Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62200 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 373 Discussion Paper No. 2000,109
Publisher: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Berlin
Abstract: 
Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining situations we can say which of the two (two-dimensional) power constellations is better and thereby derive the power structure endogenously. By distinguishing various measures of (evolutionary or reproductive) success we can identify the forces shaping the relative power indices of trade unions.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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