Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/84199 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 403
Verlag: 
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA), Buenos Aires
Zusammenfassung: 
While existing cross-country studies on political budget cycles rely on annual data, we build a panel with quarterly and monthly data from Latin American and OECD countries over the 1980-2005 period. Disaggregated data allow to center the electoral year more precisely, and show the effects are concentrated in a three-quarter window around elections. Cycles are statistically significant only in Latin America, but the pattern is similar to OECD countries: the budget surplus/GDP ratio falls in the election period and rises in the post-election period. In line with the logic of rational opportunistic manipulation, these effects cancel out.
Schlagwörter: 
temporal aggregation
electoral window
pre- and post-electoral effects
political budget cycles
rational opportunistic cycles
JEL: 
D72
D78
H60
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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