Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/80142 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2004-05
Verlag: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Zusammenfassung: 
In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a noexpulsion baseline. Expulsions were strictly of the lowest contributors, and there was an exceptionally strong fall-off in contributions in the last period, when the expulsion threat was unavailable. Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracism is one device that helps groups to provide public goods.
Schlagwörter: 
Public goods
collective action
punishment
JEL: 
C91
H41
D23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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