Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/71093 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapier No. 126
Publisher: 
Helmut-Schmidt-Universität - Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre, Hamburg
Abstract: 
We apply ideas put forward in the literature on the international coordination of macroeconomic and trade policies to study the merits of an international coordination of antidoping policies. Without international coordination of antidoping policies, sports associations and national anti-doping agencies that comply to an international regulatory framework like the World Anti Doping Code are at a disadvantage. We sketch a simple game-theoretic model to illustrate this disadvantage, and the advantage of an international coordination of antidoping policies. Finally, we address the limitations of our model and how it could be extended in future research.
Subjects: 
Anti-Doping
Policy Coordination
Duopoly model
JEL: 
L83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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