Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94322 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1994
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 1994-12
Verlag: 
Rutgers University, Department of Economics, New Brunswick, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
Governments in more developed economies partially compensate import-competing industries when world prices fall, i.e. they lean against the wind. In less developed economies we often observe liberalization in response to the same shock. We use a political-support maximization model with revenue motives to derive conditions under which a rational policy-maker would respond to lower world prices by reducing tariff protection for an import-competing industry. An initial tariff that exceeds the maximum revenue level proves necessary but not sufficient for politically optimal liberalization following a fall in the world price of the importable good.
Schlagwörter: 
policy
protection
reform
tariffs
trade liberalization
JEL: 
D72
D78
F13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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