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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 995
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
When a decision-maker's attention is limited, her decisions depend on what she focuses on. This gives interested parties an incentive to manipulate not only the substance of communication but also the decision-maker's attention allocation. This paper models such attention manipulation. In its presence, competitive information supply can reduce the decision-maker's knowledge by causing information overload. Further, a single information provider may deliberately induce information overload to conceal information. These findings, pertinent to consumer protection, suggest a role for rules that restrict communication, mandate not only the content but also the format of disclosure, and regulate product design.
Schlagwörter: 
Communication
Information Overload
Limited Attention
Persuasion
Disclosure
Complexity
Consumer Protection
Salience
JEL: 
D82
D83
D18
M38
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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