Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98521 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 4 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2013 [Pages:] 738-753
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original treatment. With endogenous selection via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment, we find play also converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium as predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. While Nash equilibria with low offers are observed, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium never is.
Subjects: 
ultimatum bargaining
auction
forward induction
loss avoidance
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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