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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Voorneveld, Mark | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kets, Willemien | en |
dc.contributor.author | Norde, Henk | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-28T13:07:54Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-28T13:07:54Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56259 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholm | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x589 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Minimal curb sets | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Consistency | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Axiomatisierung | en |
dc.title | An axiomatization of minimal curb sets | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 481104410 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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