Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/47319 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2008,13
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
We set up a sequential merger game to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there is an antitrust authority present to approve mergers, and there is a sufficient alignment of interests between the antitrust authority and the firms. We point out three distinct motives for not merging: the external-effect motive, the bargaining-power motive, and the pill-sweetening motive.
JEL: 
L11
L13
L41
G34
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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