Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62714 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 373 Discussion Paper No. 2001,45
Publisher: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Berlin
Abstract: 
We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players.
Subjects: 
beauty contest experiments
individual behavior
JEL: 
C72
C91
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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