Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/85731 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 00-017/1
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
Different variations of a Principle of Coordination are used in anumber ofdifferent research traditions. Roughly speaking, one version of thePrinciple says thatif there is a unique Pareto-efficient outcome in a game, then playerswill choose theirpart of that outcome. In this paper I will investigate thefoundations of the Principleand see to what extent the Principle follows from some axiomsregarding rationalindividual decision-making.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
172.66 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.