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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2012-09
Verlag: 
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics, Ramat-Gan
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the interconnection between elites and its effects on economic growth. For decades, the bureaucratic elite has been joining the business elite after leaving office, and this in growing numbers. This relationship has been termed the revolving door in English, pantouflage in French, and amakudari [descent from heaven] in Japanese. The purpose of this paper is to explain why this social behavior takes place, and why the political elite does not try to prevent it. Moreover, this paper shows that the bureaucratic elite obtains excessive bureaucratic power, and that promiscuous elites actually lead to lower economic growth.
Schlagwörter: 
elites
bureaucracy
abuse of power
revolving door
economic growth
JEL: 
H10
H70
O11
O43
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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