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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2011,020
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates since they care more or less for the various qualities of the candidates. It is assumed that all evaluators submit vector bids assigning a monetary bid for each possible rank order. The rules must specify for all possible vectors of such vector bids the collectively binding rank order of candidates and the payments for this bid vector and its implied rank order. Three axioms uniquely define the procedurally fair ranking rules. We finally discuss how our approach can be adjusted to situations where one wants to rank only acceptable candidates.
Schlagwörter: 
social ranking
fairness
fair game forms
objective equality
mechanism
design
committee decision making
JEL: 
C70
C72
D63
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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