Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/89992 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7660
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This field experiment examines output quantity and quality for workers in a data input business. We observe two sets of workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases quantity, and we find that the resultant quality can be improved with sufficient monitoring. Committed workers also produce higher quantity and quality, showing the role of worker selection - which appears especially strong under time rates. Our results thus show how a firm can refine its worker selection and monitoring options together with the payment system to deliver its chosen quality-quantity combination.
Schlagwörter: 
piece rate
monitoring
shirking
quantity and quality trade off
field experiment
worker committment
JEL: 
D2
J3
L2
M5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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