Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/78406 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 29/2001
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic activities and (ii) something can be done about this by introducing nonfinancial performance measures as for instance with a balanced scorecard. We give an explanation for both claims in a formal model. The distortion towards operational effort arises, because with financial performance measures strategic effort can only be rewarded in the future. But renegotiation-proof long term compensation plans entail too weak variable components in the future. This problem can be reduced by introducing performance measures that help to disentangle strategic and operational effects.
Schlagwörter: 
Performance Measurement
Nonfinancial Measures
Balanced Scorecard
Incentives
Renegotiation
JEL: 
D23
J33
M41
M12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
179.44 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.