Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73897 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 100.2007
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of the agents to find the best coalition to join. Previous work into QCGs has investigated the computational complexity of determining which is the best coalition to join. We plan to expand on this work by investigating the computational complexity of computing agent power in QCGs as well as by showing that insincere strategies, particularly bribery, are possible when the envy-freeness assumption is removed but that it is computationally difficult to identify the best agents to bribe.
Schlagwörter: 
Bribery
Coalition Formation
Computational Complexity
JEL: 
C63
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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