Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38863 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2008,50
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Abstract: 
We develop a dynamic model of political competition. Each party has a policymotivated ideological wing and an office-motivated opportunistic wing. A blockade arises if inner-party conflict stops policy implementation. We use this model to study whether early elections should be used to overcome a blockade. They have the advantage that urgent decisions are no longer delayed, and the disadvantage that unsuccessful governments gain additional time in office. This may give rise to a time inconsistency. Voters are in favour of a constitution without early elections. However, in the middle of a political crisis, they are willing to abandon it.
Subjects: 
early elections
political blockades
JEL: 
D82
D72
D61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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