@techreport{Maruta1995Relationship,
abstract = {In a 2 x2 symmetric game with two symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, one risk-dominates another if and only if the equilibrium strategy is a unique best response to any mixture that gives it at least a probability of one half. In a n x n symmetric game, we call a strategy globally risk-dominant if it is a unique best response to any mixture that gives it at least a probability of one half. We show that if a finite coordination game has a globally risk-dominant equilibrium then this is the one that is selected by the stochastic equilibrium selection processes proposed by Young and by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob.},
address = {Evanston, IL},
author = {Toshimasa Maruta},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {330},
language = {eng},
number = {1122},
publisher = {Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
title = {On the Relationship Between Risk-Dominance and Stochastic Stability},
type = {Discussion Paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221478},
year = {1995}
}