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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CAE Working Paper No. 09-09
Verlag: 
Cornell University, Center for Analytical Economics (CAE), Ithaca, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
Firms often give away free goods with the product that they sell. Firms often give stock options to their top management and other employees. Mixing these two practices-giving stock options to consumers who buy the firm's product-, creates a deadly brew. Large numbers of consumers can be lured into buying this product, giving the entrepreneur huge profits and the consumers a growing profit share. But this is a camouflaged Ponzi that will ultimately crash. By analogy it is argued that the common practice of giving stock options to employees can be a factor behind financial crashes.
Schlagwörter: 
marketing
stock options
financial scams
product bundling
JEL: 
M30
G18
G32
L20
D92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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