Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81905 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 240
Publisher: 
Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm
Abstract: 
The discursive dilemma implies that the policy decision of a board of policymakers depends on whether the board reaches the decision by voting directly on policy (conclusion-based procedure), or by voting on the premises for the decision (premise-based procedure). We derive results showing when the discursive dilemma may occur, both in a general model and in a standard monetary policy model. When the board aggregates by majority voting, a discursive dilemma can occur if either (i) the relationship between the premise and the decision is non-monotonic, or (ii) if the board members have different judgments on at least two of the premises. Normatively, a premise-based procedure tends to give better decisions when there is disagreement on parameters of the model.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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