Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94172 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 394
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the entrant values only the bundle of several units (synergy), incumbents are subject to non-increasing demand. The seller proactively encourages entry and restricts incumbent bidders. In this framework, an English clock auction gives rise to an exposure problem that distorts efficiency and impairs revenue. We consider three remedies: a (constrained) Vickrey package auction, an English clock auction with exit option that allows the entrant to annul his bid, and an English clock auction with exit and entry option that lifts the bidding restriction if entry failed.
Schlagwörter: 
Auctions
package auctions
combinatorial clock auctions
spectrum auction
bundling
synergies
JEL: 
D21
D43
D44
D45
G34
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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