Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37132 
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dc.contributor.authorClements, Matthew T.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-21-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-03T13:11:29Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-03T13:11:29Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37132-
dc.description.abstractIf a product has two dimensions of quality, one observable and one not, a firm can use observable quality as a signal of unobservable quality. The correlation between consumers' valuation of high quality in each dimension is a key determinant of the feasibility of such signaling. A firm may use price alone as a signal, or price and quality together. Both signals tend to be used when the market is very uninformed, whereas price signaling alone tends to be used when the market is moderately informed. If high observable quality is inexpensive to provide, then it cannot signal high unobservable quality, and low observable quality is always an indication that unobservable quality is high.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2010-20en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelL15en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSignalingen
dc.subject.keywordqualityen
dc.subject.stwProduktqualitäten
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Preispolitiken
dc.subject.stwKonsumentenverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleLow quality as a signal of high quality-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn631457763en
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.enen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201020en

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