Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56823 
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dc.contributor.authorAngelova, Veraen
dc.contributor.authorRegner, Tobiasen
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-30-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:26:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:26:58Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56823-
dc.description.abstractThe market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned, when fees are used by financial institutions to steer advice. We experimentally investigate whether voluntary contract components can reduce the conflict of interest and increase truth telling of advisors. We compare a voluntary payment upfront, an obligatory payment upfront, a voluntary bonus afterwards, and a three-stage design with a voluntary payment upfront and a bonus after. Across treatments, there is significantly more truthful advice when both clients and advisors have opportunities to reciprocate. Within treatments, the frequency of truthful advice is significantly higher when the voluntary payment is large.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2012,011en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelG20en
dc.subject.jelL15en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfinancial advisorsen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agenten
dc.subject.keywordsender-receiver gameen
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary paymenten
dc.subject.stwAnlageberatungen
dc.subject.stwHonoraren
dc.subject.stwKapitalanlageen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleDo voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn689524307en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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