@techreport{Stahler1998Cooperation,
abstract = {An exhaustible stock of resources may be exploited by N players. An arbitrarily long duration of the game is only possible, if the utility function satisfies certain restrictions at small values R of extraction. We find that stability against unilateral defection occurs if the elasticity of the marginal utility turns out to be larger than (N - 1 )/N, however independent of the value of the discount factor. Hence we find that cooperation does not depend on the discount factor for a certain range of elasticities. Analogy to phase transitions in statistical physics is discussed.},
address = {Kiel; Kiel, Hamburg},
author = {Frank St\"{a}hler and Friedrich Wagner},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; C73; Q30; 330},
language = {eng},
number = {846},
publisher = {Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW); ZBW \textendash{} Leibniz Information Centre for Economics},
title = {Cooperation in a resource extraction game},
type = {Kiel Working Paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52660},
year = {1998}
}