Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/90057 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7806
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that individual objective functions are optimized by an effort and insurance combination that is unique and satisfies first- and second-order conditions. Modeling insurance incompleteness in terms of costly production of private insurance services, we characterize the constrained inefficiency arising in general equilibrium from competitive pricing of nonexclusive financial contracts.
Schlagwörter: 
hidden action
principal agent
first-order approach
constrained efficiency
JEL: 
E21
D81
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
282.21 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.