@techreport{Ewerhart2014Mixed,
abstract = {The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and professional forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for n ≥ 4 firms is characterized as the solution of a well-behaved boundary value problem. The analysis suggests that, in contrast to the cases n = 3 and n → ∞ , the equilibrium for a finite number of n ≥ 4 firms tends to overrepresent locations at the periphery of its support interval. Moreover, in the class of examples considered, an increase in the number of firms universally leads to a wider range of location choices and to a more dispersed distribution of individual locations. The results are used to comment on the potential benefit of competition in forecasting markets.},
address = {Zurich},
author = {Christian Ewerhart},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
doi = {10.5167/uzh-97669},
keywords = {C72; D43; D72; L13; 330; Location; Hotelling game; mixed-strategy equilibrium; boundary value problem},
language = {eng},
number = {168},
publisher = {University of Zurich, Department of Economics},
title = {Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game: The case of n ≥ 4 firms},
type = {Working Paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/111224},
year = {2014}
}