Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38689 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CSIO Working Paper No. 0064
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO), Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes simultaneous ascending auctions of two different items, viewed as complements by multi-item bidders. The finding is that such auctions overly concentrate the goods to a multi-item bidder and never overly diffuse them to single-item bidders. The main reason is that some bidders strictly want to jump-bid and jump-bidding allows the game to mimic a package auction, where single-item bidders cannot fully cooperate among themselves to bid against multi-item bidders. The second reason is that over-concentration causes resale and there is an equilibrium where a multi-item bidder becomes the reseller and chooses to under-sell the goods.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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