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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2012,029
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
We experimentally manipulate the efficiency of trust and reciprocity in a modified Investment Game. The aim of our manipulation is to test whether reciprocity is mainly affected by payoff consequences of trust or by intentions underlying it. We find that intentions matter and that consequences have an asymmetric impact: trustees reward trust more when trust is more efficient but do not adjust rewards to the efficiency of their own actions. As a result, profitability of trust is fostered by efficiency of trust as well as by efficiency of reciprocity. However, trustors do not fully exploit the high efficiency gains offered by investments and display only moderate trust.
Schlagwörter: 
trust and reciprocity
other-regarding
preferences
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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