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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 373 Discussion Paper No. 2002,71
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants' support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo. We show that beside profit differences the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.
Schlagwörter: 
cooperation
experiment
public good
free-riding
punishment institution
JEL: 
H41
D70
C92
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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