Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/75779 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 422
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
What is the optimal institutional structure for an independent central bank? The paper shows when it will be optimal for a country to have a central bank to be organized according to federal, purely national or a combination of both aspects. The analysis is then extended to a supranational monetary union and it is shown which organizational structure of a common central bank is optimal for participating countries and when they are willing to join. The implications for an enlargement of a monetary union are derived as well.
Subjects: 
Monetary union
federalism
monetary policy
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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