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dc.contributor.authorMerkl, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorvan Rens, Thijsen
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-07-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-15T07:38:26Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-15T07:38:26Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201203145670en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58497-
dc.description.abstractFirms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standard search models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired. We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphic to a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selective hiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costs of unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequally across workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfare is lower if hiring is selective.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x6294en
dc.subject.jelE24en
dc.subject.jelJ65en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordlabor market modelsen
dc.subject.keywordwelfareen
dc.subject.keywordoptimal unemployment insuranceen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkttheorieen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsucheen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsnachfrageen
dc.subject.stwPersonalauswahlen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtsanalyseen
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosenversicherungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSelective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn715288660en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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