Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53272 
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dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen
dc.contributor.authorSung, Shao Chinen
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-21-
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:32:16Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:32:16Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53272-
dc.description.abstractWe show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x52.2011en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCoreen
dc.subject.keywordHedonic Gamesen
dc.subject.keywordMonotonicityen
dc.subject.keywordStable Setsen
dc.titleSize monotonicity and stability of the core in hedonic games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn664548083en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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