Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70116 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CFR Working Paper No. 09-15 [rev.]
Publisher: 
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Cologne
Abstract: 
Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were frequently violated and that the strategic timing of trades and reports was common. Event study abnormal returns are larger after reports of strategic insider trades than after reports of otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Our results also imply that delayed reporting is detrimental to market efficiency and lend strong support to the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Subjects: 
insider trading
directors' dealings
corporate governance
market efficiency
JEL: 
G14
G30
G32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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