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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43781
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Inoue, Tomoki | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-01-24T10:22:58Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-01-24T10:22:58Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-14901 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43781 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a pure exchange economy with finitely many indivisible commodities that are available only in integer quantities. We prove that in such an economy with a sufficiently large number of agents, but finitely many agents, the strong core coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations. Because of the indivisibility, the preference maximization does not imply the cost minimization. A cost-minimized Walras equilibrium is a state where, under some price vector, all agents satisfy both the preference maximization and the cost minimization. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefeld | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Papers |x417 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C71 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D51 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Indivisible commodities | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Strong core | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Cost-minimized Walras equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Core equivalence | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gleichgewichtstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Core | en |
dc.subject.stw | Marktmechanismus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unteilbarkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 616897057 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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