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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 570
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
We model networks of relational (or implicit)contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions change under different network configurations and information transmission technologies. In our model, relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its ability to enforce cooperative agreements that could not be sustained if agents had no access to other network members' sanctioning power and information. We identify conditions for network stability and in-network information transmission as well as conditions under which stable subnetworks inhibit more valuable larger networks.
Schlagwörter: 
Networks
Relational Contracts
Peering
Indirect Multimarket Contact
Information transmission
Social Capital
JEL: 
D23
D43
L13
L29
O17
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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