Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49871 
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dc.contributor.authorHarrington, Joseph Emmetten
dc.contributor.authorSkrzypacz, Andrzejen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-19-
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-27T15:21:06Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-27T15:21:06Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49871-
dc.description.abstractMotivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements used in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics |cBaltimore, MDen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x555en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titlePrivate monitoring and communication in cartels: Explaining recent collusive practices-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn607470526en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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