Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/69424 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7183
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
While strong social ties help individuals cope with missing institutions, trade is essentially limited to those who are part of the social network. We examine what makes the decision to trust a stranger different from the decision to trust a member of a given social network (a friend), by comparing the determinants of these two decisions for the same individual. We implement a binary trust game with hidden action in a lab-in-the-field experiment with residents of an informal housing area in Cairo. Our results show that trust is higher among friends than among strangers and that higher trust among friends is related to the principal's belief of trustworthiness. However, on average a principal underestimates her friend's trustworthiness leading to inefficient outcomes. Our findings suggest that even within a social network, trade may often be limited to exchanges with few information asymmetries.
Schlagwörter: 
trust
social distance
hidden action
solidarity
economic development
JEL: 
C72
C93
D82
O12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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