Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/86155 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
arqus Discussion Paper No. 147
Verlag: 
Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre (arqus), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We observe a specific type of tax evasion among business owners in Swedish administrative panel data, after the tax authority has approved all tax returns. For the period 2006-2009, approximately 5% of tax returns overstate a claimed dividend allowance. Tax awareness decreases and complexity increases the likelihood of misreporting. Some observed misreporting could be accidental, while some misreporting is deliberate tax evasion. We identify a positive and significant effect of tax rates on tax evasion, by exploiting a large kink in the tax schedule. The majority of misreporting cases remains undetected. Self-correction is the dominant type of detection.
Schlagwörter: 
tax evasion
tax compliance
tax enforcement
tax awareness
detection
JEL: 
H26
H24
D14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
304.89 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.