Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38993 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3041
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes tax competition when welfare maximizing jurisdictions levy source-based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose tax-efficient capital-to-debt ratios. Under separate accounting, multinationals shift debt from low-tax to high-tax countries. The Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods. Under formula apportionment, the country-specific capital-to-debt ratio of a multinational's affiliate is independent of the jurisdiction's tax rate. Public good provision is either too large or too small. If the debt externality is not negative, there is clearly underprovision under formula apportionment.
Subjects: 
multinational enterprises
financial policy
profit shifting
corporate taxation
tax competition
JEL: 
F23
H25
H42
H73
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size
255.66 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.