Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43787 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers No. 399
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a 'double stable' matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.
Subjects: 
Matching with couples
(Maskin) monotonicity
Nash implementation
Stability
Weakly responsive preferences
JEL: 
C62
C78
D78
J41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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