic producers and sold to consumers in home and foreign, whilst goods and final services in the range \( z \in [\bar{z}, 1] \) are produced in foreign. To render our model tractable, we assume that each region draws an idiosyncratic productivity \( z^* \) for each final good. Productivity is independently drawn across goods and regions from a Fréchet distribution, \( F(z) = \exp(-z^{\theta}) \), where the parameter \( \theta > 1 \) is an inverse measure of the variability of technology parameters. For the two-country case, this leads to \( A(z) = ((1-z)/z)^{1/\theta} \) (see Eaton and Kortum 2002: 1747). Hence, comparative advantage is the stronger, the smaller the value of \( \theta \). Using this specification in eq. (7) we obtain:

\[ \left( \frac{1-\bar{z}}{\bar{z}} \right)^{1/\theta} = \left( \frac{w}{w^*} \right) \left( \frac{n}{n^*} \right)^{-\gamma} \quad (8) \]

To complete the short-run general equilibrium and in order to determine the (yet) hypothetical cutoff \( \bar{z} \), we bring in market clearing conditions for intermediate services and final goods and services. Starting with the former, note first that the total revenue in the intermediate service sector in home, \( np_s q_s \), has to equal the share \( \beta \) of domestic income, \( wL \). Hence \( np_s q_s = \beta wL \).

By analogy \( n^* p^*_s q^*_s = \beta w^* L^* \). Dividing these conditions and taking eqs. (4) and (5) for home and foreign into account, we can immediately conclude that the relative masses of service firms are proportionate to the relative sizes of the two regions’ labor forces:

\[ n / n^* = L / L^* \quad (9) \]

Putting this in eq. (8) and rearranging yields one schedule which links relative wages with \( \bar{z} \):

\[ \frac{w}{w^*} = \left( \frac{L}{L^*} \right)^{\gamma} \left( \frac{1-\bar{z}}{\bar{z}} \right)^{1/\theta} \quad (10) \]
Turning to domestic labor markets, market clearing commands that the total value of domestic production, \( wL \), equals the value of sales to domestic and foreign consumers \( z(wL + w^*L^*) \).

Rearranging, we obtain a second schedule linking relative wages with \( z \):

\[
\frac{w}{w^*} = \frac{\bar{z} L^*}{1 - \bar{z} L}
\]  

(11)

These two equations are immediately solved for the cutoff and for relative wages:

\[
\frac{w}{w^*} = \left( \frac{L}{L^*} \right)^{\vartheta - 1 \over \vartheta + 1}
\]  

(12)

\[
\bar{z} = \frac{1}{1 + \left( L^* / L \right)^{\vartheta + 1 \over \vartheta + 1}}
\]  

(13)

A graphical illustration of the short-run equilibrium is given in fig. 1 which depicts eq. (11), an upward-sloping schedule (as in Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson 1977) and eq. (10), a downward-sloping schedule (where we use \( \omega = w / w^* \)). The latter is drawn for two values of \( \vartheta \).

**Figure 1: Short-run equilibrium**

The steeper (downward-sloping) curve exhibits stronger comparative advantage as implied by a smaller value of \( \vartheta \). Under the assumption that the labor force in the domestic and foreign region is of equal size a symmetrical equilibrium obtains.
Long-Run General equilibrium. Workers are mobile in the long-run. We normalize the labor endowment to 1 such that $\lambda$ and $\lambda^* = 1 - \lambda$ are the domestic and foreign shares of overall labor, respectively. We assume that there are no mobility costs, so workers are attracted to the location which offers the highest indirect utility. Indirect utilities correspond to real wages $V = w / P$ and $V^* = w^* / P^*$ for domestic and foreign households, respectively, in our model. Since we assume that there are no trade costs for final goods and services in this section (they are taken up in section 5 below), the ratio of indirect utilities is given by:

$$
\frac{V}{V^*} = \frac{w}{w^*} = \left( \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \right)^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta + 1}}
$$

(14)

By construction of our model, symmetry ($\lambda = 1/2$) is always an equilibrium. However, due to the agglomerative force exerted by intermediate nontradeable producer services this equilibrium is not necessarily stable. Performing a standard analysis of symmetry breaking one can easily show:

**Proposition 1:** Assume that final goods and services are traded without costs. Then the economy exhibits dispersion iff $\gamma < 1/ \theta$ and agglomeration otherwise. The break point and the sustain point of agglomeration in terms in any of these parameters correspond to each other.

Proposition 1 brings out the fundamental tension in our model. Comparative advantage acts as a dispersion force. The parameter $\theta$ governs the strength of this force. The lower $\theta$, the stronger comparative advantage and, hence, the more likely is dispersion. The term $\gamma = \beta / (\sigma - 1)$ is an overall measure of the agglomerative forces associated with the service sector. This overall measure is governed by the importance of services as captured by $\beta$ and by the parameter $\sigma$ which is an inverse indicator of average costs relative to marginal costs in the service sector (and hence can be interpreted to be a measure of the strength of increasing returns in intermediate service production). An important conclusion of our analysis is thus that the rise of the service
sector that we have witnessed over the last decade may have contributed to the observed agglomeration of economic activities.

To carve out further predictions and to highlight the implications of the fact that the costs of trading final goods and services have dramatically fallen as a result of path-breaking innovations in transport technologies and in information and communications technologies we now introduce trade costs into the analysis.

4 Trade Costs

Short-Run General Equilibrium. Trade costs of the iceberg type for final outputs have already been considered in the basic analysis of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977). Introducing them into our modified framework is straightforward. As in the previous sections, consumers in each region buy from the minimum cost source, where now trade costs have to be taken into account when goods are imported from another region. This implies that we now have two cutoff thresholds which are embedded in the following three conditions for the general equilibrium:

\[ \kappa(z) = \tau \kappa^*(z_{II}) \]  
(15)

\[ \kappa^*(z) = \tau \kappa(z_I) \]  
(16)

\[ \frac{w}{w^*} = \frac{z_f}{1 - z_{II}} \frac{L^*}{L} \]  
(17)

Eq. (15) expresses that domestic production is the minimum cost source for domestic consumers for the range \( z \in [0, z_{II}] \) of goods. By implication, domestic consumers import the range \( z \in [z_{II}, 1] \) of goods from the foreign region. Eq. (16) states that foreign production is the minimum cost source for foreign consumers for \( z \in [z_I, 1] \). The range of goods imported by foreign is accordingly given by \( z \in [0, z_f] \). Eq. (17) is derived from the condition that the value of domestic production, \( wL \), has to equal the sales to domestic consumers \( z_{II}wL \) plus the sales
to foreign consumers $z_fw^*L^*$. These three conditions now implicitly define the equilibrium values of $z_H, z_F$ and $w/w^*$. Using the specifications $a(z) = z^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$ and $a^*(z) = (1-z)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$ which are consistent with our specification of $A(z)$ (see Dekle, Eaton and Kortum 2007), the price levels in home and foreign are straightforwardly calculated.

**Long-Run General Equilibrium.** Labor is mobile in long-run general equilibrium, as in the previous section. The ratio of indirect utilities is now given by:

$$\frac{V}{V^*} = \frac{w}{w^*} \frac{P}{P^*}$$

(18)

Making use of the wage ratios and the price levels as calculated in the short-run equilibrium, we can perform the standard analysis of symmetry breaking. This yields:

**Proposition 2:** Let $\gamma_{\text{break}} = \frac{2}{(2\theta+1)\tau^{\theta} - 1}$ and $\gamma_{\text{sustain}} = \frac{1}{\theta}$. Then three cases may arise: (i) The symmetric equilibrium prevails for $\gamma < \gamma_{\text{break}}$. (ii) The partially agglomerated equilibrium prevails for $\gamma_{\text{sustain}} < \gamma < \gamma_{\text{break}}$. (iii) The fully agglomerated equilibrium prevails for $\gamma > \gamma_{\text{break}}$.

Proposition 2 is illustrated in fig. 2 below. It neatly comprises proposition 1. The break and sustain points in terms of the cost share of services coincide when $\tau = 1$. As soon as trade costs are positive, break and sustain points differ. Moreover, if agglomeration occurs there is partial (rather than full) agglomeration of economic activity when trade costs are positive. The intuition of this result is that trade costs reinforce the dispersion force associated with comparative advantage. The stark implication which obtains when trade costs are absent – a bang-bang solution – no longer holds when costs of trading final goods and services are taken into account. Now, agglomeration, if it occurs, obtains only partially and we have a (smooth) pitchfork bifurcation. However, the model also implies that dispersion arises as trade costs are lowered. Hence,
secular rise in the importance of the service sector induces more agglomeration, whereas the secular fall in trade costs works in the opposite direction. Moreover, there is evidence that the margins of comparative advantage have become thinner at least within the OECD as expressed in Bhagwati’s notion of ‘kaleidoscopic comparative advantage’ (Bhagwati 1995). If so, our analysis suggests that this development reinforces agglomeration tendencies.

In case (ii), the partially agglomerated equilibrium prevails. In this case, we can show the following.

**Proposition 3.** If \( x^* \in (1/2,1) \) is a stable equilibrium, then \( w < w^* \) and \( P < P^* \).

According to this proposition whenever an asymmetric distribution is a stable equilibrium, the wage in the region with the higher share of labor and firms is always lower than the wage in the (partial) periphery. Intuitively, this is so because labor is the relatively abundant in the large region. Interestingly, in the geography regime (i.e. with mobile labor) the larger region always has the lower wage in a stable equilibrium, whereas with immobile labor (the trade regime) this was not necessarily true.

Furthermore, the price index is lower in the larger region because final goods are more accessible. The lower nominal wage and the lower price index in the larger region are consistent with the same utility level across regions in spatial equilibrium.
Fig. 2: Stable locational equilibria

![Graph showing stable locational equilibria with axes labeled γ and τ, indicating full agglomeration, partial agglomeration, and symmetry.]

**Welfare analysis.** We finally ask whether it is possible to reallocate labor across locations in such a way that the (potential) winners can compensate the (potential) losers so that the welfare of all individuals is raised. Such a second-best optimum can be implemented through a lump-sum tax-transfer mechanism across the two regions where the national government (a ‘benevolent social planner’) transfers lump-sum income (say T) from the domestic to the foreign region to equalize indirect utilities and then chooses the allocation of labor (λ) to maximize the (common) level of indirect utility. Note that such a scheme encompasses potential Pareto improvements, too. Performing this analysis we obtain:

**Proposition 4:** The market and the social optimum coincide when the trade of final goods and services is completely free (i.e. for τ = 1).

Our numerical simulations indicate that for positive levels of trade costs, the market equilibrium exhibits too little agglomeration.
5 Conclusion

This paper has proposed a simple tractable yet fully micro-founded Ricardo-Marshall agglomeration model in order to analyze the important structural changes that the world economy has witnessed in the last century. Agglomeration forces are strengthened and dispersion forces weakened with key changes in the last century, the rise of the service sector and the dramatic fall in trade costs. The tractability and full micro-foundation of our model should make it a useful tool for generalizations (e.g. to many regions), policy analysis and empirical work. These are the lines we envision for future research.

References


