Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/71916 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2007-01
Verlag: 
University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance, Innsbruck
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naive advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas subjects who observe others' past behavior before making their decision do only have a temporary advantage over uninformed subjects. We show in a simulation that the latter result is due to subjects failing to make the most out of observing others.
Schlagwörter: 
social learning
advice
observational learning
beauty-contest game
JEL: 
C70
C72
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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