Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79766 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Managers: Behaviour and Wages No. D14-V1
Verlag: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the role of transparency in a novel three-person profit sharing game in which managers and board directors decide on how to distribute the revenues of a company among themselves and shareholders, who are the residual claimants of the companies revenues. We examine two hypotheses. One is that the distribution of revenues is largely determined by an informal quid pro quo among the two decision makers at the expense of shareholders. The second hypothesis is that public transparency attenuates exaggerated manager pay because of increased social pressure. We find strong support for our first hypothesis, but reject the second one: Public transparency actually increases managerial wages as well as board director compensation, further reducing the revenue share that goes to shareholders. Competition to keep managers further magnifies these patterns.
JEL: 
C92
G34
D63
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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