Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93831 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 23
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that have external effects on other members of the organization. Because of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to internalize these effects in the decision maker's objective. The optimal assignment of decision rights minimizes the resulting inefficiencies. We illustrate this in a principal-agent model where the principal retains the authority to select '€˜large' projects but delegates the decision right to the agent to implement '€˜small' projects. Extensions of the model discuss the role of effort incentives, asymmetric information and multistage decisions.
Schlagwörter: 
Authority
Control Rights
Decision Rights
Delegation
Externalities
Incomplete Contracts
Theory of the Firm
JEL: 
D23
D82
L22
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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